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ABSTRACT
The global financial system is an intricate network of networks, and recent financial
crises have laid bare our insufficient understanding of its complexity. In response,
within the five chapters of this thesis we study how interconnectedness, interdepen-
dency and mutual influence impact financial markets and systemic risk.
In the first part, we investigate the community formation of global equity and cur-
rency markets. We find remarkable changes to correlation structure and lead-lag
relationships in times of economic turmoil, implying significant risks to diversifica-
tion based on historical data.
The second part focuses on banks as creators of credit. Bank portfolios generally
share some overlap, and this may introduce systemic risk. We model this using Eu-
ropean stress test data, finding that the system is stable across a broad range of
asset liquidity and risk tolerance. However, there exists a phase transition: If banks
become sufficiently risk averse, even small shocks may inflict great losses. Failure to
address portfolio overlap thus may leave the banking system ill-prepared.
vi
Complete knowledge of the financial network is prerequisite to such systemic risk anal-
yses. When lacking this knowledge, maximum entropy methods allow a probabilistic
reconstruction. In the third part of this thesis, we consider Japanese firm-bank data
and find that reconstruction methods fail to generate a connected network. Deriving
an analytical expression for connection probabilities, we show that this is a general
problem of sparse graphs with inhomogeneous layers. Our results yield confidence
intervals for the connectivity of a reconstruction.
The maximum entropy approach also proves useful for studying dependencies in fi-
nancial markets: On its basis, we develop a new measure for the information content
in foreign exchange rates in part four of this thesis and use it to study the impact of
macroeconomic variables on the strength of currency co-movements.
While macroeconomic data and the law of supply and demand drive financial mar-
kets, foreign exchange rates are also subject to policy interventions. In part five,
we classify the roles of currencies within the market with a clustering algorithm and
study changes after political and monetary shocks. This methodology may further
provide a quantitative underpinning to existing qualitative classifications.
vii
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
With his work “The Theory of Speculation”[Bachelier, 1900], the French mathemati-
cian Louis Bachelier laid the ground work for some of the most important and influen-
tial results in quantitative finance. In order to value stock options, that is, contracts
that give the buyer the right to sell or purchase a security at a fixed price and date,
Bachelier described the price movement of that security St as a random walk:
dSt = a dt+ b dWt, (1.1)
where t is time and Wt a stochastic process. Based upon this work, Black and Scholes
[1973] developed the theory for derivative pricing which has become indispensable in
modern finance. Eq. (1.1) is equivalent to Brownian motion with a drift, named after
botanist Robert Brown and successfully explained by Albert Einstein1.
“The same equations have the same solutions”, Richard Feynman reminded his
students in his famous lectures [Feynman et al., 1971], and it is equations like Eq. (1.1)
that offer physicists a natural connection to quantitative finance. As a result, equity
and foreign exchange markets have historically been the main focus of econophysics.
In addition to the mathematical connection, their abundance of time series data pro-
vided resources to study the distribution of asset returns, the properties of correlation
matrices and the agent based modeling of trading activity.
1 The movement of stock prices turns out to be better described by Geometric Brownian Motion
(GBM) of the form dSt = aSt dt + b St dW . GBM has the desirable property that the relative
change in stock price, or return, is independent of price. It also ensures positive prices.
2In the past few years, this focus has shifted away from equity and foreign exchange
markets, triggered in no small part by the global financial crisis of 2008 and the ensu-
ing European sovereign debt crisis of 2011. The former chair of the Federal Reserve
Board of Governors, Janet Yellen, summarized the causes of the global financial crisis
five years after it started as follows2:
Losses arising from leveraged investments caused a few important, but
perhaps not essential, financial institutions to fail. At first, the dam-
age appeared to be contained, but the resulting stresses revealed exten-
sive interconnections among traditional banks, investment houses, and the
rapidly growing and less regulated shadow banking sector.
In other words, the high interconnectedness of the financial system had brought with
it a build-up of a critical level of systemic risk. This systemic risk had not been
properly monitored or regulated and caused much larger and more widespread dam-
age than expected. The large societal cost of the crisis demonstrated the need to
better understand the dynamics of the financial system, in particular its complexity.
Therefore, in recent years more and more researchers have directed their attention to
the question of financial stability, recognizing that the intricate topology of financial
systems needs to be modeled as a complex network.
1.1 Outline
Chapters 2 through 6 contain the main contributions of this dissertation. Each chap-
ter is written as a self-contained paper, providing its own introduction, overview of
the methodology, analysis and conclusion. While these chapters can be read in any
order, it is recommended to follow the order presented in this thesis as each chapter
builds upon ideas and methodologies from the previous ones.
2 https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/Yellen20130104a.pdf
3Chapter 2 analyzes the community formation in global financial markets using
methods from network science. The co-movement of financial indicators like stock
prices or foreign exchange is typically measured through Pearson’s correlation coef-
ficient. Here, this approach is used to create and analyze a network from over 50
countries. This chapter is a lightly edited version of the paper “Community Analysis
of Global Financial Markets”, coauthored with Irena Vodenska, Di Zhou, Dror Y.
Kenett, H. Eugene Stanley and Shlomo Havlin. It appeared in Risks 2016, 4(2), 13
[Vodenska et al., 2016b]. The research shows that community structures and lead-lag
relationships for correlation measures change remarkably in times of turmoil. This
calls into question diversification and risk management based on historical data.
Chapter 3 focuses on banks as creators of credit and on portfolio overlap as a source
of systemic risk. Even if banks are diversified, their portfolios generally overlap to a
certain degree, and this may be a source of systemic risk for two reasons. One, a shock
to the system may affect a large number of financial institutions at once. Two, in
an effort to rebalance their portfolios, banks may inadvertently put more pressure on
a distressed asset, potentially causing a fire sale and a downward spiral. Using data
from the stress test performed by the European Banking Authority, the response of
financial institutions to adverse financial conditions is modeled. The results indicate
the financial system is stable across a broad range of asset liquidity and risk tolerance.
There exists, however, a phase transition, and if banks turn risk averse, even small
shocks have the potential to inflict great losses. While regulating banks individually
is sufficient in favorable economic conditions, the research presented suggests that
failure to address portfolio overlap and correlations leaves the banking systems ill-
prepared for adverse conditions. At the time of this writing, the paper reprinted
in this chapter is under review for the Journal of Financial Stability, following the
Second Conference on Network Models and Stress Testing for Financial Stability in
4Mexico City in September 2017.
Chapter 4 summarizes a forthcoming paper regarding the reconstruction of bipar-
tite networks using methods of maximum entropy. Studies of systemic risk typically
require complete knowledge of the network, which is typically unobtainable or only
available for historic data. In this case, one can resort to maximum entropy methods
like the Bipartite Configuration Model which reconstruct the network in a probabilis-
tic sense from marginal information. The network of Japanese banks and firms is
considered as an example to show the successes and limitations of maximum entropy
reconstruction methods. The empirical study of this network and the analytical cal-
culations show that sparse networks with heterogenous layers may leave many nodes
unconnected. This thesis provides confidence intervals for a successful reconstruction
in terms of network structure and node properties. Originating from the principle of
maximum entropy, the work described in this chapter forms a link between network
science approaches to financial markets and stability in the first part of the thesis and
the following chapters focusing on foreign exchange markets. Therein, the concept of
maximum entropy in a slightly different context.
In Chapter 5, titled “Information Transmission Channels of the Foreign Exchange
Network”, the foreign exchange market is interpreted as a network. This leads to
the development of a new measure for the co-movement of assets with which the
information content in a currency pair is quantified. The results indicate that this
maximum entropy based measure is strongly impacted by macroeconomic data like
trade volume or interest rates. Since the work described herein is at the time of this
writing under preparation for publication, methods are described and developed in
more detail than a research paper allows.
While macroeconomic data and the law of supply and demand generally drive
the foreign exchange market, currency rates are subject to policy interventions by
5central banks. Chapter 6 furthers the analysis of currencies by studying how this
affects the FX market. With a clustering algorithm, roles of currencies in the market
are classified, and it is studied how they change after political and monetary shocks.
This methodology may further be useful to provide a quantitative underpinning to
existing qualitative classifications in the FX market. The chapter is a slightly edited
version of the paper titled “Political and Economic Effects on Currency Clustering
Dynamics”, which is forthcoming in Quantitative Finance, co-authored with Marcel
Wollscha¨ger, Irena Vodenska, H. Eugene Stanley and Rudi Scha¨fer.
Finally, a summary of the previous chapters and concluding remarks are offered
in Chapter 7.
6Chapter 2
Community Analysis of Global Financial
Markets
We analyze the daily returns of stock market indices and currencies of 56 countries
over the period of 2002-2012. We build a network model consisting of two layers,
one being the stock market indices and the other the foreign exchange markets. Syn-
chronous and lagged correlations are used as measures of connectivity and causality
among different parts of the global economic system for two different time intervals:
non-crisis (2002-2006) and crisis (2007-2012) periods. We study community forma-
tions within the network to understand the influences and vulnerabilities of specific
countries or groups of countries. We observe different behavior of the cross corre-
lations and communities for crisis vs. non-crisis periods. For example, the overall
correlation of stock markets increases during crisis while the overall correlation in
the foreign exchange market and the correlation between stock and foreign exchange
markets decrease, which leads to different community structures. We observe that
the euro, while being central during the relatively calm period, loses its dominant
role during crisis. Furthermore we discover that the troubled Eurozone countries,
Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain, form their own cluster during the crisis period.
72.1 Introduction
Financial crisis can cause substantial damages and economic losses not only locally,
but also in other countries through trade relations, currency policies, financial con-
tracts, and cross-country investments. Some examples of such crises are the 1997
Asian financial crisis, 1998 Russian bond crisis, 2001 dot-com bubble, 2007-08 global
financial crisis, and 2010 EU sovereign debt crisis, all spilling over to various parts
of the world. Similar to the transmission of a disease, small financial shocks initially
affecting only a particular sector of the economy or geographic region can spread to
other economic sectors and other countries with quite healthy economic outlook [Lin
et al., 1994].
Many research studies have examined the connections among countries by explor-
ing correlations of various financial time series data [Smith, 2009, Forbes and Rigobon,
2002, Flavin et al., 2002, Solnik et al., 1996, Ramchand and Susmel, 1998, Boyer et al.,
2006, Bonanno et al., 2000, 2003, 2004, Sheedy, 1998, Meese, 1990, Longin and Solnik,
1995, Arshanapalli and Doukas, 1993, Kenett et al., 2010, 2011, 2012b, Onnela et al.,
2003, Sandoval Jr and Franca, 2012, Sandoval Jr, 2014, Curme et al., 2014, Aste et al.,
2010, Tumminello et al., 2007]. Moreover, many studies have analyzed relationships
between stock and foreign exchange markets, given the significant increase in global
capital flows in the last two decades [Dornbusch and Fischer, 1980, Dooley and Isard,
1982, Morley, 2002, Nieh and Lee, 2002, Bae et al., 2003, Gagnon and Karolyi, 2006,
Cappiello and De Santis, 2005, Granger et al., 2000, Pan et al., 2007, Ning, 2010,
Zhao, 2010, Katechos, 2011, Lin, 2012]. Other studies have focused on global stock
market return predictability offering diverse findings across different regions and time
periods [Cohen and Frazzini, 2008, Cochrane, 2008, Fama and French, 1988, 1989,
Welch and Goyal, 2008, Ferson and Harvey, 1993, Dahlquist and Hasseltoft, 2013,
Breen et al., 1989, Harvey, 1991, Bekaert et al., 2009, Rapach et al., 2013].
8There have been dramatic advances in the field of complex networks in many
research fields. The world-wide-web, the Internet, highway systems, and electric
power grids are all examples of networks that can be modeled using coupled systems
[Baraba´si and Albert, 1999, Buldyrev et al., 2010, Mantegna, 1999, Watts and Stro-
gatz, 1998, Albert and Baraba´si, 2002, Amaral et al., 2000, Li et al., 2015, Kenett
et al., 2012a], where the connectivity between network components is essential. Simi-
larly, the economic system is composed of many agents, interacting at different levels.
The agents in the system could be individual traders, firms, banks, financial markets,
or countries, hence the global financial system can be well represented by using a
complex network model. Recently, researchers have used network theory to study
economic systems as well as systemic risk propagation through the financial network
[Billio et al., 2012, Gai et al., 2011, Anand et al., 2012, Haldane and May, 2011, Bat-
tiston et al., 2012a, Huang et al., 2013, Schweitzer et al., 2009, Glasserman and Young,
2015, Acemoglu et al., 2015, 2012, Dehmamy et al., 2014b, Ellis et al., 2014]. In this
chapter, a two-layer interdependent network is developed and analyzed, where each
layer represents a different financial market and interactions exist not only within the
same market, but also between the two layers. Because of these interdependences,
failure in a certain network node can trigger global systemic risk and crisis propaga-
tion to other nodes in the network. This study comprises major global stock market
indices and their corresponding currencies as the two layers in our coupled network
model.
Stock markets are a common trade place for company shares thus reflecting com-
panies’ performances and investors’ perceptions of company values. Moreover, stock
markets are considered leading economic indicators and therefore useful as predictors
of the economy. The foreign exchange market is the largest financial market in the
world, with market participants actively involved in currency trading 24 hours a day
9except weekends, with daily turnover of over 5 trillion US dollars, according to the
Bank for International Settlements [BIS Monetary and Economic Department, 2013].
These two financial markets capture important aspects of a country’s economic sta-
tus, and therefore, we use them as a centerpiece of our research. We use a complex
network approach to model the interaction between stock and foreign exchange mar-
kets to capture the topology as well as the dynamics in this coupled financial system.
We study 56 stock market indices and 45 distinct currencies since 12 of the countries
in our data set use the euro as their official currency. The analysis reveals novel
insights and interesting features of the interactions among global stock and currency
markets. We divide the entire period of 2002 to 2012 into two time intervals, non-
crisis (2002-2006) and crisis (2007-2012) periods. The research presented here finds
that correlations exhibit different behavior during the crisis period such as higher
stock market correlations and lower foreign exchange correlations when compared to
the non-crisis period.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: The data set and the methods
are described in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 presents the correlation-based community
analysis results for two different sub-periods, the non-crisis period (2002-2006) and
the crisis period (2007-2012); Section 2.4, provides a discussion of the findings.
2.2 Materials and methods
2.2.1 Data
We acquired the data from the Boston University Bloomberg terminal provided by
Bloomberg L.P. for academic research. In our analysis, we used a time range of 11
years from January 1st, 2002, to December 31st, 2012, with daily frequency. We
used the daily closing price. Weekends were excluded, and for holidays we repeated
the closing price of the previous day. We selected 56 representative countries, which
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included developed as well as emerging countries. The list of the countries in the data
set can be found in the appendix in Table A.1.
When a country has more than one well-known major stock market index, the
following criteria were used to select the most representative index: first we selected
the stock market indices that are widely used in the financial industry, and from
that subset, we selected the index that includes most of the companies listed on the
respective exchange, covering mostly large capitalization stocks and in some instances
including some mid or small capitalization stocks as well. Using this criteria, we have
selected one single index for each country, such as the S&P 500 for the US, Nikkei
225 for Japan, STI for Singapore, etc.
For the foreign exchange rates, we used the closing mid price, which is the average
of the closing bid and ask prices. The foreign exchange market convention is for the
majority of the currencies to be expressed in terms of USD, except for the British
pound, Australian dollar, New Zealand dollar, and the euro that are all expressed
as USD per currency. For consistency, these four currencies were converted to be
expressed in terms of USD. For any country in the eurozone that had adopted the
euro at a later date than January 1st, 2002, we kept the separate currencies up to the
date before the actual euro adoption, and replaced them with euro after the adoption
day. This accounts for the somewhat independent movement of these currencies
before the adoption of the euro [Slovenska, 2005, OECD, 2004]. Examples include
the Maltese lira and Slovak koruna, which were replaced by the euro on January 1st,
2008, and January 1st, 2009, respectively.
In order to also include the US dollar as part of our analysis, we have expressed all
currencies as currency over SDR. The SDR is an international reserve asset, created by
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1969 to supplement its member countries’
official reserves. At the time of the analysis, its value was based on a basket of four key
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international currencies, and SDRs could be exchanged for freely usable currencies.
Though it is not a currency, per se the SDR can be used as a currency unit in our
study [Frankel and Wei, 1993, Frankel et al., 1995]. The IMF fixes the value of one
SDR in terms of US dollars daily.
2.2.2 Pearson correlation analysis
For all analyzed time-series, first the logarithmic returns were obtained as follows:
S(t) is the value of the time series at time t, where t = 1, 2, . . . , N , and N = 2866 days
is the size of the time series. The logarithmic return of time series i is
Ri(t) = lnSi(t)− lnSi(t− 1). (2.1)
We then rescaled Ri(t) to have zero mean and unit standard deviation,
ri(t) =
Ri(t)− 〈Ri〉
σi
, (2.2)
where 〈Ri〉 and σi are the mean value and standard deviation of time series i.
For stock market indices, the dimension of the logarithmic return time series
matrices is 56×2865. For foreign exchange markets, it is 45×2865 since all Eurozone
countries are grouped together. We calculated the cross-correlation matrix C, and
the value of each entry cij as follows,
cij = 〈rirj〉, (2.3)
where cij represents the Pearson correlation between rescaled logarithmic return time
series for a pair of countries i and j.
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2.3 Results
2.3.1 Pearson correlation analysis
In order to see how the cross-correlation trends change with time, we divided the data
into 11 annual periods. Figure 2·1(a) shows a heat map of the yearly stock market
correlations. The x-axis represents the years, and the y-axis shows the 1540 unique
pairwise correlations, excluding the diagonal of the correlation matrix. We used the
color bar to show the magnitude of the correlations, where red means c = 1 and the
two series are perfectly positively correlated, while blue means c = −1 and the two
series were perfectly negatively correlated. Green means c = 0, or the two series were
not correlated.
Figure 2·1(a) indicates that the overall correlation of the global stock markets
trended upward starting in 2006, reached its peak in 2008, and stayed at a high level
thereafter. These increasing correlation trends match the global financial crisis of
2007-2008 and could possibly be regarded as indicators of increased co-movements
heading towards financial crisis.
In Figure 2·1(b), the heat map for foreign exchange markets is plotted. It was
generated in the same way as the heat map for the stock markets; however the number
of entries is lower due to the lower number (45) of distinct currencies among the 56
countries. Hence, 990 distinct correlations make up the currency correlation matrix,
excluding the diagonal. Generally foreign exchange markets showed stronger correla-
tion compared to stock markets. It seems that the overall foreign exchange correlation
fell during the financial crisis period, contrary to the stock market correlation trend.
2.3.2 Summary statistics
To study the statistical characteristics of the correlations, we calculated the mean
and the standard deviation of any of the correlation distributions for the 11 years for
13
(a)
(b)
Figure 2·1: Heat maps of the annual Pearson correlations for 2·1(a)
stock markets and 2·1(b) foreign exchange markets logarithmic returns.
For the stock markets, we considered all 56 countries; for the foreign
exchange markets, we considered the 45 distinct currencies. The color
shows the value of the correlations for different years, where red indi-
cates strong positive correlation, blue indicates strong negative corre-
lation, while green means that the correlation is weak.
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Figure 2·2: (a) Annual mean correlation and (b) annual standard
deviation for stock markets (x), foreign exchange markets (+), and be-
tween stock and foreign exchange markets (o). The stock markets were
more correlated during the crisis period, whereas the foreign exchange
market correlation were higher in the non-crisis period. The correla-
tion between stock and foreign exchange markets was lowest during the
crisis. The standard deviation for both, stock and foreign exchange
markets remained fairly constant, while the standard deviation for the
interlayer correlations increased.
all 3 cases, including Pearson correlations for stock market layer, currency layer, as
well as inter-layer correlations.
Figure 2·2 shows that the mean value of stock market correlations reached a peak
during the crisis period (2007-2012). This finding suggests (similar to Fig. 2·1(a))
that during crisis the overall correlation increased and the stock markets tended to
move together. This could be due to portfolio re-balancing, reducing equity market
exposures and increasing allocations in the bond market. Such re-balancing in global
portfolios occurs across different countries and produces declining stock market trends
internationally.
On the contrary, the means of the foreign exchange market Pearson correlations
were low during the crisis period, while they peaked during the non-crisis period. This
finding suggests that in general the correlations among currencies are low during crises
and high during non-crisis periods, contrary to the stock market behavior. For both,
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Stocks Currency
2002–2006 2007–2012 2002–2006 2007–2012
Mean 0.175 0.315 0.370 0.318
Standard Deviation 0.208 0.249 0.260 0.279
Minimum −0.320 −0.340 −0.155 −0.575
Maximum 0.965 0.966 1.000 1.000
Table 2.1: Statistics for the pre-crisis and the crisis periods.
however, the standard deviation of the correlations remained fairly constant, which
suggests uniform increase (decrease) of the correlations in the stock markets (foreign
exchange markets) throughout the entire time period.
In order to confirm this qualitative description that the means of the correlation
were in fact different for the years in the calm period and for the years in the crisis
period, we performed Student’s t-test. The null hypothesis was that the annual mean
correlations were the same for both periods and that any differences come from the
standard deviation. We applied the two-sample Student’s t-test. It rejected the null
hypothesis that the two means were equal, and the p-value was 0.0002/ Thus the
alternative hypothesis of unequal means was accepted.
The mean value of Pearson correlations between stock and foreign exchange mar-
kets exhibited a local minimum during the crisis period, which could be interpreted
as positive stock market returns corresponding to currency appreciations. Overall
the interlayer correlation did not change much throughout the entire period. The in-
crease in standard deviation, however, indicates a larger spread in correlation values
between the two layers during the crisis.
We distinguisheded between two different markets in our analysis, the network
of stock market indices and the network of foreign exchange markets. Besides their
obvious differences, the two markets also exhibited different correlation distributions,
as visual inspection of Figures 2·1(a) and 2·1(b) hints. Performing the two-sample
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Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (K-S test) confirmed this, with the null hypothesis being
that the two sample data were from the same continuous distribution. The K-S test
rejected this null hypothesis at a significance level α = 0.001. Therefore we concluded
that the correlation distributions of stock markets and of foreign exchange markets
were different.
2.3.3 Community formation and cluster analysis
In our analysis we focused on two periods: a period of relative economic calmness
(2002-2006) and a period of economic crisis (2007-2012). Using the correlation infor-
mation, we depicted the network structure of the stock markets and of the foreign
exchange markets for each of these time periods. Since countries have different peak
trading times due to their respective geographical locations and different time zones,
lagged correlations allow to infer information about regional influences. We separated
the 56 countries and 45 currencies into 3 groups according to their geographical lo-
cation. When we considered synchronous correlations, we used the returns at time
t for every country. In that case, the Asian markets are the first to trade, then the
European markets, and finally the American markets. A shock originating in the US,
for example, would then not show its immediate effect on the other markets because
the stock markets in other parts of the world were closed for most or all of the trading
hours of the NYSE. When we considered lagged correlations, we used the returns at
time t for the American countries and at time t + 1 for the other countries of the
world. In that case, it is as if the American markets were first to trade, followed by
the Asian and then the European markets. A shock from the US would then be very
visible. For both, the stock and the foreign exchange markets, we first considered
the synchronous correlations and then compared the results to those of the lagged
correlations.
We used Planar Maximally Filtered Graphs (PMFG) [Tumminello et al., 2005,
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Di Matteo et al., 2010] to study the properties of stock and foreign exchange market
correlations. PMFG is useful for filtering meaningful correlations from the bulk of
the 1540 correlation pairs, as it suppresses small correlations while maintaining the
overall network structure. In order to build the graph, we ordered the correlations cij
from largest to smallest. First, the pair with the largest correlation was connected.
In subsequent steps we connected the countries i, j under the condition that a link
between them maintained the planar structure of the graph; if it did not, the pair
was skipped. This procedure resulted in an adjacency matrix with unweighted links
from which the graph is plotted. We used Wolfram Mathematica to investigate the
communities in the network, which were detected with respect to their modularity.
Stock markets
Synchronous correlations. Figure 2·3(a) shows the PMFG for the period from
2002 to 2006, where we identified 5 clusters which seemed to be organized by geo-
graphical locations. The cluster on the top left was led by Singapore, a financial hub,
and Saudi Arabia, which connected to many other OPEC countries in the cluster.
The second Asian cluster was centered around Hong Kong and Japan. The third
cluster contained smaller European countries, organized around the Scandinavian
countries. The fourth cluster contained the major European economies, except for
Italy and Germany which were closely connected to the American countries in the
fifth cluster, particularly through ties to the US and Canada. These four countries
exhibited particularly strong connections within and, in case of Germany and Italy,
to countries outside the cluster. The communities changed significantly during the
crisis period, where Singapore and Hong Kong led a large Asian cluster, as illustrated
in Figure 2·3(b). The American cluster formed during the non-crisis period became
more mixed during the crisis period, as Norway, Iceland and Russia became part of
this cluster. The change in the community comprised of mostly American countries
18
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Figure 2·3: Planar maximally filtered graph (PMFG) for the stock
markets obtained using synchronous correlations during (a) the eco-
nomically calm period and (b) crisis period. The countries are denoted
by their three-letter symbols and are color-coded according to their ge-
ographical locations: green for Asia, light blue for Europe and orange
for the Americas. For the calm period, we detected five large clus-
ters which are mostly geographically divided. The clusters significantly
changed during the crisis period. Most notably the troubled Eurozone
countries, Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal, formed their own cluster.
The Asian countries formed one larger cluster centered around Hong
Kong and Singapore. We also observed a smaller cluster containing a
diverse group of less connected countries.
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suggests that Italy and Germany influenced the performance of the American markets
in the non-crisis period, while during the crisis period, Norway and Russia seemed to
increase their influence. The majority of the European countries, connected through
France, formed another cluster, strongly linked to the countries in the American clus-
ter. These observations are in line with the coordinated responses to the crisis from
the US, large European economies, and the ECB; at the same time the Asian coun-
tries do not become more closely connected to them. Most notably, however, two new
clusters appeared: one with the troubled Eurozone countries Portugal, Italy, Greece
and Spain, and another consisting of rather less connected countries like Slovakia,
Mauritius and Tunisia.
Lagged correlations. As pointed out before, lagged correlations are an important
measure to study the influences of financial markets. They allow to consider effects
originating in one region and spreading to another. We considered the correlation
calculated for the returns for the Americas at time t, and for Asia and Europe at
time t+ 1. In other words, we focused on how the index movements in the Americas
would affect the index movements in the rest of the world. Please note that such a
procedure does not change the correlations within one geographical region, nor could
the correlations between Asian and European countries change. However, due to the
PMFG algorithm, larger correlations that appeared for countries in the Americas
with countries in the rest of the world changed the structure of the network.
The European clusters remained mostly unchanged in the calm period, except
that Germany and Italy no longer formed a community with American countries,
when considering lagged correlations compared to synchronous correlations. Since
here we considered the Americas at time t and Europe and Asia at time t + 1, it
seems that the American countries, including the US, did not affect Italy and Ger-
many significantly. The Netherlands, Italy, France, and the Scandinavian countries
20
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Figure 2·4: Planar maximally filtered graph (PMFG) for the stock
markets obtained using lagged correlations during (a) the economically
calm period and (b) crisis period. The countries are denoted by their
three-letter symbols and are color-coded according to their geographical
locations: green for Asia, light blue for Europe and orange for the
Americas. For the calm period, we observed four large clusters, while
in the crisis period the number of communities changed to three, as the
two European clusters merged.
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still manifested themselves as the most connected European countries. We did, how-
ever, observe large changes in the American cluster on the very right in Figure 2·4(a);
Australia and New Zealand, economically close to the US, moved from the Asian
community to connect more tightly to the American countries. Different responses
by central banks, leading to higher interest rates particularly in Australia, can be
considered a reason for this [Rodriguez, 2012]. They were joined by smaller coun-
tries, such as Sri Lanka and the Philippines, that we had previously identified as
countries with weak links to other Asian countries. The Asian cluster was led by Sin-
gapore, Hong Kong and Japan, which displayed the most significant correlations to
countries outside of their community. The community structure changed significantly
during the years of economic turmoil in Figure 2·4(b). Most obviously, the number of
communities reduced to three because the two European clusters from the non-crisis
period mostly merged. Netherlands, United Kingdom and France were at the center
of the European community in the crisis period. Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain
were found at the periphery of this cluster. Using synchronous correlations, Germany
and Netherlands were tightly connected to the American cluster during the crisis pe-
riod, while when considering lagged correlations, they belonged to the large European
cluster. We observed that Japan, Australia and New Zealand, among others, formed
a community with the American countries during the crisis, which suggests that the
major financial markets in the Pacific followed the trends of the American stock mar-
kets. The importance of the US stock market is emphasized by the largest number of
connections in this cluster. Australia was the second most connected country in this
community.
Foreign exchange markets
While we analyzed a total of 56 global stock market indices, we only investigated 45
currencies because 12 countries in our data set use the euro.
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Synchronous correlations. Figure 2·5(a) shows the dominant role that the euro
played in Europe prior to the crisis. Together with the Danish krone, pegged to the
euro via the European Exchange Rate Mechanism, the euro was connected with all
European currencies, and it exhibited close ties to the Canadian dollar, the Australian
dollar, and the New Zealand dollar. With 19 links each, the node for the euro and the
node for the US dollar showed the highest interconnectedness among all currencies in
the calm period. The US dollar is at the center of the cluster comprised of the majority
of the American currencies and the oil-exporting countries. In Figure 2·5(b) we
observed that the clear structure and hierarchy of the European community during the
calm period fell apart during crisis. In addition, a fourth cluster appeared, comprised
of European and South and Central American currencies, like the Brazilian real,
the Mexican peso and the Chilean peso, which had been closely connected to the
US dollar in the non-crisis period. As the financial crises unfolded, the Fed and its
European counterparts employed “quantitative easing” as monetary policy, which in
turn elicited strong criticism in the BRIC countries, as QE corresponded to currency
devaluation [Blackden, 2012]. The US dollar maintained its strong ties with the
currencies of oil-exporting countries. Its cluster was joined by the Japanese yen and
the Chinese yuan. China moved to a managed floating regime during the crisis period
[Reuters, 2012], whereas the Japanese government tried to stimulate its economy with
policies similar to QE, known as “Abenomics” [BBC, 2011].
Lagged correlations. In Figure 2·6(a), using lagged correlations during the non-
crisis period, we observed that the Euro was at the center of the cluster of European
currencies. The Japanese yen joined this cluster. The US dollar and the currencies of
the Asian (Middle Eastern) oil-exporting countries no longer shared close ties. Fig-
ure 2·6(b) reveals that during the crisis period there was a mixed cluster comprised of
all the American currencies and a group of Asian currencies, including India, Singa-
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Figure 2·5: Planar maximally filtered graph (PFMG) for the foreign
exchange markets obtained using synchronous correlations during (a)
the economically calm period and (b) crisis period. The currencies
are denoted by their three-letter symbols and color-coded according to
their geographical locations: green for Asia, light blue for Europe, or-
ange for the Americas. For the calm period, we detected three large
clusters. Most distinctive was the European cluster shown on the right,
with the euro and the Danish krone, which is pegged to the euro, at
the center. The Asian countries split in two different clusters, with ma-
jor oil-exporting countries being closely associated with the US dollar
which were at the center of its community. The remaining Asian coun-
tries formed the third cluster. During the crisis, the hierarchy of the
euro cluster collapsed. The community around the US dollar still con-
tained the oil-exporting countries. It was joined by the Chinese yuan
and the Japanese yen. The Brazilian real, Mexican peso and Chilean
peso, however were no longer part of the US dollar-centered community
during the crisis period.
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Figure 2·6: Planar maximally filtered graph (PMFG) for the foreign
exchange markets obtained using lagged correlations during (a) the
economically calm period and (b) crisis period. The currencies are de-
noted by their three-letter symbols and color-coded according to their
geographical locations: green for Asia, light blue for Europe, orange for
the Americas. For lagged correlations we used time t for the Americas
and time t+1 for Europe and Asia. For both periods, we detected three
large clusters. In the non-crisis period we observed that the clusters
were determined by the geographical currency location, except for the
Japanese yen, New Zealand dollar and Australian dollar. Iceland ap-
peared in the predominantly Asian cluster, while Malaysia, the Philip-
pines and Indonesia were part of the American community. During the
crisis period the interconnectedness between American and South East
Asian currencies increased as they belonged to the same community.
The purely Asian cluster comprised the Japanese Yen along with the
currencies of the oil-exporting countries. The Russian ruble joined the
European cluster.
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pore and Korea, while the South East Asian currencies formed their own community
using synchronous correlations, as observed in Figure 2·5(b). The number of connec-
tions of the nodes comparing the two different periods remained stable; the majority
of the currencies did not gain or lose more than two connections. Instead we find that
different connections developed within the clusters. For example, Hong Kong lost the
link with countries like India and Russia during the crisis, but became more closely
connected to Singapore, the Philippines and Thailand.
Any currency is traded during every hour of the day, and therefore any sudden
changes should be reflected in all the currencies on a time scale shorter than one full
day. In fact, one would expect the strong correlations to correspond to shorter time
scales. Hence the community structure of the currencies is depicted by synchronous
correlations, while when using lagged correlations the true structure of the network
disappears.
2.4 Discussion
In this study, we have investigated the daily logarithmic returns in the stock and
foreign exchange markets of 56 countries and 45 currencies. We have used network
theory and community analysis to understand the structure of the coupled financial
network formed by global stock market indices and currencies. We defined weighted
links within a network layer and between the two layers (stock markets on one hand
and currencies on the other) using Pearson correlation. The overall correlations within
stock markets increase during the crisis period, and the overall correlations within for-
eign exchange markets, as well as the correlations between stock and foreign exchange
markets decreased during this period. We have investigated statistical properties of
our results by presenting correlation summary statistics and performing the K-S test
to closely study the characteristics of the correlation distributions. We applied the
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PFMG method to discover distinct community formations and categorize the coun-
tries into clusters. We identified the importance of the countries according to their
relative positions in the communities and the strength of their links with other mem-
ber of the community as well as the strength of their external links with countries
that do not belong to their cluster. In our analysis, we have distinguished between
synchronous and lagged correlations. We divided the countries in three geographical
regions, Asia, Europe and Americas. To study lagged correlations, we considered the
returns at time t in the Americas, and the returns at time t + 1 in Asia and Eu-
rope. The comparison of the network and community structures allowed us to infer
influences from one region to another, in both, crisis and non-crisis periods. Using
synchronous correlations we have identified five clusters in the stock market during
the non-crisis period. These clusters changed their structure during the crisis period,
where, for example, four of the five troubled Eurozone countries, Portugal, Italy,
Spain and Greece, formed their own community. In the case of lagged correlations,
we observed four clusters in the stock market layer during the non-period period and
only three communities during the crisis period. We observed that the American
countries are most closely connected to Asian countries. The introduction of a time
lag and the onset of the crisis caused the European countries to become more tightly
connected. Unlike stock markets that are bound to different time zones, currencies
trade around the clock. Any influences among currencies are immediately reflected in
their returns, hence synchronous correlation define the true network structure of the
foreign exchange markets. We observed that the Euro played a central role among
the European currencies during the non-crisis period, while it lost its central position
during the crisis-period. The US dollar was closely linked to the currencies of the
major oil-exporting countries, both, during non-crisis and crisis periods.
These findings could have policy implications and could be helpful for central
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bankers, policy makers and regulators, offering a tool for identifying tightly related
communities of countries by stock market performance and by currency dynamics.
If for instance a financial crisis originates in a specific country, the most vulnerable
countries, where the crisis might spread first, are the countries with stronger links
with the originating country, most likely belonging to the same community. If policy
makers have knowledge of these communities, they might be able to focus needed
bailout funds or implement temporary preventative measures in the most vulnerable
countries, thus reducing the impact of inherent global financial crisis to the rest of
the world and preventing the propagation of the crisis before severe damages cripple
the entire economic system.
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Chapter 3
Overlapping Portfolios: a Source of
Systemic Risk
Stability of the banking system and macroprudential regulation are essential for
healthy economic growth. In this chapter we study the European bank network
and its vulnerability to stressing different bank assets. The importance of macro-
prudential policy is emphasized by the inherent vulnerability of the financial system,
high level of leverage, interconnectivity of system’s entities, similar risk exposure of
financial institutions, and susceptibility for systemic crisis propagation through the
system. Current stress tests conducted by the European Banking Authority do not
take in consideration the connectivity of the banks and the potential of one bank
vulnerability spilling over to the rest of the system. We create a bipartite network
with bank nodes on one hand and asset nodes on the other with weighted links be-
tween the two layers based on the level of different countries’ sovereign debt holdings
by each bank. We propose a model for systemic risk propagation based on common
bank exposures to specific asset classes. We introduce the similarity in asset distribu-
tion among the banks as a measure of bank closeness. We link the closeness of asset
distributions to the likelihood that banks will experience a similar level and type of
distress in a given adverse scenario. We analyze the dynamics of tier 1 capital ratio
after stressing the bank network and find that while the system is able to withstand
shocks for a wide range of parameters, we identify a critical threshold for asset risk
beyond which the system transitions from stable to unstable.
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3.1 Introduction
In today’s interconnected world the financial system with increased global reach is
becoming more vulnerable to international corporate, household, and sovereign ex-
posures. Drawing national business boundaries for banks has become a difficult task.
Even though in general banks still have significant exposures to domestic economies,
the largest financial institutions have a substantial international presence. Systemic
risk describes the vulnerability of a system, like the bank network, as a whole to
exogenous and endogenous shocks. If not understood and closely monitored, these
shocks can wipe out significant parts of a system. Therefore, monitoring the vulner-
abilities of banks globally is highly important for policymakers. Stress tests are an
important tool for determining the fragility of banks under adverse scenarios. While
there are many factors that determine the health of financial institutions, (i) adequate
level of capital and (ii) high quality liquid assets are two main aspects to consider
when assessing banks’ stability. Additionally, (iii) examining the interconnectivity
among banks plays an important role in determining the macroprudential fragility of
the network.
In this paper we address all three important factors from above and demonstrate
that if banks are well capitalized, hold liquid high quality assets, and maintain well-
balanced portfolios in relation to other banks, we can expect better overall stability
of individual banks as well as the banking system as a whole. While the first two
factors are well studied (Moyer [1990], Beltratti and Stulz [2012], Calice et al. [2013],
Distinguin et al. [2013], Miles et al. [2013], Bank [2014], DeYoung and Jang [2016]),
we offer a novel insight into the importance of the network structure and dynamics
of the system of international financial institutions through the study of the third
factor.
We propose a bipartite network model of banks on one hand and assets on the
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other and test the stability of the network under specific adverse scenarios. The links
between the banks are established indirectly through common exposures to asset
classes such as corporate loans or commercial real estate loans, and the weights of
the links are approximated based on bank exposures to sovereign debt of different
countries. Our model has two parameters: (i) size of the initial shock to the banking
system, and (ii) spreading or spillover parameter, which we identify as a measure of
systemic risk. The initial shock reduces bank capital or increases the risk weights of
bank assets. Both types of shocks cause a deterioration in the tier 1 capital ratio,
which is used as benchmark to assess proper capitalization of financial institutions.
This deterioration prompts a response from the affected banks which can further
distress other parts of the system. We confirm, in accordance with Eisenberg and
Noe [2001] and Glasserman and Young [2015], that any spillover effect in a linear
system is not significant, and it is bounded by the initial shock to the system, i.e., no
systemic effect is observed through network spreading dynamics. To investigate the
conditions when systemic risk propagates through the banking network, we introduce
non-linearity in our model. We simulate a non-linear bank response to a loss of equity
or an increase of specific asset risk weights. In the non-linear scenario, we observe
increased fragility of the banking system. The spreading parameter which describes
asset vulnerability to risk is a critical parameter that separates the stable from the
unstable regime of the system.
3.2 Literature review
Central banks often work in concert to steer the financial system towards stability.
Just recently, researchers from 13 central banks joined efforts to study data from 25
different markets to understand how to reconstruct exposures in financial networks
(Anand et al. [2017]). Financial crises such as the sub-prime credit crisis of 2007-2009
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and the European sovereign debt crisis of 2010-2012 have revealed weaknesses in bank
risk management practices as well as softness in the global regulatory framework. As
a response to the economic system instabilities, regulators have focused on strength-
ening liquidity and capital requirement rules to increase the stability of the financial
system and reduce the possibility of major negative impact on global economy (Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision [2010], Congress [2010])
The Basel Committee on Bank Supervision has developed the first Basel Capital
Accord in 1988 to address apprehensions arising from financial deregulation. The
Basel III accord (endorsed by the G20 countries in November 2010) responds to the
need for effective regulation to maintain the stability of the financial system in times
of economic downturns, such as the financial crisis of 2007-2009. More specifically,
Basel III calls for improvement in quantity and quality of capital, redefines tier 1
capital, weighs on banks’ risk management, and calls for capital buffer requirements
to increase the stability of the entire financial system (macroprudential regulation).
Previous Basel regulations (I and II) have focused on the stability of the financial
system’s entities (microprudential regulation), disregarding the systemic risk and the
vulnerability of the financial system to cascading failures. Similarly to Basel I and
II, Basel III maintains the requirement that banks hold total capital of 8 percent of
their risk-weighted assets (RWA). One of the main differentiating aspects of Basel III
however is the introduction of a more stringent definition of tier 1 capital as a “going-
concern” capital comprised mostly of common equity (common stock, common stock
surplus, and retained earnings). Additionally, according to Basel III, 75 percent of
the total banks’ capital should consist of tier 1 capital. Common equity tier 1 capital
should account for at least 4.5% of RWA of the bank.
The RWA are fundamental input for Basel III capital requirements and are deter-
mined by an internal rating-based (IRB) approach that assesses counterparty credit
32
risk (CCR). The majority of banks use external credit ratings attributed to their
counterparties. Large banking institutions, however, may choose to use internal risk
models to determine the capital needed to offset specific RWA, based on their esti-
mates of exposures to loss or likelihood of loan defaults (King and Tarbert [2011],
Padgett [2012]).
One of the challenges in macroprudential regulation is proper risk assessment of
financial institutions and ensuring that, on a systemic level, the risk of network failure
is minimized. Since the bank risk is based on exposures to different sectors of the
main economy as well as the liquidity of the rest of the financial system, having an
accurate assessment of asset risk factors as well as ensuring high quality tier 1 capital
is essential. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision introduced the Basel III
reforms in 2010 to address the vulnerabilities in the financial system focusing on
the liquidity requirements expressed through the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR)
and the Net Stable Finding Ratio (NSFR). Basel III stirred numerous arguments
between supporters of the reforms who argue that Basel III will increase the stability
of the financial system and opponents who claim that the reform will reduce credit
availability and economic activity (Admati et al. [2011], Admati and Hellwig [2011],
Allen et al. [2012], King [2013], Miles et al. [2013])
Given that certain banks are allowed to use internal models for calculating risk-
weighted assets (RWA), and hence influence their tier 1 capital ratios, it is not always
possible to state the proper capitalization of banks with great confidence. The banks
can influence tier 1 capital ratios by holding assets weighted with a low risk that
actually have higher risk. Additionally, there is a risk that asset risks might change
over time. Moreover, correlations of banks’ shared portfolios are prone to increase
and contribute to higher risk in the banking system (Engle [2009], Acharya et al.
[2014], Caccioli et al. [2014b], Brownlees and Engle [2015], Corsi et al. [2016]).
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The establishment of the European Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) in
November 2014 opened a new era of bank supervision in the euro zone. The in-
tention of the SSM has been to harmonize key areas of bank supervision and to
contribute significantly towards the safety and resilience of the European banking
system. By conducting a comprehensive assessment of 130 banks in the euro area,
the European Central Bank (ECB) has addressed several important objectives includ-
ing: (i) strengthening bank balance sheets, (ii) enhancing transparency and improving
quality of information regarding bank conditions, as well as (iii) building confidence
by assuring banks’ appropriate capitalization after completion of necessary corrective
actions. The 130 banks, involved in the comprehensive assessment, account for e22
trillion total assets or over 80% of total assets in the SSM as of December 2013 (Au-
thority [2016]). Similar efforts to regulate the financial system have been made in the
US, most prominently in form of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010 (Congress [2010]) Just recently though, there have been sig-
nificant efforts by the new US administration to revoke some of the regulations put in
place by this bill (Rapperport [2017]). This shows that there is a significant political
component to regulation, specifically regarding how much or how little regulation is
appropriate. The focus, however, should not necessary be on more or less regulation,
but rather better regulation in order to curb banking crises or reduce systemic distress
in the financial network.
This is all the more urgent as banking crises have been more frequent than ex-
pected in both developed and emerging market economies with an annual probability
of a crisis of approximately 4-5 % (Walter [2010]).
Stability of financial institutions has attracted the attention of many economists
who have offered insight into financial system fragility, measures of systemic risk as
well the impact of regulation on systemic risk. In addition to central banks’ stress
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test methodologies, Acharya et al. [2014] have proposed an alternative approach to
measuring systemic risk (SRISK) by offering an insight into how much capital a
financial institutions will need to raise during economic crisis to bring their capital
up to regulatory levels.
Comparison studies between regulatory stress tests and stress tests that use only
public market data reveal that approaches used to weight assets by risk are not cor-
related with market measures of risk. The well capitalized banks also have not fared
better than the rest of the European banks in light of the European sovereign debt
crisis of 2011 (Acharya et al. [2012, 2014], Lucas [2014a]). On the other hand, Yan
et al. [2012] find Basel III reforms to have significant long-term positive effects on
the UK economy. Lucas argues that in addition to financial institutions, which are
tightly interlinked with the main economy, the Government is also a significant source
of systemic risk. While other factors such as lack of transparency of government ac-
tions and the scope of government’s involvement in financial markets can contribute
to overall systemic risk buildup in the economy, a notable systemic characteristic of
the government is its enormous size as financial conglomerate. When considering
the traditional credit programs, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the Federal Home Loan
Banks, deposit insurance, the Federal Reserve System, and the Pension Benefit Guar-
antee Corporation, the government becomes a $20 trillion financial institution (Lucas
[2014b]). The government, on the other hand, can also serve as an essential contrib-
utor to financial stability in times of crises undertaking appropriate actions carried
out swiftly. Both aspects of government, carrying significant costs, may contribute to
rethinking the notion that government debt is risk-free and hence reconsider sovereign
debt risk weights used to determine banks’ RWA.
To incorporate the complexity of the financial system, interdisciplinary approaches
have been proposed. Understanding the interconnections among financial institutions
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as well as interlinks between bank networks and the main economy have been a focus
of many researchers during the past two decades starting with Eisenberg and Noe
[2001] and Furfine [2003]. Using tools from network science, researchers have studied
the likelihood of contagion (Upper [2011], Glasserman and Young [2015]), developed
systemic risk measures (Battiston et al. [2012b]), and analyzed specific banking sys-
tems (Van Lelyveld and Liedorp [2006], Upper and Worms [2004]). Other approaches
include the study of robustness, the cost of repair, and topological properties and
their consequences for systemic risk (Garlaschelli and Loffredo [2004, 2005], Elsinger
et al. [2006], Caldarelli [2007], Iori et al. [2008], Huang et al. [2011], Vitali et al. [2011],
Battiston et al. [2012a], Dehmamy et al. [2014a,b], Joseph et al. [2014], Piˇskorec et al.
[2014], Battiston et al. [2016], Majdandzic et al. [2016], Vodenska et al. [2016a]).
Following a shock, the natural response of financial institutions includes reducing
losses by selling assets, which most likely trade at depressed prices: due to the dis-
tress, liquidity may dry out and a lack of buyers reduces market value. (Huang et al.
[2013], Greenwood et al. [2015]). Previous studies have considered fire sale dynam-
ics, in which banks attempt to unload their assets as efficiently as possible, leading
to a downward spiral exacerbated by overlapping portfolios (Duarte and Eisenbach
[2015], Cont and Schaanning [2017]). We expand upon this approach and introduce
a behavioral component by including the risk tolerance of banks, modeling finan-
cial institutions’ inclination to induce a fire sale. We suggest that by being able to
monitor the dynamics of links in the bank network, regulators might be able to fore-
see specific bank network vulnerabilities in light of certain exogenous or endogenous
economic shocks.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: In Section 3.3 we describe the data
that we use for empirical analysis. In Section 3.4 we introduce the simulation model
of systemic risk propagation through the bipartite network of banks and assets, while
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in Section 3.5 we present the results of the simulation using the European Banking
Authority stress test results data. Here we highlight the effect of inter-connectivity of
the banks through shared portfolio networks. In Section 3.6 we discuss the regulatory
implications of our results and offer our concluding remarks.
3.3 Data
We use the data from the 2011 European Banking Authority (EBA) stress test. The
data from the EBA offers insight into asset portfolios of European banks. It shows
the total exposure of 90 different banks in the following seven investment categories:
sovereign debt, financial institutions, corporate, retail residential mortgage, retail
revolving, retail small and medium-sized enterprises (retail SME), and commercial
real estate (CRE). Figure 3·1 shows the structure of the banks’ holdings. For each of
the seven asset classes we plot the histogram of the percentage they make up in the
banks’ portfolios.
We observe that banks tend to hold large amounts of corporate loans and assets
in the residential retail sector. Sovereign debt and loans to the financial sector play
a smaller roll, while retail revolving, retail SME, and commercial real estate tend to
make up the smallest part of the banks’ portfolios. This is reflected by the means, in-
dicated by dotted lines in the plot. An average bank portfolio is comprised of roughly
14% sovereign debt, 15% loans to financial institutions, 30% loans to corporate, 26%
residential mortgage, 3% revolving retail, 5% retail SME and about 7% commercial
real estate. The data set also details which kind of country’s sovereign debt each bank
holds. These countries include 30 European nations, the United States and Japan as
well as a category “other”.
Fig. 3·2 represents a network representation of the portfolio similarity of the
banks. Since all banks exhibit a certain overlap in portfolio, we filter the network
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Figure 3·1: Histograms of bank holdings where the x-axis is the per-
centage of a bank’s portfolio an asset makes up. The dotted line indi-
cates the mean value of the distribution.
using a method introduced by Tumminello et al. [2005]. Such a planar maximally fil-
tered graph (PMFG) reduces the number of edges for information filtering and better
graphical representation. A link, drawn in gray, between two banks indicates that
there exists a significant overlap between their respective sovereign debt portfolios.
The minimum spanning tree Kruskal [1956] of the graph is indicated by the thicker,
solid edges. We define the overlap of two portfolios as their cosine similarity: given
portfolios A and B with weights ai, bi distributed among asset classes i = 1, . . . , N
and ΣNi ai = Σ
N
i bi = 1, the cosine similarity is given by
similarity =
∑N
i=1 aibi√∑N
i=1 a
2
i
√∑N
i=1 b
2
i
, (3.1)
which is the normalized inner product of the relative weights of portfolio A with the
relative weights of portfolio B.
This product yields a number between 0 and 1 where a value of 0 means that
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portfolio A does not contain any asset that is in portfolio B and vice versa, and a
value 1 means that both portfolio holders allocate their money equally among the
available assets. The size of the nodes and their color correspond to the value of all
assets in the respective bank’s portfolio and to the country or region in which it is
headquartered.
The largest banks by asset value are positioned at the center of the minimum
spanning tree. The French bank Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale, which is the 11th largest bank,
has the most, 13, connections to non-domestic banks. The French bank BNP Paribas
(2nd largest), the Belgian bank Dexia (17th largest), and the British bank HSBC
(largest bank in the data set) follow in second place with 10 connections to banks
from other countries. We can roughly separate the banks into two groups. On the one
hand we have around 20 of the largest banks which show significant portfolio overlap
with banks from other countries, indicating a broad and international portfolio of
sovereign debt. On the other hand we find the remaining banks sharings a larger
overlap with banks from their own country or neighboring countries. For example,
sovereign debt holdings by Danish banks tend to be more similar to sovereign debt
holdings of other Scandinavian banks as compared to the portfolios of banks from
other European countries. These home and regional biases may be due to regulatory
requirements such as Basel II, which have allowed to favor domestic sovereign debt1,
and probably reflect the focus of a bank’s business operations.
The EBA data also details the tier 1 capital ratios of banks which is defined as
the ratio of tier 1 equity and the sum of the risk-weighted assets of a bank. The
risk-weighted assets of a bank are calculated by weighting the exposure to an asset
by an estimate of their riskiness. Until 2013 Basel III has required banks to maintain
a tier 1 capital ratio of at least 4.5 percent at all times. In line with the phase-in
1 http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128b.pdf
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Figure 3·2: PMFG (Planar Maximally Filtered Graph) and MST
(Minimum Spanning Tree) network showing portfolio overlap in
sovereign debt of European banks, including British and Irish banks
(bright red), French banks (blue), banks from the Benelux countries (or-
ange), German banks (yellow), Austrian and Eastern European banks
(gray), Spanish and Portuguese banks (light red), Italian banks (crim-
son red), Greek, Maltese and Cypriot banks (purple), and Scandinavian
banks (light blue). The size of the node represents the value of all as-
sets a bank. The largest banks are at the center of the network. We
observe that banks from the same country cluster, indicating that their
portfolios are similar due to home and regional bias.
arrangements of the Basel III framework2, the requirements are currently higher than
that; however we recognize that we need to compare the situation of the banks in
our data set with the regulations at the time. The 2011 EBA report includes two
banks that have a capital of less than 4.5 percent already, however, which we have to
remember in the analysis of the results of our simulations. These banks are the Allied
Irish Banks (tier 1 capital ratio of 3.7%) and the Spanish Caja de Ahorros (3.8%).
Hypo Real Estate exhibits the largest value among all banks, with a tier 1 capital
ratio of 28.4 percent. The mean and median capital ratio of the banks in the data
set are 9.3 percent and 8.7 percent, respectively.
2 http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3/basel3 phase in arrangements.pdf
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3.4 Simulation model
β = 1 2 3 4
. . .
NB
s = 1 2 3
. . .
NSD
Figure 3·3: Bipartite network of the banks β and sovereign debts s.
While the EBA data details the origin of sovereign debts in a bank’s portfolio, it
does not identify the origin of other assets, that is, financial institutions, corporate,
retail residential mortgage, retail revolving, retail SME, and commercial real estate.
We make the assumption that the distribution of sovereign debts of a given bank is
a good proxy for the entire portfolio of that bank. In other words, if half of a given
bank’s sovereign debt exposure comes from German bonds, we assume that also half
of its exposure to financial institutions, corporate, etc., comes from Germany. The
static balance sheet and distribution of bank portfolio assumptions are based on the
bank balance sheet characteristics, where the credit exposures that banks have on one
hand (the asset side) and the financing, i.e. short and long term debt on the other
(the liability side) of the balance sheet are usually quite stable over extended periods
of time. Bank leverage (or the equity level of the bank) is also quite invariant and it
is regulated by international regulatory frameworks such as Basel III.
This allows us to construct a complete bipartite network, in which banks and assets
interact back and forth, as illustrated for the case of sovereign debts in Figure 3·3.
Let us first define variables on the bank layer and the asset layer, and then the risk
propagation procedure.
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3.4.1 Modelling a bank’s Exposure
A bank β ∈ [1, 2, 3, · · · , NB(= 90)] is invested into different asset subcategories a ∈
[1, · · · , NA(= 7)] from different countries s ∈ [1, · · · , NSD = 32]. We define the
following financial variables for bank β:
Aβ NA × NSD matrix detailing the exposures to different asset classes
from different countries:
Aβ =

Sβ,1 · · · Sβ,NSD
Aβ,2,1 Aβ,2,2
...
. . .
Aβ,NA,1 Aβ,NA,NSD

Countries
Asset Classes
Sβ,s The first row of the matrix Aβ, contain the exposure to all sovereign
debt SD held by this bank. An individual sovereign debt s is there-
fore Sβ,s = (Aβ)1,s.
Cβ tier 1 capital.
Wβ Sum of risk-weighted assets (RWA).
Rβ tier 1 capital ratio, Rβ = Cβ/Wβ.
The RWA of a bank β in the data are calculated according to Basel III. We instead
make use of a weighted sum as our definition of RWA:
Wβ = W
SD
β +W
other
β =
NSD∑
s=1
rsSβ,s +
NSD∑
s=1
NA∑
a=2
wa,s (Aβ)a,s , (3.2)
where rs denotes the risk factor (weight) of the SD s and wa,s for a ≥ 2 are the
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risk factors of other assets from different countries. Cash is an important part of any
bank’s assets. It, however, presents no risk, and is therefore absent in this summation.
The weights for the RWA are estimated using an optimization procedure against the
reported aggregated holdings of risk-weighted assets. While debt with longer maturity
poses less immediate risk, in this study we use a simple sum of all holdings, regardless
of their maturity.
3.4.2 Modeling sovereign debts and other assets
The EBA data details the country of origin of the sovereign debt. We assign the
following variables for sovereign debt s, where s is again the indicator for the country
of origin:
Ss Total exposure, owned by all the banks in our database, Ss =
ΣNBβ=1Sβ,s.
rs Risk factor, rs = w1,s. Before shock, r1 = r2 = · · · = r
Ds Yearly average of the CDS spread.
Q(Ds) Spreading parameter; Q(Ds) = 1 − 2−Ds/100, so that Q(0) = 0,
Q(100) = 0.5, as shown in Figure 3·4.
We use the following variables for assets from the other subcategories:
Aa,s Total exposure to all assets from asset category a from country s,
owned by the all banks in our database, Aa,s = Σ
NB
β=1 (Aβ)a,s.
wa,s Risk factor. Before shock, wa,1 = wa,2 = · · · = wa
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Qa Spreading Parameter for a given asset class; constant across all coun-
tries.
As pointed out before, the data regarding the exposure to other asset classes than
sovereign debt come in aggregate form. In other words, while we know (Aβ)a, we
infer (Aβ)a,s from the sovereign debt holdings.
Figure 3·4: Spreading parameter Q(Ds) where Ds is the CDS spread
in basis points for a given sovereign debt s. We choose a the transfor-
mation Q(Ds) = 1 − 2−Ds/100 such that its value is between 0 and 1
and that a spread of 100 basis points corresponds to a value of 0.5. A
CDS spread of 0 corresponds to a Q value of 0, and as the CDS spread
grows, Q approaches 1. Note the similarity of the function Q(Ds) with
the default probability derived from a CDS spread for some maturity
and recovery rate as outlined in Chan-Lau [2006].
3.4.3 Iteration model
We run simulations for different crisis scenarios. One, we shock the sovereign debts
of a given country by increasing their risk factors. The only interaction occurs be-
tween banks and sovereign debts; the other asset categories are unaffected. Two, we
shock any sector of a given country by increasing its risk factor, and we include the
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a Item wa range Aa wa waAa
1 Sovereign Debt [0.002, 0.1] 27,267 0.002 55
2 Financial institutions [0.5, 1.0] 25,044 0.5 12522
3 Corporate [0.5, 1.3] 61,237 0.5 42866
4 Retail: Residential Mortgages [0.5, 0.8] 36,663 0.5 14665
5 Revolving [0.8, 1.2] 23,153 0.8 18522
6 SME [1.0, 1.3] 3,467 1.0 3467
7 Commercial real estate [1, 2] 22,228 1.0 22228
Total RWA W , according to Eq. (3.2) 114325
Table 3.1: Weighted-Average model for the risk-weighted Asset. The
values for the exposure to different asset classes are for bank No.1,
AT001. We present an example calculation for risk weights at the lower
end of the range determined by our optimization procedure.
possibility of spillover to other asset classes. The sector suffering the initial shock can
be any of the seven asset categories, from sovereign debt to commercial real estate.
Three, we shock the banks in a given country by decreasing their capital by a certain
percentage.
Shocking sovereign debts
We simulate a crisis scenario which starts with sovereign debts. We consider ten
different shock origins:
(1) GIIPS (Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, Spain)
(2) Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia,
Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia)
(3) Benelux (Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg)
(4) Greece
(5) Italy
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(6) France
(7) Germany
(8) Spain
(9) US
(10) Japan
The simulation process is as follows: Upon initialization, an SD or a set of SDs from
the countries of origin above has their risk factor increased at t = 0.
1. At t = 1, these shocks on SDs are propagated to the banks who own those
SDs. As a result of the increased risk factors, the RWA of the affected banks is
increased and their tier 1 capital ratio decreased.
2. At t = 2, those shocks on the banks are propagated back to SDs. A bank that
is affected by the shock in the previous step might be forced to take action,
putting pressure on the SDs in its portfolio. The risk factors of all SDs owned
by affected banks are therefore increased, depending on the decrease in the tier
1 capital ratio of those banks.
3. At t = 3, shocks on SDs are propagated to banks, in a manner much like the
step t = 1. The propagation continues back and forth between SDs and banks
for t = 4, 5, . . . .
The capital Cβ of bank β remains constant throughout the simulation run. Therefore
the change tier 1 capital ratio is entirely determined by the change in the RWA.
As described above, we model the risk propagation from the banks to the SD s
(at t = 2, 4, 6, . . . ) through the increase in risk factors. Each SD s contributes to the
risk-weighted assets W SDβ of bank β, and thus each bank holding an affected SD will
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see an increase in their RWA proportional to its exposure to this SD. The exposures
from other sectors also contribute to the risk-weighted assets W otherβ of each bank.
These, however, will remain unchanged:
rs(t+ 1) = rs(t) /Ωs(t), (3.3)
wa,s(t+ 1) = wa,s(t), (3.4)
where
Ωs(t) = 1−Q(Ds)
1−
NB∑
β=1
Sβ,s P
(
Rβ(t)
Rβ(t− 1)
)
NB∑
β=1
Sβ,s
 (3.5)
with no changes on the bank side, that is, in Cβ. The value for the risk weights is
capped at rmax = 2.
P (x) is a function which allows us to model the bank response to distress. The
argument x is the fraction of capital tier 1 ratio left after a shock with respect to the
tier 1 capital ratio in the previous time step; accordingly 1 − x is the relative loss
in one time step. Our analysis considers two broad cases: banks that are risk averse
and react to a deterioration of their tier 1 capital ratio accordingly on one hand, and
banks that are risk neutral on the other.
Risk attitudes correspond to different curvatures of the utility function. For pay-
offs, a concave utility function describes to risk aversion (Kahneman and Tversky
[1979], Shefrin and Statman [1985]); for losses, the utility function of a risk averse
agent therefore is convex. Functions of the form Max [1− (1− x)α, 0] are convex,
linear, or concave on the interval 0 to 1 depending on the choice of α. For simplicity,
we consider a linear approximation,
Pα(x) = Max [1− α (1− x), 0] (3.6)
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for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 as the possible bank response functions to a decrease in tier 1 capital
ratio. In this case Eq. (3.5) simplifies to
Ωs(t) = 1− αQ(Ds)
1−
NB∑
β=1
Sβ,s
Rβ(t)
Rβ(t− 1)
NB∑
β=1
Sβ,s
 (3.7)
In our analysis we focus on the cases α = 1 which we call the linear case (risk neutral
attitude) and α = 2 which we call the steep case (risk averse attitude). The linear case
implies that a bank will find a 20% drop in tier 1 capital ratio twice as bad as a 10%
drop in tier 1 capital ratio. In the steep case, losses would be perceived much more
negatively, modeling a larger sensitivity to losses. Therefore the steep function causes
a more drastic effect given the same decrease in tier 1 capital ratio. Alternatively,
the impact of the parameter α can be interpreted as follows: α determines for which
value x the function P (x) reaches the minimum value of zero, the worst case scenario.
The larger α, the smaller the decline in tier 1 capital ratio that corresponds to the
worst case scenario.
Equations (3.5) and (3.7) incorporate the CDS spread in basis points Ds. As a
bank suffers from an increase in their RWA and a decrease in tier 1 capital ratio, it
is reasonable to assume that this will affect debts of different quality differently. The
higher the spread is for a sovereign debt, the more its risk weight will increase for the
next simulation step. If the SD has a low spreading parameter, it will not be very
affected by the banks’ financial condition. With this, we model that Greek debt, for
example, will deteriorate more given additional market stress than German debt. We
refer to Q(Ds) as the spreading parameter.
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Figure 3·5: The reduction factor P (x) in Eq. (3.5). The dotted curve
shows the linear case, and the solid curve shows the steep case.
The change in risk factors leads in Eq. (3.4) changes the RWA as follows:
W SDβ (t+ 1) =
NSD∑
s=1
Sβ,srs(t) /Ωs(t), (3.8)
W otherβ (t+ 1) = W
other
β (t). (3.9)
Shocking other asset categories
In this crisis scenario, an asset category is being shocked, and there will be spill-over
to other asset categories. The simulation process can then be described as follows.
We initialize an asset categories in a country or a set of countries to have its risk
factor increased at t = 0. We consider the same 10 scenarios as in the previous case.
1. At t = 1, these shocks on assets are propagated to the banks who own those
assets. As a result of the increased risk factors, the RWA of the affected banks
is increased and their tier 1 capital ratio decreased.
2. At t = 2, those shocks on the banks are propagated back to assets. A bank
that is affected by the shock in the previous step might be forced to take action,
putting pressure on all their assets in its portfolio. We emulate this by increasing
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the risk factors of the assets that the affected bank holds, depending on how
many of these assets the bank holds and how much its tier 1 capital ratio has
decreased. Unlike in the previous scenario where the increase in risk factor was
limited to sovereign debts, that is, the asset class in which the shock started, in
this scenario the risk weights of all assets of affected banks will increase.
3. At t = 3, the increased risk factors across all asset classes lead to a new, higher
value for the risk-weighted assets of the banks. Just like in step t = 1, this
causes a further decrease in tier 1 capital ratio. The propagation continues
back and forth until the system saturates.
The capital Cβ of bank β remains constant throughout the simulation run.
As pointed out before, it is likely that a stress to a bank’s portfolio originating
from some of its exposures will lead to adjustments across all asset classes. In that
case the shock propagation will not only change the risk factors for sovereign debts,
but it will also affect the risk factors for the remaining asset classes. Again, we allow
a maximum value of 2 for the risk weights. Extending the shock propagation, we
rewrite Eq. (3.4) as follows:
rs(t+ 1) = rs(t) /Ωs(t),
wa,s(t+ 1) = wa,s(t) /Ωa(t), (3.10)
where Ωa(t) is extended to the case of non-SDs:
Ωa(t) = 1− αQa
1−
NB∑
β=1
Aβ,a
Rβ(t)
Rβ(t− 1)
NB∑
β=1
Aβ,a
 . (3.11)
Like its counterpart for sovereign debts, the shock parameter will depend on the
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other asset classes through the asset-specific holdings of a bank Aβ,a and the equivalent
of a spreading parameter, Qa. Recall that we have chosen to set Qa to be the same
for all countries.
In the same way as Q(Ds) models the susceptibility of sovereign debt s to de-
teriorating market conditions, Qa describes how strongly asset class a is affected by
a reduction in tier 1 Capital of banks exposed to it. If we set Qa = 0, we recover
Eq. (3.4) and we prohibit any spillover into other asset classes. For any other value
0 < Qa ≤ 1, banks affected by an initial shock in the SD sector will cause an increase
in risk factor for other asset classes, proportionally to their exposures.
Shocking the capital of banks
Previously we have kept the capital Cβ of all banks constant. However, we can well
imagine a scenario in which a shock to a bank or to a couple of banks stems from
a sudden drop in equity. Such a sudden drop would leave a bank potentially over-
leveraged, that is, their tier 1 capital ratio becomes too small. Our model allows us
to study the effect of such a shock as well. We do this as follows, considering the
same 10 scenarios as in the previous case.
1. At t = 1, the capital of a bank or a group of banks is reduced by a certain
percentage. As a result of that, their tier 1 capital ratio decreases.
2. At t = 2, those shocks on the banks are propagated to assets, like in the previous
scenarios, the only difference being that all assets start out with their original
risk weights. The risk weights of all assets that are held by affected banks will
increase.
3. At t = 3, the increased risk factors across all asset classes lead to a new, higher
value for the risk-weighted assets for all banks holding them. In this step,
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the crisis originating in a subset of banks spreads to other banks. Again this
propagation continues back and forth until the system saturates.
The iteration process follows the same dynamics as in the scenarios in which we
shocked sovereign debt and other asset classes, using Eqs. (3.10) and (3.11).
3.5 Simulation results
Using our model, we obtain simulation results for the three different scenarios de-
scribed in the previous section, (a) shocking sovereign debt, (b) shocking any asset
category allowing for spillover, and (c) shocking bank capital. We characterize the
initial shock, market conditions, and the behavior of market participants by two pa-
rameters and a response function. As the shock origin we consider the ten scenarios
as described in 3.4.3. The shocked sector refers to the part of the financial network
in which the shock starts; this may be an asset class or the equity of a bank. When
shocking assets, we increase their risk weights, increasing the risk-weighted assets and
thus reducing banks’ tier 1 capital ratio. The shock size ranges from increasing the
risk weights by a factor of one-and-a-half to four3. We perturb the banks by simu-
lating a sudden decrease of their equity and thus reducing the tier 1 capital ratio;
this shock size ranges from a reduction by 10 to 90 percent. The spreading parameter
describes the market conditions for sovereign debt Qs and for other asset classes Qa.
The spreading parameter Qs for the sovereign debt is a function of the CDS spread
as shown in Figure 3·4. The spreading parameters for the other asset classes is a
free parameter where for simplicity we set Q1 = Q2 = · · · = Qa for all asset classes.
The bank response function P (x) describes the behavior of market participants. We
distinguish between the linear and the steep bank response function P (x) as put forth
in Eq. (3.6).
3 Recall that we limit the magnitude of a risk weight to wmax = 2, which shall not be exceed
through the initial shock.
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3.5.1 Shocking sovereign debt only
The first scenario in our simulation considers a shock to sovereign debt without any
spillover to the other asset classes. Sovereign debt usually makes up a small fraction
of a bank’s assets, with exposure of most banks of about one tenth of the total as
shown in 3·1 in the data section.
If we use risk weights (rs) for sovereign debt at the lower end of the range described
in Table 3.1, the impact of sovereign debt on a bank’s risk-weighted assets becomes
all but negligible. Therefore, even a major shock in any of the ten different shock
origins will not have any significant effect on banks’ risk-weighted assets for initial
risk weights rs = 0.002. In turn, the tier 1 capital ratio decrease is so minor that any
shock propagation is stalled right away. This finding holds for both the linear and
the steep bank response function. Therefore, the value we initially assume for the
risk weights rs becomes crucial.
If we use the risk weights at the upper end of the range in Table 3.1, rs = 0.1, a
major shock such as a fourfold increase in those risk weights for an affected country
will have a measurable impact on banks holding a large chunk of this sovereign debt.
However, the shock propagation stalls after at most a couple of steps for both the
linear and the steep bank response function. If we consider a shock originating in a
country or region with very low sovereign debt CDS spread, such as Germany or the
Benelux countries, the increase in risk weights diminishes already in the step right
after the initial shock. Considering the GIIPS countries, which exhibit the largest
CDS spreads in our data set, the shock propagates for two steps; however it does not
noticeably impact banks any more than the original shock.
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3.5.2 Allowing for spillover between asset classes
We have observed that shocks to sovereign debt alone do not become systemic events
within the framework of our model. This is mainly due to three reasons:
(i) Many banks hold only a low amount of sovereign debt.
(ii) The risks weights of sovereign debt are very low, signifying that it is considered
practically riskless. The European sovereign debt crisis at least raises doubts
regarding the risk-free nature of sovereign debt.
(iii) We do not consider a spillover between asset classes, that is, a shock to sovereign
debt will remain contained within the sovereign debt sector.
We therefore proceed to analyze the results when we include other asset classes with
their larger risk weights as the source of shocks as well as when we allow for a spillover
from one asset class to another, according to Eqs. (3.5) and (3.11).
We take 10 of the 90 banks as a sample to illustrate the dynamics and the out-
come of a shock from various origins. The banks are Erste Bank Group (AT001),
Deutsche Bank (DE017), ES065 (Banco de Sabadell), Credit Agricole (FR014), Bar-
clays (GB090), National Bank of Greece (GR031), Bank of Ireland (IE038), Unicredit
(IT041), ING Bank (NL047), and Banco Comercial Portugues (PT054). This selec-
tion aims to represent a good cross section of all European banks and to demonstrate
one or more banks very vulnerable to the scenarios we consider. For example, we can
expect Deutsche Bank to be initially more strongly effected by a crisis that originates
in Germany, scenario (7).
The first scenario we consider is a shock which originates in the GIIPS countries,
Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. Figures 3·6 through 3·8 show the dynamics
for the banks given an increase of the risk weights associated with residential mort-
gages from these countries. For most banks, retail residential mortgages are the most
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Figure 3·6: Tier 1 capital ratios over time after a shock to the re-
tail residential sector in GIIPS countries, given different bank response
functions and both a small shock size and a small spreading parameter.
important or second most important asset class by exposure. We present results for
different shock sizes, spreading parameters, and bank response function. If we con-
sider a spreading parameter of Qa = 0.3, the system is stable for both a linear and a
steep bank response function, as Figure 3·6 indicates As a matter of fact, a fourfold
increase of the risk weights does not cause a systemic event either, see Figure 3·7 The
sudden large increase in risk weights, however, causes a tremendous decline in the
tier 1 capital ratio for banks heavily involved in mortgages in this region. Banks from
other than GIIPS countries see an obvious downtick in their tier 1 capital ratios as
well. As a consequence, a couple of banks fall below the Basel III threshold.
Figure 3·7: Tier 1 capital ratios over time after a shock to the re-
tail residential sector in GIIPS countries, given different bank response
functions and a large size and a small spreading parameter.
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If we increase the spreading parameter to Qa = 0.6 while still considering a linear
bank response function, the system remains in the stable regime, and the initial
shock does not cause a spillover. If we consider a spreading parameter of Qa = 0.6
and assume a steep bank response function, however, the system exhibits instability.
This can be seen in Figure 3·8, and it holds true for any shock size. While an increase
of risk weights increase of wa → 4wa could not cause a systemic event for a lower
spreading parameter or a linear bank response function, even the smallest increase
of wa will trigger a systemic event if the spreading parameter is sufficiently large
and we use the steep bank response function. As an example, Figure 3·8 shows how
wa → 1.5wa causes all banks to eventually fall below the Basel III threshold in our
simulations.
Figure 3·8: Tier 1 capital ratios over time after a shock to the re-
tail residential sector in GIIPS countries, given different bank response
functions and a small shock size and a larger spreading parameter.
Figure 3·8 has demonstrated that even small shocks may eventually cause a sys-
temic event, given an adverse set of parameters. While we concluded that sovereign
debt in isolation cannot trigger a systemic event, we revisit this problem, now allowing
for spillover to other asset classes. Specifically, we focus on the conditions that have
facilitated a systemic event after an initial shock to residential mortgages. Figure 3·9
shows the dynamics for the banks given an increase of risk weights for sovereign debt
from GIIPS countries from 0.002 to 0.008. We use a spreading parameter of Qa = 0.6
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and the steep bank response function. While the slope of the tier 1 capital ratio
decline is much less than in Figure 3·8 and therefore the development of the systemic
event is considerably slower, the dynamics become equivalent. Indeed, the final tier
1 capital values for the banks are very similar for both cases, not shown in the figure.
Figure 3·9: Tier 1 capital ratios over time after a shock to sovereign
debt in GIIPS countries, given different bank response functions and
spreading parameters.
Our observations for these two cases hold for a shock origin in other asset classes
from the GIIPS countries as well. In absence of a systemic event, the final tier 1
capital ratio of a bank can be well approximated by the impact of the initial shock
on its tier 1 capital ratio. In other words, the exposure to a specific asset class from
a specific country determines the magnitude of tier 1 capital losses. If we observe a
systemic event, however, banks start deteriorating uniformly as the initial shock has
spread to all asset classes. In this case, the initial exposure to a specific asset class
from a specific country influences only the initial rate of decline, but it does not affect
the outcome.
We study how many banks fall below the Basel III threshold after 50 time steps
and after 100 time steps. Table B.1 in Appendix B reports how many banks would be
distressed in the ten scenarios we have proposed. Since only the steep bank response
function and a high enough spreading parameter can trigger a systemic event, we
consider shocks to all seven sectors given Pquad(x) and Qa = 0.6. As we can see by
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comparing Figs. 3·8 and 3·9, shocks to different sectors and with different shock sizes
permeate the system at different speeds.
In many cases, two thirds or more of the 90 banks can be considered distressed
in our simulation after 100 time steps. This is true regardless of shock origin and
the asset class which is initially shocked. The largest average distress across all asset
classes can be found when shocking the GIIPS countries; 65.6 percent of all banks
have fallen below the Basel III threshold after 100 time steps. Even after only 50
time steps, shocks to assets from the GIIPS country have large destructive capacity,
distressing nearly half of all banks. A shock to assets from Spain leads to the second
largest number of distressed banks across all sectors, with 64.9 percent of all banks
having a tier 1 capital ratio of less than 4.5% after 100 time steps. As compared to
a shock to the GIIPS countries of which Spain is part, a shock to assets from Spain
tends to spread more slowly, leaving only about a quarter of banks distressed after
50 time steps. We observe that, while most shocks have large negative impacts, a
shock to corporate loans damages the system very fast. In contrast, shocks to retail
SME loans or commercial real estate tend to spread out more slowly, allowing for
more time to intervene. We report these results in more detail in the appendix in
Tables B.2 through B.9.
3.5.3 Shocking the equity of banks
So far we have only shocked the risk-weighted assets of the banks. Subsequently, we
simulate the reduction of equity in a subset of banks. Since in this study we analyze
the European banking system, we focus on scenarios (1) through (8). We report both
the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio as well as the number of banks which fall below
the Basel III threshold of 4.5 percent. The results are summarized in Appendix B in
Tables B.10 through B.17.
It comes as no surprise that a shock to banks in the GIIPS countries would have
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the largest effect on the entire system. Almost half of the banks in our data set are
based in one of these five countries, and therefore the size of the initial shock would
be quite significant. Furthermore, we recognize that a linear bank response function
effectively stops spillover of the crisis. For example, in scenario (i), even given the
largest shock size of 50 percent and a large spreading parameter of Qa = 0.9, only
five banks from other countries would fall below the Basel III requirements. The
importance of the spreading parameter is again amplified in case of the steep response
function: If the spreading parameter is large and we assume a steep bank response
function, the initial shock size matters very little. Almost all banks would fall below
the Basel III tier 1 capital ratio threshold given these parameters, regardless of where
the shock originated.
Figure 3·10: Evolution of the tier 1 capital ratio of Deutsche Bank
(DE017) for a shock to various sectors in Germany, given a linear re-
sponse function and a steep response function.
In order to compare the dynamics of a shock to a bank’s equity, that is, a direct
shock, to the dynamics after an indirect shock through an asset class, we consider
in more detail the outcomes for Deutsche Bank (DE017) as an example. Figure 3·10
illustrates the development of the tier 1 capital ratio of Deutsche Bank for a shock to
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asset classes from Germany as well as the equity of all German banks. We initialize
the shock by an increase of risk weights of the shocked asset class by 50 percent or
decreasing the equity of German banks by 20 percent, respectively. We confirm that
the linear response triggers now systemic event and we focus on the results for the
steep response function. A shock to the equity of all German banks has both the
largest initial impact on Deutsche Bank and leads to the lowest tier 1 capital ratio at
the end of the simulation. In fact, the final tier 1 capital ratio is about one fifth lower
than for shock to other asset classes. A shock to corporate loans or financial loans
from Germany causes the fastest deterioration of the tier 1 capital ratio of Deutsche
Bank, as this bank is strongly invested in these two asset classes. Shocks to other
asset classes lead to slightly different dynamics: While the tier 1 capital ratio in the
cases of initial shocks to corporate and financial loans is practically linear, a shock
to other asset classes starts slowly, with a low downward slope, but picks up pace
as time goes by. Apparently, an initial shock in these asset classes builds up slowly
and it is not until other, more important asset classes to the bank become affected
that the propagation causes bigger losses. Interestingly, for this reason, the shock
that originates in the corporate loan sector and causes a tier 1 capital ratio decline
the fastest leaves the bank at a slightly higher tier 1 capital ratio at the end of the
simulation. The shock spreads at such a high rate that the maximum risk weight of
wa = 2 is achieved very quickly for this asset class, stalling the propagation before
“infecting” other asset classes. It needs to be pointed out, though, that this difference
is minor, and in all cases Deutsche Bank falls below the Basel III threshold in our
simulations.
In Figure 3·10, we only consider shocks that originate in Germany, affecting Ger-
man assets and German banks’ equity initially. Figure 3·11 focusses on the asset class
of corporate loans, which we have identified as the shock affecting the bank the fastest,
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Figure 3·11: Evolution of the tier 1 capital ratio of Deutsche Bank
(DE017) for a shock to corporate loans in various countries or regions,
given a linear response function and a steep response function.
and we differentiate now by origin of shock. The shock size and spreading parameter
are the same as in the previous discussion. Since we have used the sovereign debt
holdings of Deutsche Bank to approximate its holdings in other classes, Figure 3·11
is an approximation to how affected the bank will be due to its holdings as well as
the potential of a shock to spread throughout the market. Again, we only observe a
decrease in tier 1 capital ratio through the initial shock using the linear bank response
function, and we observe a systemic event using the steep bank response function. As
we have seen before, a shock to assets from GIIPS countries leads to the fastest decline
in tier 1 capital ratio for Deutsche Bank, which reflects the size of the original shock,
followed by a shock to German assets which reflects the domestic bias of Deutsche
Bank. Interestingly, a shock to US exhibits a very quick decline in tier 1 capital ratio
as well. This is not too surprising however, because we would expect an global player
like Deutsche Bank to be very active on the US market. It takes the longest time
for shocks from Greece (due to the comparably low amount of Greek assets on the
market), Japan and Eastern Europe (due to the limited amount of holdings in these
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regions) to put Deutsche Bank below the Basel III threshold. However, as before the
initial shocks all converge to roughly the same final value of tier 1 capital ratio for
Deutsche Bank.
3.5.4 Phase space analysis
In our exploration of specific parameters, we have recognized that there appears to
be a phase transition for the steep bank response function, depending on the value
for the spreading parameter. In the following we expand our analysis to a wide
range of parameters for both, a linear and a steep response function. We use a
shock originating in the Benelux countries as an example to discuss the outcome for
the banks in our sample given. We choose the Benelux countries because unlike a
shock to the GIIPS countries which involves a very large amount of assets and banks
or to Eastern Europe, for example, which involves much fewer assets and banks,
this scenario corresponds to a mid-sized shock with respect to assets and number of
initially affected banks. We want to point out that the following analysis and its
findings are applicable to shocks from different origins.
Figure 3·12 shows the phase diagrams for a shock originating in the Benelux
countries, using a linear bank response function. Each of the subplots captures a
different crisis origin and explores the outcome for a wide range of parameters of
shock size and spreading. We consider a crisis onset due to a sudden loss in tier 1
equity for all banks in the Benelux countries as well as crisis onsets due to a sudden
increase in risk weights for assets from a given asset class in Portugal, Italy, Ireland,
Greece, and Spain. We allow the shock between banks and assets to propagate back
and forth for 200 time steps, that is, 100 propagations from assets to banks and 100
propagations back from banks to assets. On the y-axis we show the average decrease
in tier 1 capital ratio of all banks. On the x-axis we show the sector spread, that is,
the value of the parameter Qa, which indicates how affected an asset from a given
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asset class is when banks holding it experience distress. For the presentation of these
results, we set Q2 = · · · = Qa for all asset classes except the sovereign debt where we
use the idiosyncratic values from the CDS swaps. Indicated by colors is the size of the
original shock. We consider the following range of shock sizes: In the case of banks,
we reduce the capital by 10 to 90 percent. In the case of the other assets, the shock
is initiated by an increase of risk weights by 50 percent up to a fourfold increase.
Our main observation in Figure 3·12 is that, as expected, the impact on banks
grows with the size of the spillover Q between sectors grows as well as with the size of
the original shock. A shock scenario which begins with a sudden reduction in capital
for banks in our dataset appears to have the largest negative effect on the system.
Let us first consider the scenario in which all banks in the Benelux countries were to
suffer from an abrupt loss of 10 percent of their equity and therefore suffer from a
reduction of their tier 1 capital ratio by 10 percent. The systemic consequences then
depend on the size of the spreading parameter, Qa. In the case of weak spreading,
Qa = 0.3, banks from Benelux countries see a total reduction of their tier 1 capital
ratio R of 11.0 percent, barely more than through the initial shock alone. Banks from
all other countries will see a reduction in their R of 0.3 percent. This comes out to
an average reduction in R of 1.1 percent, reflecting that there are far fewer banks in
the Benelux countries than in the rest of Europe. In the case of strong spreading,
Qa = 0.9, the reduction in tier 1 capital ratio for banks from Benelux countries is
more drastic, amounting to a total of 16.5 percent. We also observe a noticeable effect
on banks from other European countries which see their R reduced by 4.1 percent.
With larger initial shock size, these numbers become bigger, but not systemically.
This is similar to our previous discussion in Section 3.5.3 and reflected in Table B.12.
The results are very different, as we have discussed before, if we consider a steep
bank response function. We recognize two distinct regimes of the system in Fig-
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Figure 3·12: Phase space for different scenarios given a linear bank
response function: We consider a variety of initial shock sizes to banks
and asset classes as well as a variety of values for the spreading pa-
rameter. We observe no amplification of shocks. The size of the initial
shock is indicated by the color, where from yellow (small shock) to dark
purple (very large shock).
64
Figure 3·13: Phase space for different scenarios given a steep bank
response function: We consider a variety of initial shock sizes to banks
and asset classes as well as a variety of values for the spreading param-
eter. The size of the initial shock is indicated by the color, where from
yellow (small shock) to dark purple (very large shock). We observe be-
havior reminiscent of a second order phase transition, where the critical
parameter is the magnitude of the sector spread Qa. The tipping point
of the system appears to be around Qa = 0.55.
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ure 3·13, depending on the size of the spreading parameter. If Qa < 0.5, then the
loss in the tier 1 capital ratios of banks grows, but it grows slowly and steadily with
increasing Qa and with increasing initial shock size, very much in the same fashion
as it has in Figure 3·12 for the linear bank response function. However, if Qa > 0.6,
banks lose, on average, about 75% of their tier 1 capital ratio. In other words, all
banks with less than 18 percent tier 1 capital ratio at the onset of the simulation are
in acute danger of falling the stress test in this scenario. Remarkably, this behavior is
true for all asset classes and bank equity, with the exception of sovereign debt which
we will discuss later. Furthermore, regardless of the asset class in which the shock
originated and regardless of the size of the initial shock size, the final tier 1 capital
ratio of banks will be the same.
We speculate that the system exhibits a phase transition around Qa = 0.55, and as
a consequence the banking network can be extremely fragile. Below this parameter,
an initial shock can be quite damaging to banks, however it diminishes over time.
Above this parameter, an initial shock does not diminish as quickly as it spreads to
other sectors of the system. Instead it has the potency to affect all asset classes and
thus all banks.
This sudden switching behavior can be better understood when considering the
slope at the transition as well as the dependence on the initial shock size leading up
to the transition point. We observe that the transition is smoothest for a shock to
bank equity, followed by a shock to corporate loans and loans to financial institutions.
Since corporate loans and loans to financial institutions tend to make up a very large
part of the balance sheets of banks, especially larger banks, a shock to these asset
classes is more impactful than a shock to other asset classes. Likewise, a shock to
bank equity of 10 or 20 percent or more is a significant shock. In contrast, a shock to
revolving retail or SME has only a minor initial impact on many banks. For the sake
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of the argument, let’s consider a fairly small shock to the risk weights of a given asset
class. Obviously, no disruption to a specific asset class by itself by themselves cause
a systemic event because banks are diversified across asset classes and countries, and
therefore a small change to one risk weight will be a very small change to a bank’s
overall risk-weighted assets – and, in turn, to its tier 1 capital ratio. A systemic event
gets underway if the initial shock can fester for long enough and spread to other
countries and asset classes, increasing the associated risk weights. In the case of the
bigger asset classes (corporate and financial) as well as equity, the initial shock will
have had a measurable impact already, such that the transition looks less sharp. In
the case of the smaller asset classes (ret. revolving and SME), however, the transition
is very sudden: Below a certain spreading parameter, the shock remains contained
and the possible damage to tier 1 capital ratios is bounded by the volume of these
asset classes; but beyond that spreading parameter, the shock spreads to all parts of
the system.
A notable exception is sovereign debt. Due the low risk weights and also the
idiosyncratic spreading parameters derived from the CDS swaps, an initial shock
within the scope of current risk weights is often just too small to cause a systemic
event. Given a very large initial shock or very many time steps, a systemic event can,
nevertheless, be triggered by a shock to sovereign debt. The value of Qa for the phase
transition, however, may be very different than that for the other asset classes. This
again reflects the idiosyncratic spreading parameters.
Figure 3·14 shows the dependency of the outcome of the simulation with respect
to the parameters Qa and α which we had identified as critical parameters of the
phase transition. We observe that there is a sharp boundary between two regimes,
one corresponding to the resilient and one corresponding to the fragile phase. If
we increase Qa, the steepness parameter α necessary for a regime switch decreases
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Figure 3·14: Stationary state that the system reaches in the sim-
ulation depending on the spreading parameter Qa and the steepness
parameter α. Green colors indicate a very small average deterioration
of the tier 1 capital ratios of the banks in the system, whereas purple
indicates the worst attainable stationary state. The bright line sepa-
rating the two regimes indicates the point of the phase transition. The
plot corresponds to a shock to loans in the French financial sector.
accordingly. Interpreting the steepness parameter as an indicator of risk aversion,
this implies that if the market is fragile, small amounts of risk aversion among the
banks may be sufficient to topple the system. Conversely, if Qa, a measure related to
the probability of default of the assets, is small, the banking system is particularly
robust, even if banks are very risk averse. Figure 3·14 illustrates one specific shock
scenario, that of a shock to financial institutions in France; other scenarios yield a
similar result with a small shift to the regime boundary.
3.6 Discussion and conclusion
In this chapter we have analyzed the European Banking Authority stress test results.
We have created a bipartite network with banks on one side and assets on the other,
based on European banks’ holdings of sovereign debt from 30 European nations, the
United States, and Japan. We have proposed a systemic risk propagation in which
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we take into consideration the interconnectivity between banks based on the overlap
of their asset portfolios. We have analyzed the systemic impact of shocks to bank
assets by increasing the risk weight of these assets as well as of shocks to the equity
of banks. Both types of shocks lead to an initial decrease in the tier 1 capital ratio
of the affected banks. In our propagation model a deterioration of the tier 1 capital
ratio prompts a reaction of the banks, putting stress on assets in their portfolio and
further enhancing the crisis. We have considered a linear response of banks to the
shock and we confirm that banks are more affected by the initial shock than by
subsequent spillovers. In accordance with Glasserman and Young [2015], we found
no significant contagion, hence the effect of the shock is locally contained and can be
explained by portfolio overlap and the size of the initial shock. If, however, the banks’
response was described by a steeper function, the stability of the banking network
becomes strongly depended on the spreading parameter. This spreading parameter
has a critical value associated with a phase transition. Below the critical value, the
system exhibits stability and is comparable to the linear case: We observe no spillover
and losses depend on both the size of the initial shock and the origin of the shock.
However, above the critical value the system breaks down, and we observe a very large
deterioration of the tier 1 capital ratio of all banks; in fact most banks fall below the
Basel III threshold. The critical value depends slightly on the origin of the shock and
the asset class; however, the outcome for the banks beyond the critical value of the
spreading parameter is then independent of the origin of the shock and of the size of
the initial shock.
Our results show that even though the systemic risk propagation through the
banking network is homogeneous once strong contagion is present, the trajectory
of tier 1 capital ratio deterioration for a given bank depends on the origin of the
shock, the size of the shock and its balance sheet. We suggest that our model is a
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good complement to the current stress tests to capture the interconnectivity of banks
due to their portfolio similarities, their business models, and their regional biases.
Understanding these dynamics can be helpful to regulators as well as policy makers,
and it may serve to inform the impact of interventions and the lack thereof in times
of crisis.
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Chapter 4
Reconstruction of the Japanese
Bank-Firm Network
The study of systemic risk in complex networks requires both a good model and
detailed knowledge of the network. Often, we cannot observe individual edges, and
information is only available about the nodes on an aggregate level. If systemic risk is
to be modeled as a shock propagation, an accurate estimate of the edges is imperative.
Recently, a variety of network reconstruction methods has been put forth, of which
the configuration model based on the principle of maximum entropy has emerged as
a front runner. Inspired by reconstruction attempts on the Japanese firm-bank data
set and their shortfall, we establish limits on the applicability of the configuration
model for sparse networks.
71
4.1 Introduction
Knowing the network structure is a prerequisite to studying systemic risk. In Chaper 3
of this thesis, we introduced a model for systemic risk emanating from overlapping
portfolios of financial institutions. The model takes into account the bank behavior as
well as the liquidity. While the data set detailed the exposures of banks to sovereign
debt, we had to reconstruct the portfolios in other asset categories from this partial
information. Often, no such information is available due to confidentiality reasons or
missing data. Typically, we can only rely on aggregate information. In the example
of interbank lending, this means that we do not know the exposure individual banks
have to one another; instead we know for each bank how much money they borrowed
and lent in total1. Much work has been devoted to reconstructing networks from such
partial or marginal information with the goal of studying systemic risk, for example
by Cimini et al. [2015] or Anand et al. [2015].
In a recent work, Ramadiah et al. [2017] performed a horse race of different recon-
struction methods, including the enhanced capital asset-pricing (ECAPM) by Squar-
tini et al. [2017], on the extensive Nikkei data set of Japanese banks and firms. Con-
sidering this credit network, the authors used a shock propagation model according
to Huang et al. [2013] to test the network reconstruction methods on how well they
describe the systemic risk. Surprisingly, Ramadiah et al. [2017] found that all network
reconstruction methods underestimated the effect of a shock to the system. While
the configuration model of Cimini et al. [2015] performed very well in a comparison
of reconstruction methods studied by Anand et al. [2017], the extension for bipartite
networks [Squartini et al., 2017] apparently was not successful in capturing critical
parts of the Japanese bank-firm network.
In previous studies, the quality of network reconstructed was estimated through
1 Of course, central banks or other regulatory bodies typically know the detailed exposures.
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network topological and similarity measures, for example in the horse race in Anand
et al. [2017]. We highlight another important feature to consider, the likelihood
of connectivity. Due to their probabilistic nature, configuration models may fail to
connect a subset of nodes in any given realization. We derive bounds for network
properties like density and layer heterogeneity to guarantee connectivity at a given
confidence level.
4.2 Methodology
4.2.1 Principle of maximum entropy
Given N possible events with probabilities P (xi), i = 1 . . . N , the entropy H is defined
as
H(X) = −
N∑
i=1
P (xi) logP (xi), (4.1)
with x log x = 0 if x = 0. As originally defined by Shannon for a discrete random
variable X with probability mass function P (X), this is equivalent to the expected
value
H(X) = E [− logP (X)] . (4.2)
Generally the probability distribution is constrained to values Fk through some
functions fk:
N∑
i=1
P (xi)fk(xi) = Fk, (4.3)
with k = 1, . . . ,m. An obvious constraint for every probability distribution is
N∑
i=1
P (xi) = 1, (4.4)
the normalization requirement. We can formulate the maximum entropy probability
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distribution as
P (xi) =
exp [λ0 +
∑m
k=1 λkfk(xi)]∑N
i=1 exp [λ0 +
∑m
k=1 λkfk(xi)]
, (4.5)
where we recognize that the denominator is the partition function Z (λ0, . . . , λm).
The parameters λ0 is the Lagrange multiplier of the normalization, and λ1, . . . , λm
are the Lagrange multipliers of the other m constraints, satisfying
Fk =
∂ logZ
∂λk
. (4.6)
While we defined entropy in Eq. (4.1) for discrete random variables, the concept
can easily be extended to continuous random variables by replacing the summation
with integration. It can be shown that the exponential distribution and the normal
distribution are the maximum entropy distributions given certain constraints. The
exponential distribution is the maximum entropy distribution of the class of distri-
butions over all positive real values with mean µ. The normal distribution is the
maximum entropy distribution of the class of distributions over all real values with
mean µ and variance σ2. That means that any other distribution over the respective
domains assumes further knowledge over the data, like the value for higher moments.
4.2.2 Maximum entropy for networks
Following the lines of the seminal work of Park and Newman [2004] and Squartini
and Garlaschelli [2011], we briefly explain how the principle of maximum entropy is
applied to the reconstruction of complex networks. Assuming we know the degree
sequence of a graph, that is, the degree of each node, denoted by ki. Obviously,
we can conceive many graphs with such a degree sequence, rendering the problem
underdetermined. In their approach, Park and Newman [2004] consider a graph G
within an ensemble G of graphs. Each graph is assigned a probability P (G) which
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needs to be estimated. This is done by maximizing the entropy of the ensemble,
H = −
∑
G∈G
P (G) logP (G), (4.7)
subject to the constraints that the probability sums up to one and that the expected
value of the degree sequence of the ensemble matches the observed degree sequence.
Using Eq. (4.5), we can write the result as
P (G) =
e−H(G)
Z
, (4.8)
where H(G) = −∑i λiki(G) is the Hamiltonian with the Lagrange multipliers λi and
degree sequence ki for graph G, and Z is the partition function.
Let us consider the simple case of an unweighted, but directed network with the
adjacency matrix A with entries aij = 1 if i is linking to j, aji = 1 if j is linking to
i, and aij = 0 if the nodes are not connected. We then find the in-degree of node i
as kini =
∑
j aji and its out-degree k
out
i =
∑
j aij. Park and Newman [2004] proceeds
to specify a coupling parameter Θij for each edge, and the Hamiltonian becomes
H(G) = −
∑
i,j
λi aij = −
∑
i<j
Θij aij, (4.9)
and consequently the partition function is
Z =
∑
{aij}
exp
(
−
∑
i<j
Θij aij
)
=
∏
i<j
(
1 + e−Θij
)
. (4.10)
Following statistical mechanics, we calculate the free energy F = − logZ correspond-
ing to the Hamiltonian to find the probability that there exists a link between node
i and node j, specified by the coupling parameter Θij:
pij =
∂F
∂Θij
=
exp[−Θij]
1 + exp[−Θij] . (4.11)
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In our example of the unweighted directed network, the coupling parameter can be
separated into a component describing the in-degree of node i and the out-degree of
node j:
pij =
exp[−Θij]
1 + exp[−Θij] =
e−λ
out
i −λinj
1 + e−λ
out
i −λinj
=
xiyj
1 + xiyj
, (4.12)
where we have switched to the notation of Squartini and Garlaschelli [2011] in the last
step. It is worth pointing out that this probability can also be calculated for bipartite
networks. A bipartite network is a network in which we can divide the nodes in
two subsets U, V , and all links exist only between a node in subset U and a node in
subset V , but not within either subset. By treating all nodes in subset U to have an
in-degree larger than zero and an out-degree of zero and all nodes in subset V to have
an in-degree of zero and an out-degree larger than zero, we can apply Eq. (4.12) in
a straightforward manner. Let’s denote the nodes in subset U with the index i and
the nodes in subset V with the index α, then the probability to find a link between
these nodes is
piα =
xiyα
1 + xiyα
(4.13)
Since this thesis presents an empirical study of the bipartite Japanese firm and bank
network, in the following we focus on the reconstruction of bipartite networks accord-
ing to Squartini et al. [2017].
4.2.3 The fitness ansatz
The constrained maximum entropy approach yields an ensemble of graphs which
satisfies the constraints in the sense of the ensemble average. In Section 4.2.2 we
showed the calculation to find the probability for a link between two nodes, which
is equivalent to the expected value of the adjacency matrix over the ensemble. This
calculation requires knowledge of the degree sequence. Generally, we do not know the
degree sequence. However, we may be able to estimate the density of the network or
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equivalently the total number of links L. In this case the fitness ansatz has proven
successful, for which we assume that there exist intrinsic node properties, or fitnesses,
that are proportional to the xi, yα:
xi =
√
zV vi
yα =
√
zC cα.
Defining z =
√
zV zC , Eq. (4.13) becomes
piα =
zvicα
1 + zvicα
. (4.14)
Since the number of links in a bipartite network is the sum over the degree of all
nodes in both layers, the following relation has to hold:
L (G∗) = 〈L〉G =
∑
i
∑
α
zvicα
1 + zvicα
, (4.15)
where G∗ is the graph we empirically observe. In order to find the probabilities piα,
we need to solve Eq. (4.15) numerically for the network we wish to reconstruct. This
can be done with a simple optimization routine, minimizing the absolute difference
of L and the double sum.
In the case of a weighted bipartite network, Squartini et al. [2017] reconstruct the
weights of any given realization G ∈ G as
wiα =
vicα
W piα
aiα =
(
z−1 + vicα
) aiα
W
, (4.16)
where W is the sum of all weights and aiα is the adjacency matrix of the realized
graph G. Without the fitness parameter, the reconstructed network would be fully
connected. As the last part Eq. (4.16) shows, however, the introduction of the fitness
parameter z leads to a sparsification of the network by introducing a minimum weight
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of z−1. Since the reconstructed wiα have to sum up to the total weight W , some links
cannot be formed because an additional flat cost is incurred for each link. The
fitness parameter z grows monotonously with the density of the network, and in the
following section we show some results for different underlying distributions for the
node properties vi and cα.
4.2.4 The challenge of sparse networks
While we are always able to reconstruct the network on the ensemble level as discussed
in Sec. 4.2.2, there is one constraint that the methodology does not take into account:
each node has to be part of the reconstructed network. If a certain node does not
have a large value for its node strength, connection probability to a node in the other
layer will be small. This is particularly problematic if the bipartite network is very
imbalanced, meaning that one layer consists of a large number of nodes while the other
layer has very few nodes in it. If we sparsify the network sufficiently, the expected
degree of a weak node in the big layer will be less than one, and therefore most
reconstructions in the ensemble leave this node unconnected. This would violate a
constraint which we have ignored in the derivation of the reconstruction method, that
is, we know of the presence of each node in the system, so it needs to be connected.
In fact, real life networks can be sparse with densities of d ≤ 0.1. To illustrate
this challenge, let’s consider a bipartite network with 400 nodes in layer N and 1000
nodes in layer M. The strengths of the nodes in both layers follow a log-normal
distributions, in layer N we have V ∼ Lognormal (0, 1) and in layer M we have
C ∼ Lognormal (0, 2). By design, this network incorporates the two challenges for
reconstruction: the layers are quite different in size, and the nodes on the bigger layer
vary in strength more strongly. Using Eq. (4.15), we calculate the value for z that
corresponds to a network density of d = 0.1, that is, a network with 20 000 links.
In Figure 4·1 we observe that weak nods have very low connection probabilities.
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Figure 4·1: Distribution of the connection probabilities in a simulated
sparse bipartite network of size 400 × 1000 with density d = 0.1. The
probabilities for a single weak node in layer N are shown in blue, for a
weak node in layer two in red, and the overall distribution of connection
probabilities is shown in light gray. Note that a node in layer N has 1000
possible links, and a node in layer M has 400 possible links. We observe
that the connection probabilities of the weak nodes are exclusively at
the lower end of the overall distribution.
This is exacerbated in layer M where the strengths of the nodes have greater variance.
layer N is more homogeneous with respect to the node strengths, and therefore higher
connection probabilities are achieved even for the weak nodes in the layer.
Picking node i in layer N, we calculate its connection probability piα to all other
nodes α = 1, · · · , 1000 in layer M, and vice versa. The probability that node i or α
remains disjoint from the network in any given realization of the reconstruction then
is simply
P (Node i unconnected) =
∏
α
(1− piα) ,
P (Node α unconnected) =
∏
i
(1− piα) .
Figure 4·2 shows the results of our simulation and illustrates that nodes in layer N,
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Figure 4·2: Distribution of probabilities of a node to be unconnected
in any given realization of the network reconstruction. The nodes
in layer N have at least degree one in practically all reconstructions,
whereas there is a significant chance for a number of nodes in layer M
to remain unconnected.
which are similar in strength and have many possible partners in layer M, have a
probability or being unconnected of practically 0. In contrast, nodes in layer M,
which are heterogenous in strength and have fewer possible partners in 1, may have
significant non-zero probabilities of remaining unconnected. In our example, like all
nodes in its layer, the weak node in layer M has 400 possible links, and the largest
connection probability among these links is just 0.45%. As a result, this node has
a chance of not being connected in any given reconstruction of 67.5%. 5.2% of the
nodes have a chance of more than 5% of remaining unconnected.
4.3 Distribution of connection probabilities
The node properties V,C and the density of the network to be reconstructed both
determine the distribution of connection probabilities, P (piα). Let us consider the
limit of an infinitely large bipartite network, that is, a network with N nodes in
layer N and M nodes in layer M where we take the limit N,M → ∞ as we keep
the degree of connectivity fixed. We show the distribution of connection probabilities
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in terms of the density of the network d for two node property distributions: the
uniform distribution and the log-normal distribution. While the uniform distribution
is unrealistic for empirical data, it allows us to obtain analytical results to demonstrate
the behavior of the fitness parameter z. Closest to empirical data in the reconstruction
of financial networks is the log-normal distribution because the size loan portfolio of
a set of banks can be approximated this way.
4.3.1 Uniform distribution
The continuous uniform distribution for a random variable with support between 0
and a real number a has the probability distribution
f(x) =

1
a
for 0 ≤ x ≤ a
0 else.
(4.17)
Let’s assume both V and C are uniformly distributed between 0, 1. Note that the
random variables V and C only appear as a product in Eq. (4.13), and therefore the
behavior of X = V · C is important. If V,C ∼ U(0, 1), then X = V · C follows the
probability distribution
fX(x) = − log x, 0 < x ≤ 1.
Equation (4.13) transforms the input into a probability through the function
g(x) = zx/(1 + zx). Since g(x) is strictly increasing for all allowed values and maps
to the interval [0, 1], it has an inverse function,
h(y) = g−1(y) =
y
z (1− y)
with the derivative
h′(y) =
1
z (1− y)2 .
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Figure 4·3: Fitness parameter z as a function of the network density
d in a semilogarithmic representation based on Eq. (4.21) and from a
simulation of a bipartite network with 300× 100 nodes.
Assuming that the each V and C are uniformly distributed, we can calculate the dis-
tribution of connection probabilities fY (y) from their distribution fX(x) in Eq. (4.18)
using the transformation rule
fY (y) = fX(h(y)) |h′(y)| =
log z (1−y)
y
z (1− y)2 (4.18)
for 0 < y ≤ z
1+z
and 0 everywhere else.
Rewriting equation (4.15) in terms of a single random variable X = V · C yields
〈L〉G =
∑
j
zxj
1 + zxj
. (4.19)
The density of the network is the number of observed links divided by the number of
possible links, and we can write
d =
1
N
∑
j
zxj
1 + zxj
= E
[
zX
1 + zX
]
= E [Y ] . (4.20)
In the continuous limit we therefore find for V,C ∼ U(0, 1) that density of the network
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as a function of the fitness parameter z is
d(z) = E [Y ]
=
z
1+z∫
0
y
z (1− y)2 log
z (1− y)
y
dy
= 1− 1
z
[
pi2
6
+ log(z) log(1 + z)− 1
2
log2(1 + z)− Li2
(
1
1 + z
)]
, (4.21)
where Li2 is the polylogarithm of order 2. The inverse of this function z(d) exists, but
it has to be evaluated numerically. Figure 4·3 shows the behavior of z as a function
of the network density and compares the theoretical result based on Eq. (4.21) with
a simulated network of 300 nodes in one layer and 100 nodes in the other.
4.3.2 Log-normal distribution
If the random variable Y follows a normal distribution with mean µ and variance
σ2, then X = eY follows a log-normal distribution. The support of the log-normal
distribution is the realm of positive real numbers, which makes it a natural candidate
to describe the node properties or node strengths. Conveniently, the product of two
independent log-normal distributions described by the parameters µ1, σ
2
1 and µ2, σ
2
2,
respectively, is again a log-normal distributions, with the parameters µ1 + µ2 and
σ21 +σ
2
2. If we therefore choose V ∼ Lognormal (0, σ2/2) and C ∼ Lognormal (0, σ2/2),
the resulting random variable X = V · C is log-normally distributed:
fX(x) =
1
x
√
2piσ2
e−
log2 x
2σ2 .
However, it may be desirable to consider a network that consist of two inhomogeneous
layers, particularly σ21 6= σ22. To find the distribution of the connection probabilities,
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we start with the cumulative distribution function (cdf)
P (Y ≤ y) = P
(
Y ≤ zX1X2
1 + zX1X2
)
= P
(
X2 ≤ y
z (1− y)
1
X1
)
, (4.22)
which we can calculate as
FY (y) =
1√
4pi2σ21σ
2
2
∞∫
0
dx1
x1
y
x1z (1−y)∫
0
dx2
x2
exp
(
−1
2
[
log2 x1
σ21
+
log2 x2
σ22
])
=
1√
8piσ21
∞∫
0
dx1
x1
e
− log2 x1
2σ21
1 + erf
 log
[
y
x1z (1−y)
]
√
2σ22
 . (4.23)
This integral does not have an analytical solution. However, we can find the proba-
bility density function (pdf) where we can integrate out x1,
fY (y) =
d
dy
FY (y)
=
1
2piσ1σ2 y (1− y)
∞∫
0
dx1 exp
(
−1
2
[
log2 x1
σ21
+
log2 y
x1z (1−y)
σ22
])
=
1√
2pi(σ21 + σ
2
2)
1
y (1− y) exp
(
−1
2
log2 y
z (1−y)
σ21 + σ
2
2
)
. (4.24)
While we considered the case µ1 = µ2 = 0 for the derivation for better readability,
including the parameters µ1, µ2 is straightforward:
fY (y) =
(
y
z (1−y)
)µ1+µ2
σ21+σ
2
2 exp
(
− (µ1+µ2)
2+log2( yz−yz )
2(σ21+σ22)
)
√
2pi(σ21 + σ
2
2) y(y − 1)
In the following we continue with µ1 = µ2 = 0.
Since only the sum of the parameters σ2 affects the distribution, let’s use σ21 =
σ22 = σ
2/2 to study the distribution and the implications for the fitness parameter.
Figure 4·4 shows the behavior of the cdf FY (y) for different σ2-parameters of the log-
normal distribution and different desired network densities. If the desired network
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Figure 4·4: Cumulative probability distribution FY (y) of the connec-
tion probabilities in the reconstructed network for different densities d.
Left: less variance in the node strengths in the layers. Right: more
variance.
density d is small, a large number is assigned low probabilities. This effect is more
pronounced if the parameter σ2 is larger. Conversely, as the desired network density
gets closer to 1, most node pairs are assigned a larger probability. Again this is more
pronounced for larger σ2.
Let us now analyze the relationship between z and the network density d. Follow-
ing Eq. (4.21), the density as a function of the fitness parameter in the log-normal
case then is
d(z) =
1√
2piσ2
1∫
0
e−
log2
y
z (1−y)
2σ2
(1− y) dy. (4.25)
This integral can only be solved numerically, but we observe that the fitness parameter
z depends on the desired network density d and the combined variance of the layers
in the network. For d = 0.5, the solution becomes independent of σ2, and we find
z = 1. Figure 4·5 shows the behavior of z as a function of the network density for
σ2 = 1, comparing it to a simulation of a 40× 40 bipartite network.
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Figure 4·5: Fitness parameter z as a function of the network density
d in a semilogarithmic representation based on Eq. (4.25) and from a
simulation of a bipartite network with 40× 40 nodes.
4.4 Hypothesis testing for connectivity
In Section 4.2.4 we used a simulated network to show that the reconstruction of
sparse and lopsided bipartite networks may be unsuccessful in the sense that the
reconstructed network is not connected. This is problematic because the study of
systemic risk requires an accurate reconstruction of the network. If nodes remain
unconnected in the reconstruction, we cannot account for their influence on systemic
risk. In particular, we want to be able to check the following hypothesis:
Hq0: A node in layer i with strength q at the q-quantile of the distribution
of strengths of nodes in the layer has at least degree 1.
In the following, we derive the equations to test this hypothesis for the case of log-
normally distributed strengths, X1 ∼ Lognormal (0, σ21), X2 ∼ Lognormal (0, σ22).
This allows us to estimate the limits of the reconstruction approach. Where we
cannot solve the equations analytically, we provide numerical estimates when we
have to reject hypothesis Hq0.
We formulated Hq0 because we use as a proxy for the network connectivity an
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individual node at a certain strength quantile q of the distribution of strength among
the nodes in that layer. Typically, the likelihood that a weak node is connected in a
reconstruction is of concern.
4.4.1 Analytical calculations
If we want to find the connection probability distribution of a node at the q-quantile
of the distribution of strengths, we modify Eq. (4.23) in order to find the cumulative
distribution function conditioned on the value of one node P (Y ≤ y | X1 = xq) with
Bayes’ rule:
P (Y ≤ y | X1 = xq) = P (Y ≤ y ∩ X1 = xq)
P (X1 = xq)
. (4.26)
To compute the denominator, we need to find the value of the node strength pdf at
the quantile. The quantiles of the log-normal distribution are calculated through
q =
xq∫
0
fX1(x1) dx1. (4.27)
Thus, if a node is at the q-quantile of a Lognormal (0, σ1) distribution, then it has
strength xq = exp
(
−
√
2σ21 erfc
−1(2q)
)
, where erfc−1 denotes the inverse complemen-
tary error function. Obviously, P (X1 = xq) depends on only σ1 and q:
P (X1 = xq) =
exp
(
erfc−1(2q)
[√
2σ21 − erfc−1(2q)
])
√
2piσ21
(4.28)
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In order to calculate the intersection, we need to modify Eq. (4.23) and introduce a
Dirac delta to fix X1 = xq:
P (Y ≤ y ∩ X1 = xq) =
1√
8piσ21
∞∫
0
dx1
x1
e
− log2(x1)
2σ21
1 + erf
 log
[
y
x1z (1−y)
]
√
2σ22

× δ
(
x1 − exp
(
−
√
2σ21 erfc
−1(2q)
))
.
(4.29)
The probability density function of the intersection is calculated as the derivative with
respect to y as usual. Dividing by the pdf for X = xq, we then get the conditional
probability density function2:
fY |X=xq(y) =
1
2piσ22 y (1− y)
exp
− log2 exp
(√
2σ21 erfc
−1(2q)
)
y
z (1−y)
2piσ22
 (4.30)
The expected value µY of fY |X=xq(y) can only be written in integral form,
E [Y |X = xq] =
1∫
0
dy y fY |X=xq(y). (4.31)
Likewise, the second moment only exists in integral form as well:
E
[
Y 2 |X = xq
]
=
1∫
0
dy y2 fY |X=xq(y). (4.32)
2 In case the marginal distributions have parameters µ1 and µ2 for the underlying normal distri-
butions, this expression becomes
fY |X=xq (y) =
1
2piσ22 y (1− y)
exp
−µ22 + log2 exp
(
−µ1+
√
2σ21 erfc
−1(2q)
)
y
z (1−y)
2piσ22

×
exp
(
−µ1 +
√
2σ21 erfc
−1(2q)
)
y
z (1− y)
µ2/σ
2
2
.
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Figure 4·6: Comparing the analytical solution of the connection prob-
ability for the node in the lowest quantile with a weak node results from
a simulated network.
It is integrable, meaning that the variance of Y is finite: σ2Y = E
[
(Y − µY )2
]
<∞.
Figure 4·6 shows that the analytical pdf is in good agreement with the connection
probabilities for a weak nodes in our simulation. For the curve describing the ana-
lytical solution, we plug in the same parameters for σ1 and σ2 as in the simulation,
and we choose the 1/400-quantile for the 400-node network and the 1/1000-quantile
for the 1000-node network.
4.4.2 Numerical results
Equations (4.31) and (4.32) do not have closed form solutions. The integrals have to
be solved numerically, and we explore the results for a large range of parameters.
Statistics primer
Before we delve deeper into the integrals and their implications, however, let us take a
step back and consider a simple toy model for the connectivity of a node. We consider
a node Q that can connect to N other nodes with some probability p. The degree of
the node is the number of successful connections and can range from 0 to N . If we
are concerned with connectivity, we want to study how likely it is that the node ends
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up with degree zero.
From a statistical point of view, we are performing N independent Bernoulli trials
with probability p and summing up their outcome. This sum K, which describes the
degree of the node, follows a binomial distributionB(N, p) with meanNp and variance
Np(1−p). In order to find the probability that the node is connected we simply have
to calculate P (K = 0) = (1− p)N .
So far, we have considered the special case that node Q can connect to each of
the N nodes with the same probability. Let us relax this requirement such that the
connection probability is different for each node n = 1, . . . , N , namely pn. Then we
are performing N independent Bernoulli trials with probabilities p1, . . . , pN . Again we
calculate the sum K to find the degree of the node. K then follows a Poisson binomial
distribution, a generalization of the binomial distribution. The distribution has mean∑N
n=1 pn and variance
∑N
n=1(1 − pn) pn. Like in the case for identical probabilities,
we can calculate the probability P (K = 0) to find the probability that node Q has
degree zero:
P (K = 0) =
N∏
n=1
(1− pn) . (4.33)
Until now, we have assumed that we know the connection probabilities p1, . . . , pn.
If we consider a network in which the N nodes have some strength distribution from
which we compute their connection probability to node Q, then these connection
probabilities themselves are variates y1, . . . , yN of the random variables Y1, . . . , YN .
Node Q has degree zero with probability P (K = 0 |Y1 = y1, . . . , YN = yn), that is, the
probability conditional on observing the values y1, . . . , yN for the N Bernoulli trials.
90
Using the law of total probability, we get
P (K = 0) =
∞∫
y1=0
· · ·
∞∫
yN=0
P (K = 0 |Y1 = y1, . . . , YN = yn)
× fY1(y1) · · · fYN (yN) dy1 · · · dyN ,
(4.34)
where we have used the fact that the Yn are independent random variables, and fYn(yn)
are their corresponding probability density functions. The conditional probability for
K = 0 has the same form as the probability in Eq. (4.33), and therefore the integrals
factorize, yielding
P (K = 0) =
 ∞∫
0
(1− y)fY (y) dy
N . (4.35)
We can further simplify this expression using the expected value,
P (K = 0) = (1− E [Y ])N , (4.36)
showing that the connectivity of the node depends on the number of nodes to connect
to and the probability distribution from which we draw the connection probabilities.
Equation (4.36) calculates the probability of degree zero over all possible combi-
nations for the probabilities y1, . . . , yN underlying the Bernoulli trials. This allows
us to test the null hypothesis Hq0 in terms of the expected value of the connection
probability of node Q.
Connectivity of a node with fY |X=xq(y)
Let us now return to our example of the bipartite network in which one layer has N
nodes, and their strengths are distributed log-normally with parameters µ = 0 and
σ2 = σ2N . We also refer to this layer as the in-layer. Similarly, the second layer has M
nodes, and their strengths are also distributed log-normally with parameters µ = 0,
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σ2 = σ2M . Accordingly, we refer to the second layer as the out-layer (because a node
wants to connect out of it). We consider node Q from our toy model be one of the
M nodes in this second layer. We assume node Q to have strength xq which is the
value at the q-quantile of the strength distribution across the nodes in its layer. In
Eq. (4.30), we calculated the distribution of connection probabilities of such a node,
denoted by fY |X=xq . We recall the expected value of Y conditioned on X = xq,
E [Y |X = xq] = 1
2piσ2M
1∫
0
dy
1− y exp
− log2 exp
(√
2σ2N erfc
−1(2q)
)
y
z (1−y)
2piσ2M
 . (4.37)
For readability, let µQ denote the expected value E [Y |X = xq] for node Q. Its prob-
ability of being disconnected in a reconstruction then is P (K = 0) = (1− µQ)N .
Obviously, this probability becomes negligible if µQ or N are sufficiently large. If the
connection probabilities for node Q are small, however, then µQ is small as well. In
this case the probability that Q is disconnected in a realization the network recon-
struction may be significantly larger than 0. Considering µQ < 0.1, we set a threshold
10−θ and take the logarithm of the probability for degree equal to zero. This yields
the condition N log(1−µQ) ≈ NµQ ≤ θ log 10, an easy criterion to determine whether
a combination of N and µQ exceeds a probability threshold.
An empirical network which we want to reconnect typically has N between 100
and 2000. A 99.9% success rate in reconstruction (the node Q has degree of zero in
only 0.1% of the cases) implies θ = 3. The critical value of µQ then is in the range
of 0.0035 for N = 2000 and 0.069 for N = 100. Put another way, if the expected
value of Y |X = xq is larger than these values for a given N , node Q is connected in
practically all network reconstructions.
Figures 4·7 and 4·8 show the expected value for a broad range of network param-
eters. We plot the results for different quantiles of node strength for node Q. Since
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the quantile provides a relative strength estimate, this is equivalent to considering
different values M for the size of the layer in which Q is.
Figure 4·7 varies the σ2 parameter of the strength distribution in one of the layers
while holding it constant for the other layer. The network is reconstructed with a
density of d = 0.1. In the left panel we see that the expected value of connection
probabilities grows for node Q if the parameter σ2 in the layer of nodes Q can connect
to becomes larger. The intuition behind this is as follows: If the network is sparse, as
is the case in this example, a node with low strength in one layer is likely only able to
connect to nodes with high strength in the other layer. If the parameter σ2 is larger
in that other layer, there likely exist a few nodes with very high strength. Then node
Q, even if its strength is low, has a reasonable chance of forming at least one link. In
the right panel we see that the expected value of connection probabilities decreases
for node Q if the parameter σ2 in the layer in which Q is becomes larger. If the
strength distribution of this layer becomes more heterogeneous, then node Q at a low
quantile becomes weaker in relation to most other nodes in this layer. For example,
a node at quantile q = 0.95 is stronger than a node at quantile q = 0.05 by factor
of roughly e3.29σ
2
if the strengths are log-normally distributed with parameters µ = 0
and σ2. As a result, the nodes with large strength have such high probabilities in the
reconstruction that most links in a sparse network are assigned to them, leaving node
Q more likely to be unconnected. Note that we have not considered yet the number
of nodes N to which node Q can connect. The larger N is, the lower is the threshold
for the expected connection probability for Q that yields at least one connection in
the reconstruction.
Figure 4·8 varies the density of the network which we want to reconstruct for fixed
parameters σ2 for the two layers of the network. Unsurprisingly, the expected value
of the connection probability for Q grows with the density of the network, and it
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Figure 4·7: Average expected connection probability for node Q if
its strength is at the quantile values q = 1/400, 1/1000, 1/2500 de-
pending on the parameters of strength distributions. The network is
reconstructed with density d = 0.1. The left plot shows E [Y |X = xq]
if we vary the the parameter σ2N of the log-normal distribution of the
strengths of the nodes to which node Q can connect. The right plot
shows E [Y |X = xq] if we vary the the parameter σ2M of the log-normal
distribution of the strengths in the layer of node Q. In both cases we
keep the parameter σ2 fixed to 1 for the other layer.
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Figure 4·8: Average expected connection probability for node Q if its
strength is at the quantile values q = 1/400, 1/1000, 1/2500 depending
on the network density d. The left plot shows E [Y |X = xq] if σ2 is
bigger for the layer of the nodes to which Q can connect than for the
layer in which Q is. The right plot shows E [Y |X = xq] if σ2 in the
opposite case.
approaches one for a fully connected network. To get the probability that node Q
remains unconnected, we again need to consider what N is. Assume N = 100 and the
more favorable case of σ2N = 2, σ
2
M = 1 like in the left panel of Figure 4·8. In order
to have a probability of less than 10−3 that node Q is unconnected, the critical value
for the expected value is roughly 0.069, as we calculated earlier. If q = 1/400, this
value is reached at network density d ≈ 0.41. In relation to empirical networks, this
is a large value. If q = 1/1000 or q = 1/2500, d needs to be roughly 0.44 and 0.50,
respectively. In the less favorable case of σ2N = 1, σ
2
M = 2 like in the right panel, d
needs to be 0.66, 0.72, and 0.76 for the different quantiles. Most empirical networks
are not this highly connected, and the network reconstruction would fail for node Q
for the parameters used in this example.
So far, we have focused on the expected value E [Y |X = xq] = µ. We continue the
numerical analysis by calculating the probability that node Q remains unconnected,
which is given by (1 − µY )N , for different network densities, strength distributions,
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and values of N = 100, 400, 1000.
Figure 4·9 summarizes the probability that node Q remains unconnected for a
network of density d = 0.20 if its strength is at different quantiles of the strength
distribution. The color shows the probability of P (K = 0), and the x and y-axes cor-
respond to different strength distributions in the two layers of the bipartite network.
The quantile qs an estimate for its strength in relation to the other nodes in its layer.
Naturally, the smaller the quantile value, the more likely it is that node Q is not
connected to any of the N nodes it could connect to. An alternative interpretation
of the quantile value is the number of nodes node Q needs to compete against: if q is
very small, this is equivalent to node Q competing against a large number of nodes to
connect to the N nodes, and vice versa. Increasing the number of potential partners
N improves the connection probability considerably. A large value of N is particu-
larly important if the parameter σ2M , which describes the heterogeneity of node Q’s
layer, is large.
Let us briefly discuss the two most extreme cases. The top left panel corresponds
to a small network in which the layer of node Q has very many other nodes in it, while
the number of connection partners is rather low. Then for most strength distributions
node Q remains unconnected. The bottom right panel is corresponds to the opposite
case; there are few nodes in the layer of node Q, and they have many options to
connect to. Then for practically all strength distributions, node Q is connected in
the reconstructed network.
Let us now consider the case of two layers which have the same strength distribu-
tion, that is, the parameter σ2 is identical. Then the only difference between the two
layers is the number of nodes in them, measured by N and 1/q. Figure 4·10 shows,
from top to bottom, that networks with more homogeneous strength distributions are
easier to reconstruct in the sense that node Q is less likely to be disconnected. On
96
Figure 4·9: Probability that node Q remains unconnected in a recon-
struction of a network with density d = 0.2 as a function of the strength
distributions. The strength of node Q is, from top to bottom rows, at
quantile q = 10−3, q = 10−2, and q = 10−1. From left to right, we
calculate the cases N = 100, N = 400, and N = 1000.
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Figure 4·10: Probability that node Q remains unconnected in a recon-
struction of a network where the layers have the same strength distri-
butions. We consider different combinations of density d and quantile
q to compute the probability. The parameter σ2 of the strength distri-
bution of the layers is, from top to bottom rows, σ2 = 1, σ2 = 2, and
σ2 = 4. From left to right, we calculate the cases N = 100, N = 400,
and N = 1000.
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the y-axis of the heat maps we mark the density of the network, and on the x-axis we
show the strength quantile q, equivalent to the inverse of the layer size M . If Q has
a lot of competition to connect, that is, for small q or larger M , the reconstruction
is difficult for a broad range of densities, and it gets more and more difficult with
growing σ2, the layer inhomogeneity. For sufficiently large q or small M , node Q is
likely to be connected in the reconstructed network for all but very sparse networks
or low N .
In the following we supplement these theoretical calculations with a case study,
the reconstruction of the Japanese bank-firm network.
4.5 Data
The Nikkei Economic Electronic Databank System (NEEDS) contains large amounts
of financial data of Japanese banks and firms. It details the lending relationship be-
tween them, including the outstanding amount in Japanese yen as well as a distinction
between long-term and short-term debt. The data set further includes corporate bal-
ance sheets, making it an ideal source to study the effect of financial shocks and their
effect on the bank-firm network. While the database captures bank-firm relation-
ships since the 1980s for the biggest publicly listed companies, NEEDS underwent
some changes in the mid-1990s when its scope was expanded. Figure 4·11 illustrates
this change; since 1996 the database includes companies traded in over-the-counter
market, leading to an increase in the number of firms covered. These companies are
generally smaller than its previously covered counterparts. The number of banks in
the data set has slightly declined over time.
Due to the fundamental change in the composition of the database, the research
presented in this thesis covers the years 2000 through 2012. The significant change
in the pool of companies yielded consequences for the structure of the bank-firm net-
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Figure 4·11: Scope of the Nikkei NEEDS database which includes
over 100 banks and between 1400 and 2800 firms, depending on the
year.
work. The average degree of companies decreased after the expansion in the database,
presumably due to the inclusion of smaller firms with less need for large financing.
Roughly since the year 2000, however, the density of the network (which is the num-
ber of empirical links divided by the number of possible links), the average degree of
banks, and the average degree of companies has remained fairly constant.
4.6 Reconstruction of an empirical network
Since the data in NEEDS contains firm and bank specific information as well as the
exact lending relationship for each year, it allows to test the reconstruction obtained
through the configuration model with its fitness ansatz, introduced in Section 4.2.3.
At the heart of the configuration model is the assumption that there exists a con-
nection between a specific, intrinsic node property called strength and its degree k.
Recalling Eq. (4.14), the probability for a link between a node i in one layer and a
node α in the other layer is
piα =
zvicα
1 + zvicα
,
where z is the fitness parameter and vi and cα are the node strengths.
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Figure 4·12: Left: Network density of the bipartite graph derived
from banks in one layer and companies in the other. Right: Average
degree of the nodes in each layer.
A link in the original network indicates an outstanding loan between bank and
their client, a company, and its weight corresponds to the size of the loan. Mathemat-
ically, this is described by the weighted adjacency matrix W with entries wiα. The
marginals then are the total outstanding loans for both banks and customers. For
banks, this number corresponds to their exposure to the market, and for companies,
this number corresponds to the amount of money they owe:
vi =
∑
α
wiα,
cα =
∑
i
wiα.
Using Eq. (4.15), we calculated the marginals of all nodes and found the fitness
parameter z that reconstructed the density of the network. Since z is the only free
parameter of this reconstruction method, finding its value directly yielded a con-
nection probability for each node pair. Furthermore, a given value of z implies an
expected degree 〈k〉 for a node of strength vi or cα. For more information regarding
the calculation, see Squartini et al. [2017]. Figure 4·13 confirms that the strength of
the node as given by the total of outstanding loans is a reasonable good predictor for
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Figure 4·13: The Bipartite Configuration model assumes that there
exists a relationship between the node strengths vi, cα and the degrees
of the nodes. The empirical data is plotted as gray dots, and the
theoretical prediction from the model in red.
the degree of the corresponding bank or firm. It is noteworthy that the variance of
firm size given a certain degree is very large, while the model expectation is close to
the empirical data for banks.
We tested the whether the marginals followed a log-normal distribution by using
the Shapiro-test on the logarithm of the strength values. As a null hypothesis, we
assumed that the log-transformed data were normally distributed. The alternative
hypothesis was that they were not normally distributed. We rejected the null hypoth-
esis for the banks; however the sample was too small to form another hypothesis. For
most years we fail to reject the null hypothesis for the companies at the 95% confi-
dence level, implying that the strengths of firm nodes is log-normal. Coincidentally,
we rejected the null hypothesis in the years 2000, 2001 and 2008, coinciding with
major financial crisis.
We present the network reconstruction exemplarily for the year 2010. While the
distribution of the bank strengths is unknown, we determined the distribution of firm
strengths to be log-normal. The means and standard deviations of the strength data
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Figure 4·14: Empirical and theoretical distribution of connection
probabilities for the reconstruction of the network of Japanese banks
and firms in the year 2010.
computed to µB = 1.401, σB = 1.788 and µC = 3.665, σC = 2.134 for banks and
companies, respectively. Figure 4·14 shows the distribution of connection probabili-
ties, comparing it to the analytical solution for fY (y), assuming log-normal marginals
with the parameters above and the empirical network density which is known from the
data set. Despite the deviation from the model in case of the banks, the agreement
is remarkable. Due to the low density of the network, d ≈ 0.051, most probabilities
are very small.
We concluded from our analytical calculations and numerical results that the re-
construction of low sparsity networks proves particularly difficult for the nodes in the
much larger layer; in the case of the Japanese bank-firm network, this is the layer
with the companies. In the data set, they outnumber banks by a factor of 10 to
25, depending on the year. For the year 2010, which we focused our analysis on,
the data set contains 119 banks and 2339 companies. We thus hypothesized that
the ensemble of reconstructions would contain many networks in which a significant
number of companies have degree zero, that is, they are excluded from the recon-
structed network. We generated 1000 realizations of the network, and we checked
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Figure 4·15: Empirical and theoretical distribution of connection
probabilities for a small bank and a large bank.
how many banks and firms remained unconnected. Of the 119 banks, on average 3.47
(2.92%) were unconnected with a standard deviation of 1.28, and the median was 3.
The minimum number of unconnected banks was 0 and the maximum 8. Of the 2339
companies, on average 373.4 (16.0%) were unconnected with a standard deviation of
13.0, and the median was 374. The minimum of unconnected companies was 334 and
the maximum 415. In the 1000 realizations, one bank and 20 companies remained
unconnected every single time.
Exemplarily, we show the connection probabilities for a bank with small outstand-
ing loans and bank with large outstanding loans in Figure 4·15. We picked the bank
with the second smallest and the bank with the second largest portfolio and assumed
their strengths to be at the quantile values q = 2/119 and 118/119. To calculate the
conditional distributions for their connection probabilities, we estimated the parame-
ters for mean and standard deviation for the log of their strength values vi and cα. We
assumed the marginal distributions to be log-normal with the estimated parameters.
Despite these approximations, the fit is remarkable for both a bank at a low and a
bank at a high quantile. Similarly in Figure 4·16 we show the connection probabili-
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Figure 4·16: Empirical and theoretical distribution of connection
probabilities for a small company and a large company.
ties for a small company in terms of outstanding loans and a large company. Since
N = 119 possible connection yields a much smaller sample, the agreement of empiri-
cal probabilities and the theoretical curve is not as good as for the banks. However,
it describes the trend well.
4.7 Conclusion
When detailed network information is not available, we have to resort to recon-
struction methods. For bipartite networks, the enhanced capital-asset pricing model
(ECAPM), a configuration model, has proven successful in recent studies. Using
a maximum entropy approach, ECAPM generates an ensemble of networks which
fulfills known constraints of the original network. To generate the ensemble, the
algorithm relies on knowledge about the density of the network and some intrinsic
node parameters which are typically called strengths. If the network that needs to
be reconstructed is very sparse, like the Japanese bank-firm network which we stud-
ied, ECAPM may fail to connect a significant portion of nodes in many graphs of
the ensemble. Analytically and numerically, we have determined ranges of validity
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for the bipartite configuration model. Using this chapter as a blueprint, our calcula-
tions can easily be transferred to other reconstruction methods, like the universally
renormalizable model. to establish similar bounds.
Assuming log-normal distributions for node strengths in the layers of the net-
work, we derived the probability distributed of the connection probabilities according
to which links are formed in the reconstruction. We explored the results numerically
to determine for which parameters, like network density, variance of the marginal dis-
tributions, and network size, the chance of not connecting nodes at the lower quantiles
of the strength distribution is significantly different from zero. Using empirical data
from the Japanese bank-firm network, we illustrated that the analytical results pro-
vide valuable insights into the success or failure of network reconstruction even if
the assumptions of log-normal marginals are violated. So far, reconstructions have
been evaluated by considering how well the method recovers topological features like
degrees, nearest-neighbor degrees or clusters. Our work may be used to add to this
toolkit to determine the reliability of network reconstructions upon on which systemic
risks models are built.
A couple of avenues for future research offer themselves. Firstly, we may recon-
struct networks imposing a minimum degree of one for each node. In existing recon-
struction models, either the degree of nodes is imposed, requiring extensive knowledge
of the system, or the total number of links. An improvement of ECAPM, which is
of the latter type, needs to enforce degree of at least one for each node. Secondly,
renormalizable models may mitigate the limitations of configuration models as they
allow to group nodes and reconstruct on an aggregate level.
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Chapter 5
Measuring Currency Comovements with
Relative Entropy
We develop a new tool to measure the correlation of currencies. Using a network in-
terpretation of the foreign exchange market, we compute the information contained in
the edges, that is, in individual currency pairs. We identify currency pairs with large
deviations from the null model of no shared information. Studying the comovement
on an annual and quarterly basis, we observe relative stability of the foreign exchange
market. Finally, we relate the new measure to macroeconomic data such as govern-
ment bond yields, bilateral trade volumes, currency classifications, and daily turnover.
We build a generalized linear model in which we incorporate both the macroeconomic
data and idiosyncratic properties of currencies. We find that the bilateral trade vol-
ume between two countries or regions is a significant predictor of their currencies’
comovement. However, stock index correlation or share in daily turnover cannot be
confirmed as statistically significant influencers of our comovement measure.
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5.1 Introduction
The foreign exchange market is the largest financial market in the world by daily
turnover, and it is more liquid than other well-studied financial markets such as equity
or bond markets. While currency exchange is essential for world trade of goods and
services, participants in the foreign exchange market also include investors who wish to
invest in non-domestic assets like international stocks or bonds and need to exchange
currency, money managers who wish to hedge their positions in global equity markets,
or speculators. As for any traded asset, understanding correlations and dependencies
between different currencies is crucial to a successful trading strategy. Generally,
traders analyze the correlations between different pairs to guide their actions and
tune their strategies. While useful for practical application, these correlations between
currency pairs offer only limited insight into the underlying structure of the foreign
exchange market.
Taking a step back, we interpret the foreign exchange market as a network in
which the nodes are the currencies like the US dollar or the euro. The nodes are
connected through weighted links which reflect the exchange rate of a currency pair.
For example, the link between the US dollar node and the euro node is the EUR/USD
exchange rate, and as such it is a weighted link. Since the links are determined by
exchange rates, we refer to this network as the exchange rate network.
While the underlying macroeconomic fundamentals such as interest rates, infla-
tion or GDP affect the nodes of the exchange rate network, trading happens on the
edges. Changes in the characteristics of nodes happen over long time periods, that
is, quarters, years, or even decades. In contrast, the weights of the edges fluctuate
on very short time scales as the laws of supply and demand constantly incorporate
information about the nodes and future expectations of existing and new market par-
ticipants. To understand the dynamics of the foreign exchange market better, the
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task is then to relate the information contained in the nodes to the exchange rate
fluctuations purported by the links.
In this chapter, we identify channels of information transmission in the foreign
exchange network, that is, edges which carry significant information about the co-
movement of the currencies which they connect. We achieve this by introducing a
new measure rooted in information theory and with close connection to statistical
physics, the principle of maximum entropy. Considering a pair of currencies, we com-
pute the bivariate distribution of a network observable. We measure the amount of
information encoded in this empirical distribution and compare it to the null model
of independent currencies. This analysis provides novel insight into the correlation
structure of the foreign exchange market in two ways. Firstly, our study extends
beyond considering the correlation of currency pairs in isolation of the rest of the
market. Secondly, we are able to quantify the comovement of currencies regardless of
base currency. This removes the bias that is inherent to calculating, e.g., Pearson’s
correlation or copulas using a specific base currency. Papell and Theodoridis [2001]
and Hovanov et al. [2004] constitute only two examples of many in the literature
showing the impact of this bias.
The network observable that we study is called the degree imbalance and describes
the difference between in-degree and out-degree of a node [Mubayi et al., 2001]. This
thesis offers a network interpretation of the symbolic performance, introduced by
Wollschla¨ger et al. [2018]. The symbolic performance transforms the exchange rate
data into a ranking of appreciation and depreciation of individual currencies against
other currencies in the market. Thus it both discretizes the time series and removes
the effect of market volatility. The symbolic performance has proven useful to identify
the hierarchy in the foreign exchange market and to study the effect of central bank
interventions. It is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6 of this dissertation.
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: We cover the necessary concepts
from network science and information theory in Section 5.2.1. We briefly present the
rationale behind the symbolic performance (Wollschla¨ger et al. [2018] or Chapter 6).
Then we further show how to calculate the degree imbalance in the foreign exchange
network in order to recover the symbolic performance. We establish the maximum
entropy approach to study the null model of independence among currencies, and we
introduce the Kullback-Leibler divergence to measure the deviations of the empirical
data from the null model. In Section 5.2.5 we describe the foreign exchange data and
the macroeconomic data which we have downloaded from various sources. Section 5.3
introduces a generalized linear model with macroeconomic indicators as predictors for
the Kullback-Leibler divergence. We discuss these results in Section 5.4.
5.2 Methodology
5.2.1 Symbolic performance
Following Wollschla¨ger et al. [2018], we study a financial market made up of K cur-
rencies. K − 1 of these assets are quoted in a base currency, in our case that is the
euro. This gives us the exchange rate vector
~S(t) = (S1(t), S2(t), . . . , SK(t)) = (1, S2(t), . . . , SK(t)) , (5.1)
where we have set S1 = SEUR/EUR = 1 as a placeholder for the base currency. If
the market is sufficiently liquid, there should be no opportunity for arbitrage, and
then we can infer all exchange rates between currency i and j, with i, j = 2, . . . , K
from this vector. In other words, consideruing ~S(t) is sufficient to capture the entire
market. We proceed to calculate the time series of the log-returns,
Ri(t+ ∆t) = log
Si(t+ ∆t)
Si(t)
. (5.2)
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Log-returns have the desirable probability that they are additive across time, which
is not the case for returns calculated as the relative change. Especially in foreign
exchange markets, however, where the returns are very small for time steps of the
order of days or less, both measures practically yield the same numerical result.
The symbolic performance of currency i is defined as the number of currencies j
it rises against subtracted by the number of currencies K− j− 1 it falls against. The
symbolic performance ζi(t) of currency i at time t can then be found from ranking
the returns of all currencies and identifying its ordinal number:
ζi(t) = 2 rank [Ri(t)]− (K + 1). (5.3)
The values for ζi(t) range from −(K − 1) to (K − 1).
Alternatively, let us consider a network of K nodes which correspond to K curren-
cies. If the links correspond to foreign exchange rate information, then the network is
fully connected, and thus it has K(K − 1) links. Each of these links is bidirectional:
connecting currency 1 with currency 2 in one direction represents the value of cur-
rency 1 expressed in currency 2, and vice versa. Then the weighted adjacency matrix
of the network is the matrix of foreign exchange rates,
S(t) =

0 S1,2(t) · · · S1,K(t)
S2,1(t) 0 · · · S2,K(t)
...
...
. . .
...
SK,1(t) SK,2(t) · · · 0

, (5.4)
where the relationship Si,j(t) = 1/Sj,i(t) holds. If Si,j(t + ∆t) > Si,j(t), then the
base currency i appreciates against the quote currency j, and vice versa. Figure 5·1
shows the foreign exchange network for the case K = 3 with the currencies euro
(EUR), US dollar (USD), and Japanese yen (JPY). At any given time, one of the
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three currencies appreciates with respect to the other two, one of the three currencies
appreciates with respect to one and depreciates with respect to one, and one currency
depreciates with respect to the other two. Modifying the network illustrated in the
left panel of Figure 5·1 such that a link pointing from node i to node j indicates the
appreciation of currency i, we get a simple binary directed network. Let’s assume a
time step from t to t+∆t in which the euro appreciates against the US dollar and the
Japanese yen, and the US dollar appreciates against the yen. The resulting directed
network is shown in the right panel of Figure 5·1.
USD
JPY EUR
USD
JPY EUR
USD/EUR
EUR/USDUSD/JPY JPY/USD
EUR/JPY
JPY/EUR
Figure 5·1: Left: foreign exchange market consisting of K = 3 curren-
cies as a weighted directed network in which the links are the returns of
the pairs. Right: binary directed network indicating the appreciation
and depreciations for an arbitrary time step. In the example shown,
the euro appreciates against the US dollar and the yen, and the US
dollar appreciates against the yen only.
By construction, the symbolic performance is independent of base currency since
the ranking is invariant. This helps us in two ways. For one thing, we will be able
to include the base currency in our analysis and do not have to forgo its information.
This is one critical limitation of typical correlation analyses. For another thing, since
the time series ζi(t) is identical for any base currency, we are able to base our analysis
on the currency for which data are most readily available.
While correlation analyses in the classical sense always hinge on the choice of pairs
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or a base currency, the symbolic performance allows us to observe the comovement
of currencies against the background of the entire market. At any given time, we
can compare the positions of two currencies, albeit in broader terms than the specific
returns. Naturally the symbolic performance time series does not offer itself to be
investigated using Pearson’s correlation coefficient for a couple of reasons. One of
them is that two currencies can never have the same value at any given time since
we are strictly ranking returns, that is ζi(t) 6= ζj(t) if i 6= j. An analysis with
Pearson’s correlation coefficient would therefore be underestimating the correlation.
This problem with ordinal data was pointed out, for example, by Aitchison [1982].
Instead we consider the empirical joint distribution of a pair of two currencies. At
any given time, a pair of two currencies can be in a total of K(K − 1) states, where
each state is a pair of two ranks. For our data set, this amounts to 132 possible states.
The likelihood of each combination to occur is dominated by two factors:
(i) The marginal distributions of each currency set the boundaries for the shape
of the joint distribution. If both currencies have neither very high or very low
rank, then the states that describe the appearance of both currencies in one of
those ranks at the same time is very unlikely. This is a simple consequence of
Bayes’ theorem.
(ii) Correlations and anti-correlations determine the shape of the joint distributions
within these boundaries.
It is entirely possible to consider two different pairs of currencies with identical
marginal distributions, but entirely different joint distributions. This difference would
then arise from comovements, for example.
In either case, we start with the null model of independent currencies, that is,
currencies whose bivariate distribution is determined entirely by the marginals ac-
cording to (i). In order to quantify the deviation of an empirical distribution from
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the null model, we first need to determine the distributions that arises from the
marginal distributions of the two currencies we wish to analyze. The most general
joint distribution of the two currencies would be the one that assumes, firstly, no
further knowledge than their marginal distributions and, secondly, that the two cur-
rencies cannot have the same symbolic performance at any given time. Using the
method of the the principle of maximum entropy, which we explain further in Section
5.2.2, we are able to compute the null distribution. In brief, the principle of max-
imum entropy yields the distribution which under the given constraints maximizes
our ignorance. Consequently, any deviation of an empirical joint distribution from
the MaxEnt distribution encodes some kind of information.
We hypothesize that this information arises from the correlation structure of the
foreign exchange market. In Section 5.2.3 we proceed to explain how we can measure
the difference between two bivariate distributions in a way that is naturally linked to
the amount of information encoded in the empirical distribution.
5.2.2 Maximum entropy estimation of probability distributions
For any given pair of currencies, we can extract the empirical bivariate distribution
of their symbolic performances. This distribution indicates which positions the two
currencies take in the market simultaneously. This offers insight into whether they
take similar or opposite market positions over time.
Furthermore we compute the bivariate distribution that arises from the marginal
distributions of the currencies if we assume independence. We then use distance
measures in probability space to quantify the degree to which the empirical bivariate
distribution of two currencies is similar or dissimilar to that of two independently
moving currencies that otherwise share the same characteristics. This enables us
to measure the degree of dependence between two currencies and their roles in the
entire foreign exchange market. Both the estimate of the bivariate distribution of
114
independent currencies and the distance measure in probability space require us to
introduce the concept of entropy.
Researchers and traders have been successful in applying entropy methods to fi-
nance, based on their connection to statistics and physics. Zhou et al. [2013] offers
a review of a variety of uses. Some applications include portfolio selection and opti-
mization as well as asset pricing and risk management (see Philippatos and Wilson
[1972], White [1974], Avellaneda [1998], Gulko [2002]).
However, entropy has first been used in the context of statistical physics and ther-
modynamics. It can be interpreted as a measure of order in a physical system. More
precisely, it measures the number of available microstates, that is, specific configu-
rations of the system which the system can attain. Systems with a few but very
well distinguishable microstates carry a low amount of entropy. We can say that
the potential for disorder is rather low. Conversely, systems with a large number of
indistinguishable microstrates exhibit a large amount of entropy.
One of the fundamental laws of thermodynamics specifies that the entropy of a
system increases over time unless we put work into the system to maintain order.
Information theory takes a slightly different twist on the matter and defines that
entropy quantifies the information content, e.g., of a message. In the physics picture,
a system with few available microstates carries a large amount of information because
we can easily identify the possible configurations. Likewise, a system with a large
number of indistinguishable microstates contains little information because we cannot
identify in which one of the many available microstates the system is. In other words,
even in physics systems with low entropy carry a lot of information, and systems
with high entropy exhibit a lower amount of information content. This leads to the
following conclusion: When we observe a system that maintains a state that is not
the state with the highest possible entropy, there is a mechanism which creates some
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kind of order in the system. This may be the sun providing energy to earth such that
complex, more ordered organisms could form, or this may be a writer assembling
letters in a particular order to create readable content, i.e., provide information.
Using these insights, the principle of maximum entropy was formulated. Let us
assume we are given some prior information which constrain the probability distri-
bution. The most general distribution to describe the data is the distribution that
exhibits the largest entropy while satisfying the constraints. Any distribution with
lower entropy than that of the maximum entropy distribution would assume infor-
mation that we do not have. Jaynes [1982] stated the principle of maximum entropy,
or MaxEnt principle, and asserted: “When we make inferences based on incomplete
information, we should draw them from that probability distribution that has the
maximum entropy permitted by the information we do have.”
There exists a close connection between Bayes’ theorem and the principle of max-
imum entropy. In both cases, we use information to update our prior beliefs. If
the information comes strictly in the form of data we gather, we use Bayes’ theorem
to update our prior distribution. If, however, the information comes in the form of
constraints, that is, testable information, the principle of maximum entropy is used
instead. In fact, as Caticha et al. [2004] pointed out, if the prior knowledge we possess
can be interpreted both as data and as a constraint, Bayes’ theorem and the principle
of maximum entropy are equivalent.
5.2.3 Relative entropy and Jensen-Shannon divergence
Much in the same way as entropy allows us to quantify the information content of
a distribution, it can be used to measure distances in distribution space. Consider
an underlying true distribution P (x). Then any approximation of this distribution
by Q(x) will result in a loss of information. The Kullback-Leibler divergence (KL
divergence) was introduced in information theory to quantify this information loss.
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It can be extended to a metric in the space of probability distributions, and it is
defined as
DKL(P ||Q) =
N∑
i=1
P (xi) log
P (xi)
Q(xi)
, (5.5)
is a generalization of the entropy given in Eq. (4.1) and also called “relative entropy.”
It measures the information difference between the distributions P (x) and Q(x). In
that light, entropy is a special case of relative entropy given uniform Q, modulo a
constant.
Let us assume we found the proper MaxEnt distribution for the given marginals.
In the process, we have assumed that nothing is known about the interaction and
comovement of two currencies. However, we want to find out how much information
is encoded in the empirical distribution. Then we have to compare this empirical
distribution to the joint distribution that arises from the constraints of our problem.
Here the KL divergence emerges as a natural choice.
The Kullback-Leibler divergence can also be understood as a measure of how far
apart two distributions are in distribution space. However, it is not a metric. The
KL divergence is, for example, not symmetric under the exchange P ↔ Q. However,
it can be generalized to a fulfill the requirements of a metric. Using the arithmetic
mean M = 1
2
(P +Q), one can define the so-called Jensen-Shannon divergence (JS
divergence) as follows [Fuglede and Topsoe, 2004]:
DJS(P ||Q) = 1
2
DKL(P ||M) + 1
2
DKL(Q||M). (5.6)
Then d(P,Q) =
√
DJS(P ||Q) is a metric in distribution space.
For our purposes the metric property is not as important. Instead it may be
useful to rescale the Kullback-Leibler divergence to a range from 0 to 1, making it
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comparable to an absolute correlation measure:
DKL → 1− exp[−DKL] ≡ rKL. (5.7)
Note that this transformation reduces to the original expression in a first order ap-
proximation. This transformation finds applications in many fields of finance in order
to rescale a variable to the interval from zero to one. One example we already saw
in Chapter 3 is the calculation of the default probability of a credit instrument from
the spread of the underlying credit default swap (compare Chan-Lau [2006]).
5.2.4 Generalized linear models
To explain a variable y that can take any value on the real axis in terms of one or more
independent variables xn, the standard tool of statistics is linear regression. Given a
data set with i = 1, . . . ,M observations and n = 1, . . . , N independent variables, one
builds a model of the form
y(i) = β0 + β1x
(i)
1 + · · ·+ βNx(i)N + (i), (5.8)
where the superscript indicates an individual observation and the subscript denotes
the independent variables and their coefficients. (i) is an error term, accounting
for noise and deviations between the model and observations not explained by the
independent variables. In the case of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, the
coefficients β0, . . . , βN are determined such that the model minimizes the squared
error of the observations y(i) and the model prediction yˆ(i). In matrix from, the
model equation becomes
y = Xβ + . (5.9)
The solution for the coefficient vector β can be found analytically. This, however,
involves matrix inversion; in many situations it is advantageous to consider numerical
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methods like gradient descent that are computationally less expensive, for example
when the matrix X becomes large.
OLS regression assumes that the entries in the error term  are distributed nor-
mally with zero mean and constant variance. Often, this assumption is violated
to some degree, and in that case different regression approaches need to be consid-
ered. Additionally, the transformed Kullback-Leibler divergence rKL is constrained
to the interval from zero to one, per Eq. (5.7). Mitigating the shortcomings of OLS
regression, we can turn to generalized linear models (GLM) which allow the depen-
dent variable y to be distributed according to a member of the exponential family,
relaxing the normality assumption in OLS regression. Introduced by Nelder and
Wedderburn [1972], generalized linear models use a link function to describe the re-
lationship of the expected value of the data and the mean of a distribution function,
η = g
(
E[y(i)]
)
= Xβ. Such a generalized linear model then takes the following form:
η(i) = β0 + β1x
(i)
1 + · · ·+ βNx(i)N + (i), (5.10)
in which the link function η = g (E[Y ]) is supplemented by a variance function
Var(Y ) = φV (E[Y ]), were φ is a constant. Possible choices for the link function
include the identity, used to recover a normal distribution, or the logarithm, typically
used in connection with a Poisson distribution, that is log (E[Y ]) = Xβ. The data
we describe in Section 5.2.5 includes categorical data like currency classifications and
suggests the use of a GLM based on the Poisson distribution.
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5.2.5 Data
Foreign exchange data
We used the trading platform Oanda to download intraday foreign exchange data. We
employed Oanda’s open access API1. As outlined in Section 5.2.1, the time series of
one base currency is sufficient, and we could infer all information from the exchange
rates of the other currencies with that base currency. We chose the euro as the
base currency since it offers the largest and most complete dataset on Oanda. We
downloaded data from January 2005 to May 2018 in ten minute intervals. Our dataset
contained the following currencies, where in brackets we provide the three-letter code
which we will often use to refer to the currencies: Australian dollar (AUD), Canadian
dollar (CAD), Swiss franc (CHF), euro (EUR), British pound (GBP), Japanese yen
(JPY), Mexican peso (MXN), New Zealand dollar (NZD), Norwegian krona (NOK),
Swedish krona (SEK), US dollar (USD), and South African rand (ZAR).
This gave us K = 12 distinct exchange rate time series Si(t), i = 1, . . . , 12,
t = 1, . . . , T , where we included the euro time series consisting of only ones, S1(t) =
SEUR/EUR(t) ≡ 1. Analogously, we had K = 12 distinct return time series Ri(t),
i = 1, . . . , 12, t = 2, . . . , T , where, again, we included the euro time series, now
consisting of only zeros, R1(t) = REUR/EUR(t) ≡ 1. If any exchange rate data
were missing for a time point, we excluded the time point from our analysis. If two
consecutive exchange rates did not correspond to a ten minute interval, we excluded
the return corresponding between these two time points.
Macroeconomic data
Since foreign exchange rates are affected by macroeconomic indicators like interest
rates, trade volume, commodity prices, stock index correlations and others, we down-
1 http://developer.oanda.com
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loaded the corresponding data. In the following we describe the data sources as well
as the necessary data cleaning.
Trade volume. The Comtrade Database provided by the United Nations (UN) is
a “repository of official international trade statistics”2. It is compiled by the Trade
Statistics Branch of the Statistics Division, Department of Economic and Social Af-
fairs of the UN. While it contains a detailed breakdown of goods and services traded
between more than 170 nations, we downloaded only the gross total of annually im-
ported and exported commodities. We selected the countries according to the twelve
currencies in our data set: Australia, Canada, Switzerland, the countries of the eu-
rozone, the United Kingdom, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, the
United States and South Africa. Each entity reports their trade statistics with their
trading partners to the UN which compiles the data into a standard format as outlined
in the Comtrade user manual3: “All commodity values are converted from national
currency into US dollars using exchange rates supplied by the reporter countries, or
derived from monthly market rates and volume of trade.” Using the user interface
provided in UN Comtrade database, we downloaded the trade volume reported by
each country in our data set with annual frequency from 2012 to 2017. Table 5.1
shows the result for a subset of the countries; entries are in billions of US dollars.
Treasury bond yields. A treasury bond is a bond issued by the United States
Department of the Treasury. In order to finance the operations of government, the
Treasury auctions debt securities like the treasury bond (T-bond). While a variety of
such debt instruments exists, the 10-year T-bond stands out in importance. It is used
to price mortgage rates, and it is very actively traded in secondary markets. When
the T-bond is issued, the coupon payments through which the interest on the bond
2 https://comtrade.un.org
3 https://unstats.un.org/unsd/tradekb/Knowledgebase/50075/What-is-UN-Comtrade
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Imp. AUD CAD CHF EUR GBP
Exp.
AUD — 1.414 0.8 6.044 7.3
CAD 1.5 — 1.0 16.5 13.1
CHF 2.4 3.5 — 104.9 29.6
EUR 26.7 31.6 126.4 — 285.6
GBP 5.3 6.2 19.4 163.0 —
Table 5.1: Trade volumes in billion US dollar between the different
currency regions Australia (AUD), Canada (CAD), Switzerland (CHF),
the eurozone (EUR) and the United Kingdom (GBP). The rows indicate
the exporter and the columns indicate the importer.
is paid out, is fixed. In the secondary market, traders react to changes in economic
policy like interest rate changes and trade the bond at a discount or at a premium. If
the Federal Reserve (Fed) changes its target federal funds rate, colloquially just called
“interest rate”, this has an impact on T-bond prices. If the Fed increases its target
rate, for example, an older T-bond become less desirable to own since it was priced
with a lower target rate in mind. Consequently, such a T-bond is sold at a discount
in the secondary market. As a result, the yield of the T-bond increases according to
Yield =
Annual Dollar Interest Paid
Market Price
× 100%. (5.11)
Since 10-year Treasury bonds are so actively traded and have an equivalent in most
economies, we used them as a proxy for monetary policy such as changes in interest
rates. Using the provided API, we downloaded the data from the database of the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED) which uses the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) as its source [OECD, 2018]. We downloaded
the quarterly yield of the 10-year governments bond from 2012 to 2017. The ap-
pendix (C.1) offers an overview of the respective government debt instruments for
the countries in our data.
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We used the treasury bond yields as a proxy for the nominal interest rates to
consider the so-called international Fisher effect. Observing, for example, the euro and
the US dollar and their respective nominal interest rates ie and i$, the international
Fisher effect anticipates a change E(e) in the exchange rate of
E(e) =
1 + ie
1 + i$
− 1. (5.12)
For typical interest rates or bond yields in our case in the range of −2% to 10%, this
expression is well approximated by E(e) ≈ log
(
1+ie
1+i$
)
.
Stock indices. A major indicator of economic health is the stock market. We
approximated the stock market performance of each country or economic region by
considering the iShares exchange-traded funds (ETF) for the countries in our data
set. For the eurozone, for example, we used the iShares ETF which tracks large
and mid-sized publicly listed companies from countries using the euro as their official
currency. A detailed list of the ETFs used in this thesis is provided in the appendix,
C.1. While tracking the performance of an index (or any other basket of assets), an
ETF trades like a security itself. In particular, we could choose ETFs that are traded
on the same stock exchange. We downloaded the data from Morningstar in daily
frequency for the years 2012 through 2017. Using Pearson’s correlation coefficient for
two time series X = x1, . . . xn, Y = y1, . . . yn,
r =
∑n
i=1(xi − 〈x〉)(yi − 〈y〉)√∑n
i=1(xi − 〈x〉)2
√∑n
i=1(yi − 〈y〉)2
, (5.13)
with mean 〈x〉 and 〈y〉, respectively, we calculated the quarterly and the annual
correlation coefficient of the ETFs corresponding to the stock markets in our data
set.
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Classification of currencies. Our regression analysis included dummy variables
to study whether the classification of a currency as a reserve currency or commodity
currency had an effect on its behavior in the foreign exchange network. While these
classifications are more qualitative in nature, they have been well established for
practitioners as well as in the literature. Compare, for example Chen et al. [2010] or
Hossfeld and MacDonald [2015]. We again refer to the appendix (C.1) for a list of
the classifications we have used.
5.3 Results
5.3.1 Annual intervals
We observed significant deviations from the null model distribution which were per-
sistent for many years. These deviations were particularly pronounced for some cur-
rency pairs such as the euro and the Swiss franc or the Australian dollar and the New
Zealand dollar. Other currency pairs indicated codependence in some years while
not in others, such as the US dollar and the Japanese yen, or the US dollar and
the Mexican peso. Some currencies exhibited overall larger deviations from the null
model across a broad range of currencies, like the euro or the US dollar, while others
like the British pound or the Canadian dollar appeared to move independently from
other currencies. Figure 5·2 shows the Kullback-Leibler divergence of the bivariate
distributions for all possible combinations of two currencies and the null model of
independence for the years 2012 through 2017.
Note that the matrices in Figure 5·2 are symmetric. Furthermore, the diagonal
elements in each matrix are not defined since the null model of independence does not
exist. All other entries, however, are non-zero: due to the finiteness of the data, the
Kullback-Leibler divergence like any entropic measure yields a finite result, bounded
by the system being studied.
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Figure 5·2: Kullback-Leibler divergences between the empirical bi-
variate distributions and the null model of independence for the years
2012 through 2017.
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The finiteness of the data also induces some noise which results in an overestima-
tion of KL divergence. Steuer et al. [2002] provides an estimate of the finite size effect
for the mutual information I(X;Y ) which is closely related to the Kullback-Leibler
divergence:
∆I(X;Y ) =
Mx,y −Mx −My + 1
2N
(5.14)
where Mx,y,Mx,My denote the number of discrete states with nonzero probability. In
our case, Mx = My = M = 12, the number of currencies, and Mx,y = M(M−1) = 132
to account for the diagonal. N is the number of observations. We used this estimate
for our measure of the Kullback-Leibler divergence and calculated the systematic
error through finite size effects as ∆DKL(P ||Q) = 109/(2N). This yields the error
estimates shown in Table 5.2.
time N ∆DKL
2012 23481 0.00232
2013 34135 0.00160
2014 33043 0.00165
2015 33287 0.00164
2016 35025 0.00156
2017 34762 0.00157
Table 5.2: Finite size error estimates for the KL divergence.
While some values in Figure 5·2 were small, each calculated value for the Kullback-
Leibler divergence exceeded the threshold from the finite size effect calculated in
Table 5.2. Nevertheless we observed that the majority of currency pairs, on average,
only differed very slightly from the behavior we would expect of two independently
moving currencies. Yet we observed some significant outliers.
Especially the euro and the US dollar showed overall higher values. Some specific
currency pairs, such as the NOK and SEK or the AUD and NZD, also tended to show
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larger comovement than two currencies moving independently of each other. Overall,
the euro showed the highest average value for the JS divergence, closely followed by
the US dollar. This confirms that these currencies are indeed major entities in the
foreign exchange market in the sense that their course movements strongly affect
other currencies. Additionally, the difference between the empirical joint distribution
of the symbolic performances of euro and US dollar was significant. Further data
analysis indicated that euro and US dollar, however, tended to stay on opposite sides
of the market. In other words, if one currency appreciated with respect to a majority
of the remaining currencies, the other currency was more likely to depreciate overall
than just by chance. This hints that these two currencies served as the pole markers
of the foreign exchange market for the time period we studied.
It is not surprising that the South African rand, as the smallest currency of our set
and the economically least intertwined, showed a very low KL divergence across most
pairs. This indicates that it moved like an independent and, on average, uncorrelated
currency within the market. The South African rand showed only some dependence
on the euro and US dollar, which is in line with the assumption that these two
currencies dominated the overall market development.
More striking, however, was the apparent independence of the British pound. Its
average KL divergence was even smaller than that of the South African rand, and it
was even less affected by EUR and USD than the South African rand.
5.3.2 Quarterly intervals
For a more detailed analysis of the development over time, we extended the observa-
tion period and and study the KL divergence of one currency with all other currencies
at a finer time-resolution, considering the data quarter by quarter. Given that one
time interval is 10 minutes long, one quarter contained approximately 8000 to 9000
observations. Only in the year 2012, some quarters contained less data points, re-
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flecting the poorer data quality during that time. Corresponding to the analysis in
Table 5.2, this corresponded to a lower bound to our ability to resolve the KL di-
vergence to 0.6 × 10−2 for most quarters and 1.1 × 10−2 for the affected quarters in
2012. Again, we determined that the KL divergence we observed exceeded this lower
bound for every currency pair.
Average comovements over time
The results are presented in Figure 5·3 and show that the KL divergence was a fairly
constant quantity for most currencies. Notable exceptions included the Swiss franc
(CHF), euro (EUR) and the US dollar (USD). The pegging and unpegging of the
Swiss franc to the euro altered the relationship of the foreign exchange market in
that the pegging increased the information contained in the time series on one hand
and altered possible diversification strategies on the other. The first peak in the panel
for the Swiss franc corresponds to the time immediately after the peg to the euro, and
the second peak corresponds to the unpegging. A result of the unpegging was that
the Swiss franc moved rather independently from the rest of the market, as indicated
by a very low KL divergence value. Similar results, albeit weaker, were found for the
euro. Since it has been exhibiting large comovements with other European currencies,
like the Swedish and Norwegian krona, the effect of the peg and unpeg was not as
pronounced for the euro. The third peak for the Swiss franc and the euro also appears
in the graphs for most other currencies, indicating a global event in the first quarter of
2016. It was observed for the Australian and Canadian dollar, the Japanese yen, the
Mexican peso, and the New Zealand dollar. Potentially also the Swedish krona and
the South African rand exhibited a small spike in this quarter. Notably, the increase
in average KL divergence for these currencies could not be attributed to the behavior
of two or three currencies only; instead a majority of the currencies in the market
exhibited a larger comovement. Interestingly, the US dollar and the Norwegian krona
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Figure 5·3: Kullback-Leibler divergence for currencies resolved on a
quarterly basis. The value shown in this figure is the average KL di-
vergence of a currency with all other currencies in the data set. As
usual, a larger KL divergence indicates that the time series of the cur-
rency shown with other currencies contained more information than if
we assumed independence.
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exhibited a decrease in KL divergence at the same time, both quarter over quarter
and year over year for the first quarter of 2016. Future research into the causes is
necessary, however, one event comes to mind: in January 2016, the sanctions on Iran
were lifted, changing the landscape of the oil market – incidentally, the two currencies
with decrease in KL divergence belong to two major players in this market. Another
observation in Figure 5·3 supports this hypothesis: in early 2015, both the US dollar
and the Norwegian krona exhibited a spike in their KL divergence. This coincided
with large swings in oil price: in Q4 of 2014 the oil price dropped 40 percent, and
in Q1 of 2015 it dropped another 10 percent, only to recover by 25 percent in the
following quarter. Our hypothesis is further motivated by the findings in Chapter 2,
where we found that currencies of oil-exporting nations and of the US were positively
correlated for many years before 2012 already.
GLM with macroeconomic data
In Section 5.2.5 we described macroeconomic data which we identified as potential
predictors for the KL divergence of a currency pair. Using a generalized linear model,
we studied the impact of stock index covariance, bilateral trade volume, bilateral
trade imbalances, treasury bonds yields, share of the currency pair in daily FX mar-
ket turnover, and geographic proximity. Additionally the model included dummy
variables for currency classifications, that is, indicators whether the two currencies
were both considered as reserve currencies, commodity currencies, a mix of both, or
none of the above. This model based on classification is abbreviated “class”. We then
considered a second model in which we included dummy variables for each currency to
capture idiosyncratic characteristic properties which may not be explained otherwise
instead of classifications. This model based on idiosyncratic currency characteristics
is abbreviated “idio”. Features were then selected based on their impact on the root-
mean-square error which we computed after splitting the data in a training set (80%)
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and a test set (20%). If a feature neither reduced the RMSE nor exhibited statistical
significance at the 95 percent level, we excluded the feature. As a result we were left
with the following independent variables: stock market covariance, log of mean trade
volume, log of the ratio in Eq. (5.12) using the treasury bond yields and a dummy
variable for the currency cap between the Swiss franc and the euro until early 2015.
η(class) = β0 +XIndexCov β1 +Xlog(MeanTradeV ol) β2 +Xlog(Fisher) β3
+DCap β4 +DCommComm β5 +DCommRes β6
+DResRes β7 +DCurrOther β8.
(5.15)
Similarly, the second model was described by
η(idio) = β˜0 +XIndexCov β˜1 +Xlog(MeanTradeV ol) β˜2 +Xlog(Fisher) β˜3 +DCap β˜4
+DAUD β˜5 +DCAD β˜6 +DCHF β˜7 +DEUR β˜8
+DGBP β˜9 +DJPY β˜10 +DMXN β˜11 +DNOK β˜12
+DNZD β˜13 +DSEK β˜14 +DUSD β˜15 +DZAR β˜16
(5.16)
In both equations, X indicates a real-valued variable, while D denotes a dummy
variable for categorical data. We used β and β˜ for the regression coefficients in the
two different models, respectively, to avoid confusion. The results for the generalized
linear model based the classification predictor in Eq. (5.15) are shown in Table 5.3
where we report the coefficients and their significance levels. We report results for
the generalized linear model in Eq. (5.16) in Table 5.4.
In the model based on currency classification we observed that the trade volume,
the currency cap indicator for the Swiss franc and the euro, and currency classifi-
cations were significant predictors of the currency comovement as measured through
rKL. Positive coefficients contribute to higher comovement, that is, a larger deviation
from the null hypothesis of independence. Large bilateral trade volume and the cap
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Model: GLM AIC: 366.3
Link Function: log BIC: −11589.4
Dependent Variable: rKL Log-Likelihood: −175.2
Method: IRLS LL-Null: −183.5
No. Observations: 1584 Deviance: 22.2
Df Model: 7 Pearson χ2: 27.2
Df Residuals: 1576 Scale: 1.0
Coef. Std. Err. z P > |z|
β0 −6.175 ∗∗∗ 1.672 −3.694 0.000
IndexCov 2516. 1877. 1.341 0.180
log(MeanTradeVol) 0.413 ∗ 0.208 1.985 0.047
log(Fisher) −11.57 8.759 −1.321 0.187
Cap 1.755 ∗ 0.688 2.550 0.011
CommComm −1.557 ∗∗ 0.591 −2.636 0.008
CommRes −1.659 ∗∗ 0.548 −3.008 0.003
ResRes −1.812 ∗∗ 0.694 −2.611 0.009
CurrOther −1.157 ∗∗ 0.438 −2.639 0.008
Table 5.3: Result: Generalized linear model for currency comovements
rKL based on macroeconomic data and currency classifications.
contributed to higher comovement. The more two currency regions traded bilaterally,
measured as the logarithm of the sum of the imports and exports to one another, the
bigger rKL. Since the cap enforced by the Swiss National Bank against the euro linked
the value of the currencies closer together, it is not surprising that we observed it to
have a positive effect on their comovement. The dummy variables for classification all
have negative coefficients, albeit to varying degrees. The comovement of two reserve
currencies, or the amount of information in their link in the foreign exchange network,
was most strongly negatively affected. This is explicable in part due to the influence
of the Swiss franc-euro cap on the one hand and the fact that reserve currencies in our
data set belong to countries and regions with a large trade volume, e.g. the EU and
the United States on the other. The stock index covariance appeared to contribute
positively to the comovement of currencies, however, the result was not significant at
the 95% level. The impact of bond yields was determined to be negative, albeit not
at the significance level we considered.
Table 5.4 describes the model focusing on idiosyncratic properties of currencies as
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Model: GLM AIC: 374.3
Link Function: log BIC: −11538.4
Dependent Variable: rKL Log-Likelihood: −171.2
Method: IRLS LL-Null: −183.5
No. Observations: 1584 Deviance: 14.1
Df Model: 15 Pearson χ2: 17.2
Df Residuals: 1568 Scale: 1.0
Coef. Std. Err. z P > |z|
β0 −7.952 ∗∗∗ 2.287 −3.477 0.001
IndexCov 2174. 2075. 1.048 0.295
log(MeanTradeVol) 0.735 ∗ 0.301 2.373 0.018
log(Fisher) −18.65 13.60 −1.371 0.170
Cap 0.936 0.785 1.193 0.233
AUD −1.114 ∗ 0.511 −2.182 0.029
CAD −1.664 ∗∗ 0.567 −2.935 0.003
CHF −1.073 ∗ 0.502 −2.135 0.033
EUR −1.562 ∗ 0.746 −2.095 0.036
GBP −2.630 ∗∗∗ 0.742 −3.545 0.000
JPY −1.653 ∗∗ 0.616 −2.684 0.007
MXN −0.972 0.567 −1.716 0.086
NOK −1.124 ∗ 0.493 −2.376 0.018
NZD −0.603 0.408 −1.480 0.139
SEK −0.989 ∗ 0.497 −2.071 0.038
USD −1.868 ∗ 0.769 −2.430 0.015
ZAR −0.653 0.668 −0.978 0.328
Table 5.4: Result: Generalized linear model for currency comovements
rKL based on macroeconomic data and conditioned on currencies.
opposed to qualitative currency classifications like in Table 5.3. Of the macroeconomic
indicators, only the trade emerged as significant at the 95% level. The dummy vari-
ables for the currencies are significant, except for the Mexican peso, the New Zealand
dollar, and the South African rand, which coincidentally are the currencies with the
smallest daily turnover in our data set. The coefficients for stock index covariance
and Fisher effect appeared with the same sign as for the classification model.
5.4 Discussion
We presented a network interpretation of the symbolic performance, which can be
calculated as the degree imbalance in a network in which the nodes are currencies
and directed links indicate appreciation and depreciation relationships. Using tools
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from information theory, we introduced a new measure for comovement of currencies.
For this new measure we calculate the Kullback-Leibler divergence of distribution of
degree imbalances of currencies. A large value indicates a strong deviation of the null
hypothesis that the degree imbalance of currencies, and thus their appreciations and
depreciations, are independent and due to noise.
Our results showed the major roles of the euro, buoyed by the interaction with
other European currencies in our data set. As expected, the smallest currency in the
data set, the South African rand, shared little information with other currencies. More
surprisingly, the British pound appreciated and depreciated practically independently
from all other currencies, including the euro and the US dollar, the currencies of two
major trading partners. Interestingly, this did not change after the Brexit vote in
2016. Our analysis furthermore recovered the effect of the Swiss franc peg to the euro
and its effect on the market. It also showed an interesting emergence of comovement
of many currencies in our data set in early 2016, and we hypothesize that this can
be linked to the lifting of sanctions on Iran. Our hypothesis is supported by the fact
that the comovement excluded the US dollar and the Norwegian krona, two important
currencies in the oil market.
Building a generalized linear model, we studied macroeconomic indicators and
their influence on the comovement of currencies. We found a significant positive
impact from the bilateral trading volume. The stock index covariance as well as
the international Fisher effect had positive and negative coefficients, respectively;
however, they were not statistically significant at the 95% level. While currency
specific characteristics had a significant impact on their comovement, we showed that
characterizing them into reserve currencies, commodity currencies, and other was a
sufficient substitute.
For future research, the investigation of lead-lag relationships in the comovement
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is an obvious next step. Identifying the empirical and theoretical bivariate distri-
butions of the symbolic performance, our new comovement measure allows to study
which pairs currencies are leading indicators. While this measure was undirected for
synchronous appreciations and depreciations, lead-lag relationships are directed, al-
lowing us to also consider directed macroeconomic indicators, for example on bilateral
trade or differences in employment or GDP.
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Chapter 6
Political and Economic Effects on
Currency Clustering Dynamics
We propose a new measure named the symbolic performance to better understand
the structure of foreign exchange markets. Instead of considering currency pairs, we
isolate a quantity that describes each currency’s position in the market, independent
of a base currency. We apply the k-means++ clustering algorithm to analyze how
the roles of currencies change over time, from reference status or minimal appreci-
ations and depreciations with respect to other currencies to large appreciations and
depreciations. We show how different central bank interventions and economic and
political developments, such as the cap on the Swiss franc to the euro enforced by
the Swiss National Bank or the Brexit vote, affect the position of a currency in the
global foreign exchange market.
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6.1 Introduction
Similar to other financial markets, exchange rates between different currencies are
determined by the laws of supply and demand in the forex market. Additionally,
market participants (financial institutions, traders, and investors) consider macroe-
conomic factors such as interest rates and inflation to assess the value of a currency.
Central banks may participate in the forex market as well, when pursuing their fiscal
and monetary policy goals. The degree of central bank interventions in the market
determines the regime in which a currency trades. Some central banks peg their
currency to another currency, using their assets in the market to accomplish a fixed
exchange rate. If a central bank does not intervene, its currency is considered free-
floating, meaning that the exchange rate is mostly determined by market forces. Some
central banks allow their currency to float freely within a certain range, in a so-called
managed float regime.
The value of any given currency is expressed with respect to the rest of the mar-
ket through pairwise exchange rates. Currency quotes thus exhibit an important
difference to equity, fixed income or commodity markets where prices of these assets
are quoted in one specific currency. A consequence of this is that the appreciation
of one currency implies the depreciation of the currency against which it is traded.
This structural property of the market in combination with the strong influence by
macroeconomic fundamentals and central banks as market participants have led to
specific characteristic behaviors for currencies.
Qualitatively, we can distinguish between hard and soft currencies; hard currencies
are considered a store of value due to their stability even in adverse global economic
conditions, and soft currencies are more volatile, for example due to deteriorating
economic conditions in respective countries. Examples of hard currencies are typically
the US dollar, the euro or the Japanese yen [Hossfeld and MacDonald, 2015]. The
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Venezuelan bolivar, on the other hand, and its continued devaluation over the last
decade is an example of a soft currency.
Alternatively, we can distinguish between reserve currencies, funding currencies,
and commodity currencies. Reserve currencies are currencies which central banks
typically hold as foreign exchange reserves, for which they prefer hard currencies
[Habib and Stracca, 2012]. Most of the world’s currency reserves are held in US dol-
lar or euro, and to a lesser extent in British pound and Japanese yen. As a result,
until the recent inclusion of the Chinese yuan, these four currencies also comprised
the currency basket used for accounting purposes at the International Monetary Fund
(IMF)1. Funding currencies are currencies which can be borrowed at low interest rates.
Historically, the Swiss franc and the Japanese yen have been used to fund purchases
of currencies with higher interest rates, for example. Commodity currencies are cur-
rencies of countries whose economic output strongly depends on the price of one or
more commodities. Examples of commodity currencies include the Norwegian krona
due to Norway’s significant oil exports or the Australian dollar due to Australia’s
significant exports of metals and coal.
It becomes clear that the exchange rate of two currencies is therefore determined
by their own idiosyncratic behaviors and economic factors as well as by their relation-
ships with other currencies in the market. The structure and the characteristics of the
foreign exchange market pose an extraordinary challenge to traders and researchers.
The choice of the transaction or base currency influences the results, which has been
observed in the literature in several works and in many different contexts. Papell and
Theodoridis [2001] analyze efforts to calculate the purchasing power parity (PPP)
via panel tests. They show that the choice of base currency influences the outcomes
of PPP-tests. Recognizing that the choice of base currency affects the correlation
1 The accounting currency of the IMF are the so-called Special Drawing Rights, and as of 2018
their value is determined through a weighted basket of the US dollar, euro, Japanese yen, British
pound and Chinese yuan.
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between different currencies, Hovanov et al. [2004] create a currency index to deter-
mine the value of an individual currency within the global forex market, independent
of base currency. Many network approaches to understanding the foreign exchange
markets rely on correlation measures. Go´rski et al. [2008], Kwapien´ et al. [2009] in-
vestigate the effect of base currency on interrelationships between currencies when
studied through a network lens. They provide evidence that the topology of the for-
eign exchange network and the structure of its minimum spanning tree is different for
different base currencies.
In this chapter, we present a novel approach to address these issues. Instead of
considering currency pairs, we treat each currency i in a market of K currencies as an
individual entity with assigned symbolic performance ζi. This approach introduces a
measure independent of base currency to investigate the hierarchy and the dynamics
of the FX market. We aim to encode the relationship of each currency with the
remaining currencies in the market into one quantity. Instead of considering all
currency pairs for a given currency we compress information of its pairwise exchange
rates into one quantity for each currency. We do this by measuring the relative
performance of a currency in relation to other currencies, and we call this measure
the symbolic performance.
Using the symbolic performance, we investigate how a currency’s role evolves
within the market in the wake of changing economic conditions. As exchange rates
are affected by monetary policy, we especially consider central banks’ currency inter-
ventions that may be conducted directly, for example, if a central bank purchases or
sells the domestic currency. In more extreme cases central banks may introduce a
cap or a peg of its currency, backing this policy by currency transactions. Data for
interventions publicly accessible for the Swiss franc, the Mexican peso, the Singapore
dollar and Japanese yen among the currencies considered in this chapter.
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In the literature, the effects of central bank interventions (CBIs) on foreign ex-
change rates have been studied by various techniques, particularly focusing on volatil-
ity of exchange rates. These techniques include GARCH type models [Almekinders
and Eijffinger, 1996, Baillie and Osterberg, 1997a,b, Dominguez, 1998, Beine et al.,
2002], implied volatility estimation of currency options [Bonser-Neal and Tanner,
1996, Dominguez, 1998], regime-switching analysis of mean and variance of exchange
rates [Beine et al., 2003], realized volatility estimation [Dominguez, 2006, Beine et al.,
2009, ru Cheng et al., 2013], time series study of news reports [Fatum and Hutchison,
2002], and event study of CBIs [Fatum and Hutchison, 2002, 2003, Fatum, 2008].
Most of the works quoted consider only three currencies – the German
deutschmark (euro), Japanese yen and US dollar – and study the respective CBIs
of the German Bundesbank (European Central Bank), Bank of Japan and Federal
Reserve System on their domestic currency. Our approach, however, explicitly incor-
porates information of currencies whose central banks did not intervene in the time
period being analyzed. This methodological distinction allows us to examine not only
effects of CBIs on the domestic currency, but on the currency embedded in the FX
market.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. We present our foreign exchange
data set in Section 6.2. We lay out the framework and the methodology of obtain-
ing the symbolic performance measure in Section 6.3. In Section 6.4, we study the
statistics of symbolic performances for the entire time horizon as well as for specific
subintervals. In particular, we present the results of our cluster analysis revealing
the temporal evolution of the symbolic performances and identifying different roles
currencies play within the FX market. We link changes in roles and behaviors of
currencies to central bank interventions as well as economic shocks. We offer our
conclusion in Section 6.5.
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6.2 Data
We downloaded currency exchange rate time series from Oanda via an open access
API2. Our data comprised the following currencies, which are all quoted in terms of
euro (EUR) and listed in alphabetical order of their ISO currency code: Australian
dollar (AUD), Canadian dollar (CAD), Swiss franc (CHF), British pound (GBP),
Hong Kong dollar (HKD), Japanese yen (JPY), Mexican peso (MXN), Norwegian
krone (NOK), New Zealand dollar (NZD), Swedish krona (SEK), Singapore dollar
(SGD), US dollar (USD), and South African rand (ZAR). These currencies cover 14
of the 20 globally most traded currencies and each of them accounted for a share of
at least 1% of average daily turnover in April 2016 according to BIS Monetary and
Economic Department [2016]. Since Oanda does not provide sufficiently complete
data for the remaining six currencies, we omitted them in our analysis. This selection
of currencies yielded 14 distinct exchange rate time series after we included a dummy
euro time series which consisted of only ones. The data set spans from January 2,
2005, to May 9, 2017, a period of more than 12 years. The start date was chosen
such that we could observe a time window as long as possible while at the same time
maintaining the quality of the data. There was no trading on certain holidays as well
as from Friday night to Sunday night. We downloaded exchange rates in 10-minute
time intervals. Note that our results are independent of the time resolution of the
underlying data set. When studying currency dynamics, however, a large amount of
data is a prerequisite, and therefore we selected the 10-minute time intervals.
We treated missing data as follows: If no euro pair had been traded at all in a
given 10-minute interval, the Oanda platform did not report any exchange rates for
this time point. We excluded these time points from our analysis. If one particular
pair was not traded in a given 10-minute interval, the Oanda platform recorded a
2 http://developer.oanda.com
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return of zero. If more than two euro pairs had not been traded, we discarded this
time point. If at most two euro pairs had not been traded, we imputed data by
drawing values from a normal distribution. We estimated mean and variance of that
normal distribution as sample mean and sample variance of empirical log-returns of
the missing currency within the past 24 hours. If data were missing and we could
not estimate sample mean and variance over the last 24 hours, we excluded the time
point from our analysis.
Overall our data set contained 444 360 intervals, and after we accounted for missing
data according to the aforementioned procedure, approximately 413 000 intervals per
currency remained. Since we analyzed 14 currencies, this yielded about 5.8 million
exchange rates which we use for our study.
While we used the intraday foreign exchange data, we identified the roles which
currencies play with a resolution of two weeks. In visualizations and in alignment
with other data sets, these non-overlapping windows of two weeks were represented
by their midpoint.
We gathered information on central bank interventions from the websites of central
banks who publish their activity3 as well as news reports from sources like Reuters4.
This information is of daily frequency, allowing us to specify on which day an inter-
vention had taken place and to associate it with a two-week window describing the
currency roles.
3 E.g. http://www.banxico.org.mx/sistema-financiero/estadisticas/mercado-cambiario/banco-
mexico-s-foreign-exchan.html
4 E.g. http://www.reuters.com/article/global-forex-boj-idUSL8N15Q4BY
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6.3 Methodology
6.3.1 Exchange rates and returns
Let us consider a financial market consisting of K assets. In the foreign exchange
market, each asset i = 1, . . . , K, is a currency and linked to the remaining K − 1
currencies through their exchange rate Si,j(t) at time t, where j = 1, . . . , K, j 6= i.
Obviously Si,i ≡ 1. In matrix form, this becomes
S(t) =

1 S1,2(t) · · · S1,K(t)
S2,1(t) 1 · · · S2,K(t)
...
...
. . .
...
SK,1(t) SK,2(t) · · · 1

. (6.1)
Each row of this matrix describes exchange rates given a base currency, while each
column of the matrix describes exchange rates given a counter currency. In the
absence of a bid-ask spread, the reciprocal relationship implies Si,j(t) = 1/Sj,i(t).
Using the structure of the FX market, we can construct this matrix from the
exchange rates of just one currency with all other currencies at time t. Under the
assumption of no arbitrage, the exchange rates Si,j(t) and Si,k(t) imply the exchange
rate Sj,k(t) via Sj,k = Sj,i(t)Si,k(t). It then suffices to consider the exchange rate
vector Si(t) at time t which comprises of the exchange rates of currency i, acting as
a base currency, with all other currencies:
Si(t) = (Si,1(t), Si,2(t), . . . , Si,K(t)) . (6.2)
It carries complete information of the system, in that the outer product of the vector
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and its inverse yields the exchange rate matrix in equation (6.1),
S(t) =

S1,i(t)
S2,i(t)
...
SK,i(t)

· (Si,1(t), Si,2(t), . . . , Si,K(t)) . (6.3)
In this study, we calculate logarithmic returns between consecutive exchange rates in
a time interval ∆t = 10 minutes:
Ri,j(t) = log Si,j(t)− logSi,j(t−∆t). (6.4)
Analogous to equation (6.1), we can write the exchange rate returns in matrix form:
R(t) =

0 R1,2(t) · · · R1,K(t)
R2,1(t) 0 · · · R2,K(t)
...
...
. . .
...
RK,1(t) RK,2(t) · · · 0

. (6.5)
Here the reciprocal relationship becomes Ri,j(t) = −Rj,i(t).
6.3.2 Symbolic performance
Considering the foreign exchange return matrix in equation (6.5), it is intuitively
clear that a base currency with a large number of positive returns appreciates overall,
whereas a base currency with a large number of negative returns depreciates overall.
This information for a given base currency i is stored in the ith row of the return
matrix (6.5).
We introduce the symbolic performance ζi(t) which we define as the difference
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between the number of positive and negative returns currency i, acting as base cur-
rency, has at time t. This is achieved by applying the sign-function to returns Ri,j(t)
in the return matrix, yielding +1 for positive returns and −1 for negative returns,
and summing row-wise:
ζi(t) =
K∑
j=1
sgnRi,j(t). (6.6)
We know that sgnRi,j(t) = −sgnRj,i(t). In other words, if the currency i rises with
respect to currency j, then currency j falls with respect to currency i. The symbolic
performance vector then lists the symbolic performances ζi(t) of all currencies at time
t,
ζ(t) = (ζ1(t), ζ2(t), . . . , ζK(t)) . (6.7)
By construction, the symbolic performance can take values from −K + 1 to K − 1
in steps of 2, and for a given time t each value appears exactly once; this means∑
i ζi(t) = 0. As a consequence, if currency j has a larger return than currency k
with respect to the base currency i, then currency j will appreciate with respect to
currency k. It is important to point out that the symbolic performance is a measure
for each asset itself: We get K values ζi(t), i = 1, . . . , K, which describe the behavior
of the K currencies individually, while containing the correlation structure of the FX
market.
In a simple model, we can decompose the variance of a given return time series into
one part which corresponds to the state of the market, i.e. the sum of the variances of
all returns, and into another part which corresponds the idiosyncratic variance. While
the symbolic performance of a given currency contains information about all other
currencies, it does not provide information about the magnitude of an average return
at a given time. In other words, it disregards the variance of the return time series
due to the state of the market. However, it retains information on the idiosyncratic
variance of the return time series of currencies. It is easy to see that equation (6.6)
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is equivalent to a ranking of returns given a fixed base currency i where the largest
positive (negative) return is assigned the largest positive (negative) value for ζi(t):
ζi(t) =
K∑
j=1
sgnRi,j(t)
=
K∑
j=1
[2 H (Ri,j(t))− 1] = 2
K∑
j=1
1 (Rj,1(t) ≤ Ri,1(t))− 1−K (6.8)
= 2 rankRi,1(t)− (K + 1),
where H denotes the Heaviside step function and 1 the indicator function. Note that
this is true regardless of our choice of base currency i, as pointed out earlier.
Currencies with larger variance relative to the other currencies are more likely to
exhibit large swings and thus higher magnitudes of ζ, and vice versa. As a result,
currencies that tend to be more volatile regardless of market state tend to have more
fat-tailed symbolic performance distributions P (ζi). Currencies that take a position
at the center of the market in comparison to the remaining currencies tend to have
a symbolic performance distribution P (ζi) that is reminiscent of a Gaussian. For
the purpose of finding the position of a currency, it is then sufficient to consider the
distribution of the absolute values of the symbolic performance, P (|ζi|), a discrete
probability distribution which describes how often a currency takes the symbolic
performance −(K − 1) or K − 1, −(K − 3) or K − 3, etc.
6.3.3 k-means++ clustering
The movement of currencies is closely linked to the macroeconomic developments in
the corresponding countries. Therefore the more qualitative description of currencies
as, for example, G4 currencies, G10 currencies or commodity currencies, is valid on
long time scales. While this classification helps describe the roles and behaviors of
currencies in general, economic shifts as well as political or monetary shocks can alter
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the position of a currency within the market on varying time scales, and the symbolic
performance is able to capture these shifts. To investigate these currency dynamics,
we evaluate the symbolic performance distributions Pt(ζi) on reasonably short time
scales, from t to t+ ∆T , and classify them according to different currency behavior.
We use k-means++ clustering for this task. Cluster analyses find application in
many fields, such as, biology and bioinformatics, business and marketing, medicine,
social networks, computer science, climate and weather research, and data mining,
where they are used to discover similarities and patterns in large amounts of data. The
k-means++ clustering algorithm takes as input a set of vectors as well as a number
of clusters or classifications k. It then determines k points which serve as cluster
centroids such that the overall distance between all data points and their respective
cluster center is minimized. This algorithm itself does not require any knowledge of
the data set to operate, and it will find a solution even if the data is not properly
clustered into k centers. Therefore, the choice of the number of clusters k becomes
critical, as we explain later in this section.
The algorithm schematically works as follows: Given N different points in d-
dimensional space, k random points are selected as the initial cluster centers µi,
i = 1, . . . , k. Each of the N − k remaining points are then associated with the
cluster center to which they are closest. After assigning all points to clusters, the
cluster centers, defined as the mean of all points in the cluster, changes. The cluster
centers are thus re-evaluated before the next iteration, and all points are re-classified
to be closest to the new cluster centers, again. This procedure is reiterated until
convergence is reached, that is, all points x are distributed in clusters Ci, i = 1, . . . , k,
with centers µi such that
k∑
i=1
∑
x∈Ci
||x− µi||2 (6.9)
is minimized.
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The k-means++ algorithm uses the squared Euclidean metric as its distance mea-
sure. Recall that we are interested in the classification of symbolic performance dis-
tributions Pt(ζi), estimated on time intervals [t, t+ ∆T ]. To this end we arrange the
relative frequencies of Pt(ζi), in a vector,
Pt(|ζi|) =

Pt(ζi = ±(K − 1))
Pt(ζi = ±(K − 3))
...
Pt(ζi = ±1)

. (6.10)
Each vector Pt(|ζi|) is a composition. This has implications regarding the distance
measure. For compositional data the use of Aitchison’s distance, introduced in Aitchi-
son [1982], is much more appropriate. In contrast, the use of Euclidean distance may
be problematic, as Mart´ın-Ferna´ndez et al. [1998] and Aitchison et al. [2000] point out.
Alternatively, we can apply an isometric log-ratio (ilr) transformation to Pt(ζi). The
so-transformed data is then accessible to analytical methods that use the Euclidean
metric. Since the scikit-learn package which we use to classify our data requires the
Euclidean distance as the distance metric for k-means++, we apply an ilr transforma-
tion and cluster the results. In the last step, we perform the inverse ilr transformation
to express the cluster centers in terms of relative frequencies again5.
In order to be able to provide a meaningful interpretation of the symbolic perfor-
mance distribution, ∆T needs to be carefully chosen considering three criteria. One,
there is no trading on the Oanda platform for a few hours every weekend. In order
to avoid capturing beginning- or end-of-the-week effects, it is sensible that each time
window is one week long or multiples of one week. Two, if we choose the length of the
5 By using the absolute values of the symbolic performances, we reduce the dimensionality from
K to K/2, and by applying the ilr transformation, we further reduce it to K/2− 1. This mitigates
the problem of sparsity of high-dimensional spaces significantly.
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window to be too small, we undersample the distribution. Three, if ∆T is too large,
we may miss local trends and fluctuations, and we may limit our ability to resolve
the effects of political or economic shocks whose impact can last anywhere from a few
days to several months or years. Given our data resolution of 10 minutes, ∆T = 2
weeks appears to be the appropriate choice to satisfy our criteria.
It is worth pointing out that we perform the cluster analysis on the pool of all
symbolic performance distributions of all currencies, that is, on the entire FX market.
As a result, information about each currency as well as each point in time informs
the classification process. In other words, if two different currencies are classified to
belong to the same cluster at different times, their respective behavior or role in the
market is very comparable.
As pointed out previously, we also have to decide on a reasonable number of
clusters k, based on the data set. We want to choose as few clusters as possible with
as large explanatory power as possible. The gap statistic, introduced by Tibshirani
et al. [2001], is a useful metric to determine the appropriate value for k as suggested
by the structure of the data. Since k-means++ does not penalize model complexity,
that is, the number of clusters to be found, increasing k does not increase the value of
the cost function. This is true whether the data is clearly clustered or not. The gap
statistic contrasts the benefit of adding one more cluster to a structured data set to
the benefit of adding one more cluster to a comparable but random and unclustered
data set. The gap is the difference in the cost function of clustering these two data
sets. We increase k, starting with just one cluster, until the size of the gap reaches
its first local maximum; at this point adding the k + 1th cluster provides diminishing
benefits. After performing this analysis on our data set, we conclude that separating
our data in six clusters is the most sensible choice.
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6.4 Empirical results
6.4.1 Overall symbolic performance distributions
Based on the foreign exchange data introduced in Section 6.2 and the symbolic per-
formances calculated according to equation (6.6), we analyzed the overall symbolic
performance distributions P (ζi), of all currencies i = 1, . . . , 14, as shown in Figure 6·1.
These discrete probability functions indicated how often each currency i took each
value ζi from −13 to +13 during the entire time period from 2005 to 2017.
We observed that the distributions exhibit characteristic shapes for different cur-
rencies. Some are clearly convex, like the distributions for the Japanese yen, the
New Zealand dollar, and the South African rand. Others are clearly concave, like
the distributions for the euro, the Hong Kong dollar, the Singapore dollar, and the
US dollar. This reflects the degree to which extent currencies tended to exhibit large
swings, that is, had large volatility relative to the remaining currencies regardless of
market conditions on one hand, or to which currencies tended to stay in the center of
the market on the other. Irrespective of their shapes, however, all distributions are
quite symmetric around zero6.
We describe the distributions based on the appearance of maxima in the cen-
ter or at the tails; in other words we can distinguish the currencies’ performance
distributions by their curvature:
1. Strongly concave: EUR, HKD, SGD, USD.
2. Slightly concave: CHF, GBP.
3. Fairly flat: CAD, SEK.
4. Slightly convex: AUD, MXN, NOK.
6 We make use of this feature in our cluster analysis by considering only the absolute value of
the symbolic performance and its distribution.
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Figure 6·1: Overall symbolic performance distributions P (ζi), i =
1, . . . , 14, for our data set. We distinguish between a few different
shapes, characterized by their curvature. Some currencies exhibit
rather small probabilities at the center and high probabilities in the
tails. At the extremes we find the euro (EUR) with very concave cur-
vature and the South African rand (ZAR) with very convex curvature.
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5. Strongly convex: JPY, NZD, ZAR.
Let us first consider the tail-heavy distributions. Currencies like the ZAR with an
overall convex symbolic performance distribution were most likely to exhibit returns
that are larger in magnitude than all other returns. These currencies tended to out-
perform or underperform the rest of the market. This does not, however, imply that
these currencies necessarily were currencies with large exchange rate volatility. We
could easily change the base pair to change the exchange rate volatility of a currency.
When measured in euro, the Swiss franc, for example, was the currency with the
lowest exchange rate volatility, but when measured in US dollar, the Swiss franc ex-
hibited higher volatility. This observation underscores the usefulness of the symbolic
performance as a measure of relative volatility since it takes into consideration all
currency pairs at once.
Currencies like the EUR or USD with strongly concave symbolic performance
distributions tended to maintain a position at the center of the market. This means
that they were unlikely to consistently strongly appreciate or depreciate against other
currencies.
Instead, they served as some form of reference against which other currencies are
held. Consider an imaginary currency with true reference status. The size of its
returns would be distributed like a normal distribution centered around zero with a
very small standard deviation due to minor fluctuations. As a consequence, large
fluctuations would be very unlikely, and likewise the chance for being at the extreme
positions of the market would be very small as compared to other currencies.
We also identified currencies which appeared to take all symbolic performance
values and therefore roles in the market with similar frequency. This could be part
of the behavior of the currencies, or it could be a mixture of periods in which their
symbolic performance distributions exhibit concave curvature and periods in which
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they exhibit convex curvature.
6.4.2 Dynamics of symbolic performance distributions
According to the 2016 Triennial Central Bank Survey of FX and over-the-counter
(OTC) derivatives markets, the daily trading volume of the foreign exchange mar-
ket exceeded 5 trillion USD.7 This enormous volume results in high liquidity and
rich dynamics, which are enhanced by central banks interventions as well as major
political developments with macroeconomic consequences. The clustering procedure
introduced and explained in Section 6.3.3 is able describe the impact of such events.
The results of the cluster analysis are presented in Figures 6·2 and 6·3. Training
the algorithm on the symbolic performance distributions Pt(ζi) estimated on time
intervals [t, t+ ∆T ] with ∆T = 2 weeks for all t, the k-means++ algorithm identifies
six cluster centers corresponding to six distinct distributions P (ζ). Figure 6·2 shows
these characteristic symbolic performance distributions found by the k-means++ al-
gorithm. Figure 6·3 exhibits how the currencies evolve through the clusters over time,
that is, which symbolic performance distribution corresponding to certain currency
behaviors describes them.
Table 6.1 offers a summary of how often each currency was classified into each
cluster during the 12 year observation period. The euro and the US dollar occupied
clusters 1 and 2 most often. The Japanese yen, the New Zealand dollar, and the South
African rand could be found at the opposite end, as they were most often classified
into clusters 5 and 6.
We can distinguish two different groups of currencies: Currencies that maintained
their role in the foreign exchange market over a long time and spent the majority
of the observation period in one or two clusters, and currencies that changed their
role significantly over time, either in the form of short bursts or long-term shifts. A
7 Bank for International Settlements, http://www.bis.org/publ/rpfx16.htm
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Figure 6·2: Symbolic performance distributions P (ζ) corresponding
to the cluster centers found by the k-means++ algorithm. For the
sake of better illustration, we draw a line for each discrete probability
distribution, keeping in mind that P (ζ) is only defined for odd integers
between −13 and 13. The violet distribution (cluster 1) corresponds to
currencies which take central positions in the market, whereas the red
distribution (cluster 6) corresponds to currencies which tend to take
more extreme positions in the market.
typical example of the first group was the euro which maintained its reference role
almost throughout the entire time period. Typical examples for the second group wre
the British pound with the sudden change in clusters after the Brexit vote in June
2016, and the Swiss franc with drastic changes in September 2011 (pegging to the
euro) and January 2015 (unpegging from the euro).
In the following we further investigate a selection of currencies which serve as an
example to demonstrate the ability of our methodology to resolve currency dynam-
ics in response to economic and political interventions have occurred. These are in
descending order of their average daily turnover in April 2016 according to BIS Mone-
tary and Economic Department [2016]: US dollar, euro, Japanese yen, British pound,
Canadian dollar, Swiss franc, Mexican peso, Singapore dollar, and Hong Kong dollar.
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Figure 6·3: Currency clustering dynamics according for the 14 curren-
cies in our data set. Cluster 1 corresponds to reference-like behavior,
whereas cluster 6 corresponds to heavy-tail behavior.
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Table 6.1: We report how frequently (as a percentage) each currency
appears in each cluster, enumerated from 1 to 6 as in Figure 6·2, as well
as the average cluster value. The euro has the lowest average cluster
component, followed by the US dollar, the two main reference currencies
in the FX market. The Japanese yen, the New Zealand dollar, and the
South African rand stand out as the currencies with the most tail-heavy
symbolic performance distributions.
cluster AUD CAD CHF EUR GBP HKD JPY MXN NOK NZD SEK SGD USD ZAR
1 0 0 1 49 0 24 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 0
2 0 0 10 39 1 53 0 1 0 0 0 24 50 0
3 0 30 49 9 53 22 4 10 4 0 8 65 21 0
4 32 35 27 3 37 1 23 47 30 3 42 10 3 0
5 65 33 12 0 7 0 29 34 64 60 49 0 0 16
6 3 2 2 0 1 0 44 9 2 37 1 0 0 84
average 4.7 4.1 3.5 1.7 3.5 2 5.1 4.4 4.6 5.3 4.4 2.9 2 5.8
USD For the majority of the time period the US dollar was associated with clus-
ters 1 and 2 and appeared to be a reference currency. In particular, the US dollar
shared this role with the euro in cluster 1 during the year 2007, indicating very little
movement with respect to the overall market. However, with the onset of the global
financial crisis of 2008 the reference role of the US dollar within the foreign exchange
market appeared to weaken, as bigger swings and movements with respect to the
remaining 13 currencies were more prevalent. This phase in which the dollar spent
most time in cluster 3 lasts until late 2012. Hereafter the US dollar mostly stayed in
cluster 2 with some appearances in cluster 1 in 2014, reflecting the upswing of the
US economy in the wake of the persisting European sovereign debt crisis and fear of
deflation.
EUR Our analysis confirms the euro as a major reference. This is detailed by its
continued presence in cluster 1, despite global and local financial turmoil. During
the European sovereign debt crisis, though, the euro left cluster 1 to move to cluster
2 more frequently. On July 26, 2012, Mario Draghi announced that the ECB would
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do ‘whatever it takes’ to protect the euro8. This led to a large appreciation of the
euro from roughly 1.23 USD to 1.38 USD per euro in the following nine months. As
a result of this, the euro left cluster 1 for almost a year, and it even briefly moved to
cluster 3 and cluster 4, indicating a more volatile period, before returning to cluster
2 and then 1. During most of 2015, the euro was in cluster 3 again, with significant
time in cluster 4. Towards the end of the observation interval, no currency belonged
to cluster 1 for more than a few months at a time. We can interpret this as a lack of
reference in the FX market. Even after the return to cluster 2 in early 2016, the euro
occupied cluster 1 only for brief periods of time.
JPY Despite its role as one of the IMF reference currencies, the Japanese yen was
found at the tails of the market which correspond to relatively large movements.
Unlike most other currencies, which tended to stay in the same cluster for extended
periods of time and moved slowly in Figure 6·3, the Japanese yen switched clusters
rather frequently, moving mostly between cluster 5 and 6 starting in the year 2007.
It is noteworthy to highlight that this was not an artifact of the size of the interval
we had selected to estimate the symbolic performance distributions, as this observa-
tion would hold similarly for longer and shorter time intervals. Instead the symbolic
performance distribution changed frequently without deviating much from the clus-
ter centers. We observed, however, that the central bank interventions triggered the
move of the Japanese yen from cluster 6 to cluster 4, where it remained for a while.
Likewise, it took an outside shock for the yen to change its cluster association again
and return to cluster 6, as illustrated in Figure 6·4. The first line marks an inter-
vention on September 15, 2010, after reaching a 15-year-low of the US dollar with
respect to the yen, and it put the yen in cluster 4 where it remained fairly steadily.
The second intervention happened in the light of the Fukushima nuclear disaster. It
8 https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120726.en.html
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is worth mentioning that this intervention was a joint effort by the G7, and thus it is
not surprising that the yen returned to cluster 6.
The yen was mostly in cluster 3 in 2015; one may suspect that these changes
are due to central bank actions. Given the USD/JPY rate development in 2015 and
2016, the Bank of Japan (BOJ) and government officials issued statements indicating
the possibility of intervention. Our methodology indicates that these talks and any
possible covert interventions have been successful, as the yen stabilized in its standard
role in clusters 3 and 4 on the foreign exchange market in 2016. Recently, however, it
returned to clusters 5 and 6. Since Figure 6·4 shows that the yen tends to eventually
return to higher clusters a few weeks or months after interventions, we suspect that
the BOJ has been intervening less actively or forcefully in the recent couple of years.
Figure 6·4: Cluster association of the Japanese yen, highlighting the
time points and background of publicly announced central bank inter-
ventions.
GBP Being in cluster 3 for the majority of the time horizon, the British pound
played the role of a rather hard currency. On June 23, 2016, the British people voted
to leave the European Union, causing a major shock to the world economy. This
was reflected by a move of the British pound to cluster 4 already at announcement
of the referendum date, as we observe in Figure 5 in more detail, indicating higher
relative volatility. In the weeks up to the referendum, uncertainty increased further
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and the pound was classified into cluster 5. The surprising outcome of the vote caused
large movements in exchange rates around the globe, especially involving the British
pound. With our methodology we can monitor if the British pound is going return to
its role or if this kind of political intervention has changed the hierarchy in the foreign
exchange market for the long run. It is going to be interesting to analyze whether the
outcome of the British referendum to leave the European Union will have a profound
and lasting effect on the role and importance of the British pound or whether it will be
a short-term shock to the currency. In the case of the Swiss franc we observed that its
pegging and unpegging has not permanently changed its position in the market. (See
the paragraph regarding the CHF.) Instead, it was a temporary change, and within
one year of unpegging, the Swiss franc returned to cluster 3 where it was before
the major interventions. However, the uncertainty induced by the pending Brexit
negotiations with the European Union has seemed to leave this matter unresolved.
While the pound spent only a total of eight weeks in cluster 6, the cluster indicating
the largest relative volatility, it since has remained in cluster 5 most of the time.
Figure 6·5: Cluster association of the British pound, highlighting the
Brexit.
CAD As can be inferred from Figure 6·3, the Canadian dollar started out as a
currency that tended to stay at the tails of the market, as denoted by its presence in
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cluster 5. Around late 2008, with the onset of the global financial crisis, the heavy
tails became weaker, as shown by its presence in cluster 4. From mid 2011 until late
2013, the Canadian dollar behaved more like the Swiss franc or the British pound,
as shown by its association to cluster 3. In 2014 this development appeared to revert
itself, briefly. Eventually, however, the Canadian dollar maintained clusters 3 and 4.
It is crucial to emphasize that the symbolic performance distributions associated with
the clusters provide relative information. Therefore, we cannot automatically infer
whether the Canadian dollar itself has changed its role or the changes pertain to the
rest of the market; instead we have to consider the development of other currencies
during these time periods.
CHF In figure 6·6 we zoom into the cluster association of the Swiss franc, drawing
lines for each publicly announced central bank intervention of the Swiss National Bank
(SNB). The Swiss franc exhibited particularly stable behavior prior to the onset of
the global financial crisis in 2008, being in cluster 3 most of the time. While the franc
has long been considered a hard currency given the financial and political stability
of Switzerland, its use as a funding currency may frequently induce some additional
volatility in the foreign exchange rates which include the franc. As a result its behavior
is not quite like that of US dollar and euro. Instead our analysis determined its
behavior to be closer to the behavior of the British pound and the Singapore dollar.
With the onset of the financial crisis in 2008, the Swiss franc exhibited larger swings
than other currencies for a while, but soon returned to cluster 3.
Starting early 2009, the Swiss franc began an extended period in cluster 2 which is
usually only occupied by reference currencies. Additionally, currencies in a managed
float regime with respect to a reference currency or a large basket of currencies are
typically associated with cluster 2. We explain this in more detail in our discussion
of the Hong Kong dollar. In case of the Swiss franc, we can link this behavior
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to aggressive action of the SNB which acted to maintain the stability of the franc
and curb its appreciation against other major currencies by buying euros and other
currencies, effectively managing the exchange rate. These public interventions started
in early 2009, and we consider them successful in that they moved the CHF into
cluster 1, where we refer to currencies as reference currencies. In the wake of the
European sovereign debt crisis, the SNB intervened more frequently, as indicated by
the numerous lines in early 2010 in Figure 6·6. During the time of these interventions
the Swiss franc stayed in clusters 2 and 3 despite significant market pressure. However,
eventually the SNB abandoned its policy to purchase euros and other currencies9 In
the following weeks, the impact that this policy had became obvious as the Swiss franc
was mostly in cluster 5, corresponding to above-average volatility. A consequence of
the end of central bank interventions was an overall appreciation of the Swiss franc
in relation to the euro and the US dollar. These appreciations eventually shifted the
Swiss franc to cluster 6 which it had never occupied before.
These large currency movements sparked further central bank interventions, re-
sulting in the enforcement of a cap on the exchange rate of the Swiss franc to the
euro on September 6, 2011, by the Swiss National Bank. Our analysis indicates that
after a couple of months the market accepted the SNB’s controlled cap, and the
Swiss franc moved back to its more pre-crisis role, appearing in cluster 3 most of the
time. Another intervention on January 15, 2015, corresponded to the uncapping of
the Swiss franc with respect to the euro. This SNB intervention pushed the Swiss
franc in clusters 5 and 6 again. For roughly two months the Swiss franc exhibited
heavy tails in the symbolic performance distribution. Over the time scale of a year,
it returned to cluster 3, its standard position. Further intervention is suggested to
have taken place in early February 2017, inferred from rising sight deposits10, and we
9 Speech by Fritz Zurbru¨gg, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank,
https://www.bis.org/review/r150330c.png
10 http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-swiss-snb-idUKKBN15S1NU
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indeed observe a drop in cluster state around that period.
Figure 6·6: Cluster association of the Swiss franc, highlighting the
time points of publicly announced central bank interventions.
MXN The Mexican peso was, until late 2011, mostly classified into cluster 4 with
some extended stints in clusters 3 and 5. During this time period the peso therefore
could be characterized as a currency of average relative volatility when compared
to the remaining currencies in our data set. Given Mexico’s status as an emerging
market, this is not surprising. Starting in late 2011, the peso shifted to cluster 5 and
remained there for most of a time for a couple of years, reflecting a higher relative
volatility. This coincided with growth rates which remained below expectations.
Trade with the United States has long had a great impact on the Mexican econ-
omy since the overwhelming majority of Mexican exports go to the US. Generally the
Mexican peso considered a satellite currency of the US dollar, and more than 90%
of all peso transactions are trades on the USD/MXN pair. As a result of this close
relationship and economic interconnectedness, the Mexican peso has been susceptible
to political and economic developments that potentially affect the trade relationships
with the US. As of 2018, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is be-
ing renegotiated. The market seemed to have anticipated this risk after the surge of
Donald Trump in the primary polls of the Republican party in mid to late July 2016,
corresponding to a change in cluster of the Mexican peso that moved from cluster
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4 to 5 and eventually to 6. It only left this cluster to return to cluster 5 following
a surprising intervention in February 2016 when Banxico intervened with a ‘shock
and awe’ move by selling US dollars and simultaneously increasing the interest rate11.
Following the inauguration of the new president in the US in early 2017, the peso
returned to cluster 6 where it remained for the rest of the observation period. In sum-
mary, the peso behavior was characteristic of commodity currencies which are closely
correlated to world market prices of commodities which they export. The higher rela-
tive volatility of such currencies reflects the vulnerability of the underlying economies
to major market shifts. Our results suggest that the market has been considering the
importance of Mexico’s access to North American markets and its implications for
the peso to be similar to that of a commodity exporter and its exposure to the price
of that commodity.
Figure 6·7: Cluster association of the Mexican peso, highlighting the
time points of publicly announced central bank interventions in red and
political events in the United States in green.
SGD Singapore’s central bank is the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS). It
is the mission of the MAS to hold the Singapore dollar in a managed float regime
to control inflation in Singapore, which is detailed in biannual policy publications.
11 https://www.ft.com/content/7129d13c-d364-11e6-9341-7393bb2e1b51
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Through direct intervention the MAS holds the Singapore dollar within a fixed band
against an undisclosed trade-weighted basket of currencies. This method of controlling
inflation stands in contrast to what most other central banks in our data set do,
which is choosing to adjust interest rates to control inflation. Our clustering analyses
show the results we would expect given the MAS policies and procedures: First,
the Singapore dollar has occupied cluster 3 for most of the time, interrupted by
moves to cluster 2 and sometimes cluster 4. As the MAS enforces the policy band,
bigger overall swings become less likely. This is typical of currencies in clusters 2 and
3. Furthermore, the main trading partners of Singapore comprise Hong Kong and
China, whose currencies have been closely linked to the US dollar, and the United
States. This implies that the cluster of the Singapore dollar tends to be similar to
that of the US dollar. Figure 6·8 indicates with red vertical lines the times when the
MAS published its policy updates, and we observe that changes in clusters for the
Singapore dollar were often in accordance to these updates.
Figure 6·8: Cluster association of the Singapore dollar, highlighting
frequent publications of policy briefs by the Monetary Authority of
Singapore.
HKD When a currency is in a managed float regime, the central bank participates
in the foreign exchange market. It does so by buying and selling currency to achieve
the target rate within a certain band in which the currency is allowed to float. This
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reduces the relative volatility of a currency in two ways. One, since central banks
limit the amount of appreciation and depreciation through their market actions, the
volatility of the exchange rates of such a currency is suppressed. Two, when a central
bank manages its currency in such a way, it usually does so with respect to a reference
currency or a basket of currencies. A reference currency has lower relative volatility
than most currencies in the market, as evidenced by the clustering dynamics of the US
dollar or the euro. Likewise, the relative volatility of a basket of currencies generally
is smaller. As a result the relative volatility of the managed currency is lower as well.
In case of the Hong Kong dollar, the currency has been managed with respect to the
US dollar which explains the similarity of their clustering dynamics. We observed
only minor deviations at the end of 2007, where the Hong Kong dollar was in cluster
2 while the US dollar maintained cluster 1, and around 2012, where the Hong Kong
dollar stayed in cluster 3 while the US dollar moved to cluster 4.
6.5 Conclusion
We have introduced a symbolic performance measure to quantify the roles of curren-
cies in the foreign exchange market. Instead of investigating currency pairs, this novel
approach allows for analysis of currencies individually, embedded within the entire
system. We were able to identify the central (or reference) currencies in the foreign
exchange market, and unsurprisingly the euro has been playing a major role, much
like the US dollar and the British pound. Our methodology has also proven effective
in observing the dynamics of currency roles over time. We found that, in general,
currencies maintain certain positions in the FX market for extended periods of time.
The independence from the choice of base currency in our methodology and its
design enabled us to closely investigate the characteristics of individual currencies
with respect to the rest of the currencies in the network. We used our methodology
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to analyze the effects of central bank interventions, and we could hypothesize when a
covert intervention by a central bank seems to have occurred. Furthermore we have
been able to examine the impact of specific shocks to the system, such as the pegging
of the Swiss franc with respect to the euro, major interventions of the Bank of Japan,
and the vote for Brexit.
We suggest that our methodology can be used to trace movements in the foreign
exchange market to detect currency interventions, political developments and eco-
nomic downturns or booms. One natural expansion of this work would be to include
analysis of real-time data, monitoring the distribution of symbolic performances on
shorter time scales and using observed turbulences in the foreign exchange market for
currency forecasting.
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Chapter 7
Summary and conclusions
This thesis has studied the effects of interconnectedness and interdependence of finan-
cial systems across a range of scales. We began by analyzing the community structure
and lead-lag relationships on global equity and currency markets in Chapter 2. Our
results indicated significant differences depending on the state of the global economy.
Using network filtering techniques, we showed that, even in the today’s age of exten-
sive global trade, geography has been a good predictor of community formation; in
times of crisis, however, the communities were more mixed. We observed that the
euro was at the center of a community of European currencies pre-crisis, while this
hierarchy vanished during the crisis. Remarkably, we identified a cluster consisting of
the equity markets of the troubled GIPS countries – Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and
Spain – during the crisis period. Different lead-lag relationships emerged for the time
of the global financial crisis, and therefore our results caution against the reliance on
historical data for a global macro-hedging strategy.
Financial institutions and their holdings of mispriced assets took the center stage
during the global financial crisis, which showed the need for smarter regulation of
the banking system. Before 2008, regulators had put their focus on the solvency and
resilience of individual banks, also called microprudential regulation. This kind of
regulation proved too soft as it disregarded the complex and interwoven nature of
the financial system. In Chapter 3 we proposed a model to study the vulnerability
of a system of banks with portfolio overlap. Using empirical data from the European
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banking authority, we studied the effect of shocks for a broad range of risk aversion
and liquidity parameters. Precariously, microprudential regulation proves sufficient
for times of high confidence and asset liquidity, potentially providing a false sense
of security to both regulators and banks. Under adverse conditions, however, the
financial network exhibited a large degree of fragility, especially once we accounted for
the regulatory requirements imposed on banks. In fact, the more adverse conditions
became, e.g., higher risk-aversion or default probability of assets, the more sensitive
the system became to small shocks.
Since network studies on systemic risk – such as ours – typically include a shock
propagation mechanism, they require accurate knowledge of the system. Often, such
information is confidential, and the network needs to be reconstructed from incom-
plete information. Probabilistic methods have emerged as the front runner, creating
an ensemble of possible reconstructions based on the principle of maximum entropy.
Considering the Nikkei data set, which includes detailed information on Japanese
banks and firms for more than three decades, we tested reconstruction method, the
enhanced capital asset-pricing model (ECAPM), in Chapter 4. ECAPM is an ex-
tension of the popular bipartite configuration model (BiCM). Both models assume a
node property called strength to be a predictor of connectivity. Our analysis showed
that a significant number of nodes in the network would remain unconnected in most
reconstructions of the Japanese credit network, in line with recent findings that sys-
temic risk would be underestimated in this system. We derived equations to study
the range of validity of the reconstruction, depending on the distribution of node
strengths, the network density, and the size of the network. With numerical calcula-
tions, we demonstrated bounds and showed that sparse networks with inhomogeneous
layers are particularly hard to reconstruct. We propose that our results complement
typical tests of reconstruction quality which put a focus on network topology mea-
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sures, like degree distributions or the nearest-neighbor degrees.
In Chapter 5 we used the principle of maximum entropy to develop a novel measure
of co-movement of assets, applying it to the foreign exchange market. Unlike bonds or
equity, currencies are traded in a decentralized fashion, and exchange rates are quoted
pairwise. Interpreting the FX market as a fully connected network, we measured
the amount of information contained in each traded pair. We tested the empirical
networks against the null model of no information, meaning complete independence
of currencies. We found significant deviations from the null model for some currency
pairs, and with a generalized linear model we linked these findings to macroeconomic
observables like interest rates and trade volume. Our analysis showed that both,
macroeconomic indicators as well as idiosyncratic properties of currencies contribute
to the deviation from the null model.
Therefore, while macroeconomic data drives foreign exchange markets, other as-
pects like the intervention of central banks may strongly influence currency move-
ments. In Chapter 6 we introduced a a clustering approach to determine the roles
of currencies within the market. We demonstrated that this methodology is sensitive
to detecting political and monetary interventions and their impact on the structure
of the foreign exchange market. We believe that our approach can be useful in the
future to provide an underpinning of qualitative concept in foreign exchange markets.
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Appendix A
Supplementary Material to Chapter 2
A.1 Table of countries in data set
Country Currency Index Label Currency Label
Argentina Argentine peso ARG ARS
Australia Australian dollar AUS AUD
Austria euro AUT EUR
Belgium euro BEL EUR
Brazil Brazilian real BRA BRL
Canada Canadian dollar CAN CAD
Chile Chilean peso CHL CLP
China Chinese yuan CHN CNY
Colombia Colombian peso COL COU
Czechia Czech koruna CZE CZK
Denmark Danish krone DNK DKK
Finland euro FIN EUR
France euro FRA EUR
Germany euro DEU EUR
Greece euro GRC EUR
Hong Kong Hong Kong dollar HKG HKD
Hungary Hungarian forint HUN HUF
Iceland Icelandic krona ISL ISK
India Indian rupee IND INR
Indonesia Indonesian rupiah IDN IDR
Ireland euro IRL EUR
Israel Israel new shekel ISR ILS
Italy euro ITA EUR
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Japan Japanese yen JPN JPY
Kazakhstan Kazakhstani tenge KAZ KZT
Korea South Korean won KOR KRW
Luxembourg euro LUX EUR
Malaysia Malaysian ringgit MYS MYR
Malta Maltese lira MLT MTL/EUR
Mauritius Mauritian rupee MUS MRO
Mexico Mexican peso MEX MXN
Netherlands euro NLD EUR
New Zealand New Zealand dollar NZL NZD
Norway Norwegian krone NOR NOK
Oman Omani rial OMN OMR
Pakistan Pakistani rupee PAK PKR
Peru Peruvian nuevo sol PER PEN
Philippines Philippine peso PHL PHP
Poland Polish zloty POL PLN
Portugal euro PRT EUR
Qatar Qatari riyal QAT QAR
Russia Russian ruble RUS RUB
Saudi Arabia Saudi riyal SAU SAR
Singapore Singapore doller SGP SGD
Slovakia Slovak koruna SVK SKK/EUR
South Africa South African rand ZAF ZAR
Spain euro ESP EUR
Sri Lanka Sri Lankan rupee LKA LKR
Sweden Swedish krona SWE SEK
Switzerland Swiss franc CHE CHF
Thailand Thai baht THA THB
Tunisia Tunisian dinar TUN TND
Utd. Arab Emirates UAE dirham ARE AED
United Kingdom British pound GBR GBP
United States US dollar USA USD
Venezuela Venezuelan bolivar VEN VEF
Appendix B
Supplementary Material to Chapter 3
B.1 Interbank network results
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Table B.1: Number of banks that would fall below the Basel III threshold of 4.5%
tier 1 capital ratio given a shock to different sectors in each of our ten scenarios
after 50 simulation time steps (D50) and after 100 simulation time steps (D100).
The initial shock is a sudden increase of the risk weights of the shocked sector of
a particular country or region by 50%, causing an increase of the risk-weighted
assets of banks. The numbers include the two banks which are below the threshold
originally.
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Origin Sector
Shock
Size
(%)
QA P (x)
Loss
Avg
Loss
GIIPS
Loss
Other
D100
Total
D100
GIIPS
D100
Other
G
II
P
S
S
ov
.
D
eb
t
150
0.3
lin 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 2 0
steep 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 2 0
0.9
lin 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 2 0
steep 69.0 69.0 69.1 87 41 46
400
0.3
lin 0.1 0.2 0.0 2 2 0
steep 0.1 0.2 0.1 2 2 0
0.9
lin 0.2 0.3 0.1 2 2 0
steep 69.0 69.0 69.1 87 41 46
F
in
an
ci
al
150
0.3
lin 3.3 4.7 2.0 2 2 0
steep 4.9 6.6 3.2 3 2 1
0.9
lin 10.5 12.8 8.4 3 2 1
steep 69.0 69.0 69.1 87 41 46
400
0.3
lin 14.7 20.9 9.0 5 4 1
steep 18.5 25.0 12.5 7 6 1
0.9
lin 30.3 36.4 24.8 20 17 3
steep 69.0 69.0 69.1 87 41 46
C
or
p
or
at
e
150
0.3
lin 10.1 17.2 3.6 4 3 1
steep 14.3 22.6 6.8 8 7 1
0.9
lin 30.3 39.9 21.6 20 17 3
steep 69.0 69.0 69.1 87 41 46
400
0.3
lin 23.7 39.0 9.7 21 19 2
steep 27.2 41.5 14.1 22 19 3
0.9
lin 38.5 49.5 28.5 33 29 4
steep 69.0 69.0 69.1 87 41 46
R
et
.
R
es
id
. 150
0.3
lin 6.2 11.5 1.3 2 2 0
steep 8.4 14.7 2.6 3 3 0
0.9
lin 16.3 24.2 9.0 7 6 1
steep 69.0 69.0 69.1 87 41 46
400
0.3
lin 24.1 42.9 6.8 23 23 0
steep 29.5 48.5 12.1 30 29 1
0.9
lin 42.0 56.9 28.4 37 34 3
steep 69.0 69.0 69.1 87 41 46
R
et
.
R
ev
.
150
0.3
lin 1.5 3.0 0.2 2 2 0
steep 2.1 3.8 0.5 2 2 0
0.9
lin 3.7 5.9 1.7 2 2 0
steep 69.0 69.0 69.1 87 41 46
400
0.3
lin 4.1 7.9 0.7 2 2 0
steep 5.2 9.4 1.3 2 2 0
0.9
lin 8.6 13.5 4.2 4 3 1
steep 69.0 69.0 69.1 87 41 46
R
et
.
S
M
E
150
0.3
lin 3.0 5.5 0.7 2 2 0
steep 4.2 7.1 1.5 2 2 0
0.9
lin 8.4 12.1 5.0 4 3 1
steep 69.0 69.0 69.1 87 41 46
400
0.3
lin 5.4 9.8 1.3 3 3 0
steep 6.9 11.7 2.5 3 3 0
0.9
lin 11.8 16.8 7.2 6 5 1
steep 69.0 69.0 69.1 87 41 46
C
om
m
.
R
E
150
0.3
lin 3.8 6.6 1.2 2 2 0
steep 5.1 8.4 2.1 2 2 0
0.9
lin 10.0 14.0 6.3 4 3 1
steep 69.0 69.0 69.1 87 41 46
400
0.3
lin 6.7 11.7 2.1 2 2 0
steep 8.4 13.7 3.5 4 3 1
0.9
lin 13.7 19.0 8.8 6 5 1
steep 69.0 69.0 69.1 87 41 46
Table B.2: Effect of a shock that originates in the GIIPS countries.
There are a total of 43 banks in the GIIPS countries. We simulate a
sudden increase of risk weights to 150 percent and to 400 percent of
their original value. We show the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio
across the entire system (Loss Avg), the average loss in tier 1 capital
ratio for banks in the GIIPS countries (Loss GIIPS) as well as the
average loss in tier 1 capital ratio for banks in other than the GIIPS
countries (Loss Other). We also show the number of banks failing the
stress test by having their tier 1 capital ratio drop below 4.5 percent
after 100 time steps for the entire system (D100 Total), for the GIIPS
countries (D100 GIIPS) and for other than the GIIPS countries (D100
Other).
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Origin Sector
Shock
Size
(%)
QA P (x)
Loss
Avg
Loss EE
Loss
Other
D100
Total
D100
EE
D100
Other
E
a
st
e
rn
E
u
ro
p
e
S
ov
.
D
eb
t
150
0.3
lin 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 0 2
steep 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 0 2
0.9
lin 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 0 2
steep 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 0 2
400
0.3
lin 0.0 0.2 0.0 2 0 2
steep 0.0 0.2 0.0 2 0 2
0.9
lin 0.0 0.2 0.0 2 0 2
steep 69.0 67.9 69.1 87 4 83
F
in
an
ci
al
150
0.3
lin 0.6 4.1 0.4 2 0 2
steep 0.9 4.8 0.7 2 0 2
0.9
lin 1.9 6.5 1.7 2 0 2
steep 69.0 67.9 69.1 87 4 83
400
0.3
lin 3.2 19.3 2.4 3 0 3
steep 4.4 21.2 3.6 3 0 3
0.9
lin 8.9 26.0 8.1 4 1 3
steep 69.0 67.9 69.1 87 4 83
C
or
p
or
at
e
150
0.3
lin 1.8 16.4 1.1 2 0 2
steep 2.5 18.4 1.8 2 0 2
0.9
lin 5.4 23.0 4.6 4 1 3
steep 69.0 67.9 69.1 87 4 83
400
0.3
lin 5.0 39.5 3.4 5 2 3
steep 6.6 40.6 5.0 5 2 3
0.9
lin 12.5 43.8 11.0 6 2 4
steep 69.0 67.9 69.1 87 4 83
R
et
.
R
es
id
. 150
0.3
lin 0.6 7.3 0.3 2 0 2
steep 0.9 8.1 0.6 2 0 2
0.9
lin 1.8 9.8 1.5 2 0 2
steep 69.0 67.9 69.1 87 4 83
400
0.3
lin 3.1 28.6 1.9 2 0 2
steep 4.4 31.0 3.1 2 0 2
0.9
lin 9.7 37.3 8.4 4 1 3
steep 69.0 67.9 69.1 87 4 83
R
et
.
R
ev
.
150
0.3
lin 0.4 5.0 0.1 2 0 2
steep 0.5 5.7 0.2 2 0 2
0.9
lin 0.8 6.7 0.5 2 0 2
steep 69.0 67.9 69.1 87 4 83
400
0.3
lin 0.9 12.7 0.4 2 0 2
steep 1.1 13.4 0.6 2 0 2
0.9
lin 1.9 14.8 1.3 2 0 2
steep 69.0 67.9 69.1 87 4 83
R
et
.
S
M
E
150
0.3
lin 0.4 5.3 0.2 2 0 2
steep 0.6 5.9 0.3 2 0 2
0.9
lin 1.1 7.1 0.8 2 0 2
steep 69.0 67.9 69.1 87 4 83
400
0.3
lin 0.8 9.8 0.4 2 0 2
steep 1.1 10.5 0.6 2 0 2
0.9
lin 2.0 12.1 1.5 2 0 2
steep 69.0 67.9 69.1 87 4 83
C
om
m
.
R
E
150
0.3
lin 0.3 1.1 0.3 2 0 2
steep 0.5 1.5 0.5 2 0 2
0.9
lin 1.2 2.5 1.1 2 0 2
steep 69.0 67.9 69.1 87 4 83
400
0.3
lin 0.7 2.1 0.6 2 0 2
steep 1.0 2.7 0.9 2 0 2
0.9
lin 2.1 4.4 2.0 2 0 2
steep 69.0 67.9 69.1 87 4 83
Table B.3: Effect of a shock that originates in Eastern Europe. There
are a total of 4 banks in Eastern Europe. We simulate a sudden increase
of risk weights to 150 percent and to 400 percent of their original value.
We show the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio across the entire system
(Loss Avg), the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio for banks in Eastern
Europe (Loss EE) as well as the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio for
banks in other countries than in Eastern Europe (Loss Other). We also
show the number of banks failing the stress test by having their tier 1
capital ratio drop below 4.5 percent after 100 time steps for the entire
system (D100 Total), for Eastern Europe (D100 EE) and for other than
Eastern Europe countries (D100 Other).
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Origin Sector
Shock
Size
(%)
QA P (x)
Loss
Avg
Loss
Benelux
Loss
Other
D100
Total
D100
Benelux
D100
Other
B
e
n
e
lu
x
S
ov
.
D
eb
t
150
0.3
lin 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 0 2
steep 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 0 2
0.9
lin 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 0 2
steep 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 0 2
400
0.3
lin 0.0 0.1 0.0 2 0 2
steep 0.0 0.1 0.0 2 0 2
0.9
lin 0.0 0.1 0.0 2 0 2
steep 69.0 72.0 68.8 87 7 80
F
in
an
ci
al
150
0.3
lin 0.5 3.6 0.2 2 0 2
steep 0.7 4.1 0.5 2 0 2
0.9
lin 1.8 5.5 1.5 3 0 3
steep 69.0 71.9 68.8 87 7 80
400
0.3
lin 2.3 15.7 1.2 3 0 3
steep 3.5 17.1 2.4 3 0 3
0.9
lin 8.3 21.5 7.2 3 0 3
steep 69.0 71.9 68.8 87 7 80
C
or
p
or
at
e
150
0.3
lin 1.0 5.7 0.6 2 0 2
steep 1.8 7.0 1.4 2 0 2
0.9
lin 5.3 11.2 4.8 3 0 3
steep 69.0 71.9 68.8 87 7 80
400
0.3
lin 3.2 16.8 2.1 4 0 4
steep 5.2 19.0 4.0 4 0 4
0.9
lin 12.7 25.5 11.6 4 0 4
steep 69.0 71.9 68.8 87 7 80
R
et
.
R
es
id
. 150
0.3
lin 0.8 6.8 0.3 2 0 2
steep 1.2 7.7 0.7 2 0 2
0.9
lin 3.2 10.3 2.6 3 0 3
steep 69.0 71.9 68.8 87 7 80
400
0.3
lin 3.7 28.1 1.7 3 1 2
steep 5.9 31.5 3.7 4 1 3
0.9
lin 14.5 38.6 12.5 5 1 4
steep 69.0 71.9 68.8 87 7 80
R
et
.
R
ev
.
150
0.3
lin 0.0 0.1 0.0 2 0 2
steep 0.1 0.2 0.1 2 0 2
0.9
lin 0.2 0.3 0.2 2 0 2
steep 69.0 71.9 68.8 87 7 80
400
0.3
lin 0.2 0.4 0.1 2 0 2
steep 0.3 0.5 0.2 2 0 2
0.9
lin 0.7 1.0 0.7 2 0 2
steep 69.0 71.9 68.8 87 7 80
R
et
.
S
M
E
150
0.3
lin 0.3 1.9 0.1 2 0 2
steep 0.4 2.3 0.3 2 0 2
0.9
lin 1.2 3.3 1.0 2 0 2
steep 69.0 71.9 68.8 87 7 80
400
0.3
lin 0.5 3.8 0.3 2 0 2
steep 0.9 4.3 0.6 2 0 2
0.9
lin 2.2 5.9 1.9 2 0 2
steep 69.0 71.9 68.8 87 7 80
C
om
m
.
R
E
150
0.3
lin 0.3 2.4 0.1 2 0 2
steep 0.5 2.7 0.3 2 0 2
0.9
lin 1.2 3.7 1.0 2 0 2
steep 69.0 71.9 68.8 87 7 80
400
0.3
lin 0.6 4.4 0.3 2 0 2
steep 0.9 4.9 0.6 2 0 2
0.9
lin 2.3 6.4 1.9 3 0 3
steep 69.0 71.9 68.8 87 7 80
Table B.4: Effect of a shock that originates in the Benelux countries.
There are a total of 7 banks in the Benelux countries. We simulate a
sudden increase of risk weights to 150 percent and to 400 percent of
their original value. We show the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio
across the entire system (Loss Avg), the average loss in tier 1 capital
ratio for banks in the Benelux countries (Loss Benelux) as well as the
average loss in tier 1 capital ratio for banks in other than the Benelux
countries (Loss Other). We also show the number of banks failing the
stress test by having their tier 1 capital ratio drop below 4.5 percent
after 100 time steps for the entire system (D100 Total), for the Benelux
countries (D100 Benelux) and for other than the Benelux countries (D100
Other).
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Origin Sector
Shock
Size
(%)
QA P (x)
Loss
Avg
Loss
Greece
Loss
Other
D100
Total
D100
Greece
D100
Other
G
re
e
ce
S
ov
.
D
eb
t
150
0.3
lin 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 0 2
steep 0.0 0.1 0.0 2 0 2
0.9
lin 0.0 0.1 0.0 2 0 2
steep 69.0 68.8 69.0 87 5 82
400
0.3
lin 0.0 0.4 0.0 2 0 2
steep 0.0 0.4 0.0 2 0 2
0.9
lin 0.0 0.5 0.0 2 0 2
steep 69.0 69.0 69.0 87 5 82
F
in
an
ci
al
150
0.3
lin 0.5 4.2 0.3 2 0 2
steep 0.7 5.1 0.4 2 0 2
0.9
lin 1.3 6.8 0.9 2 0 2
steep 69.0 68.8 69.0 87 5 82
400
0.3
lin 2.7 19.8 1.4 2 0 2
steep 3.3 22.1 2.0 3 1 2
0.9
lin 5.8 26.9 4.3 4 1 3
steep 69.0 68.8 69.0 87 5 82
C
or
p
or
at
e
150
0.3
lin 1.7 16.0 0.7 2 0 2
steep 2.2 19.0 1.0 2 0 2
0.9
lin 4.1 25.4 2.6 2 0 2
steep 69.0 68.8 69.0 87 5 82
400
0.3
lin 4.3 38.1 1.9 5 2 3
steep 5.1 39.7 2.6 5 2 3
0.9
lin 8.2 44.1 5.6 6 2 4
steep 69.0 68.8 69.0 87 5 82
R
et
.
R
es
id
. 150
0.3
lin 0.8 10.0 0.2 2 0 2
steep 1.1 11.4 0.3 2 0 2
0.9
lin 1.7 14.1 0.8 2 0 2
steep 69.0 68.8 69.0 87 5 82
400
0.3
lin 3.5 38.8 1.0 3 1 2
steep 4.4 42.5 1.7 3 1 2
0.9
lin 7.4 48.8 4.4 4 1 3
steep 69.0 68.8 69.0 87 5 82
R
et
.
R
ev
.
150
0.3
lin 0.5 6.4 0.0 2 0 2
steep 0.6 7.4 0.1 2 0 2
0.9
lin 0.8 8.9 0.3 2 0 2
steep 69.0 68.8 69.0 87 5 82
400
0.3
lin 1.2 15.9 0.1 2 0 2
steep 1.4 17.1 0.2 2 0 2
0.9
lin 2.0 19.2 0.7 2 0 2
steep 69.0 68.8 69.0 87 5 82
R
et
.
S
M
E
150
0.3
lin 0.3 2.9 0.1 2 0 2
steep 0.4 3.6 0.2 2 0 2
0.9
lin 0.7 5.0 0.4 2 0 2
steep 69.0 68.8 69.0 87 5 82
400
0.3
lin 0.5 5.2 0.2 2 0 2
steep 0.7 6.2 0.3 2 0 2
0.9
lin 1.2 8.0 0.7 2 0 2
steep 69.0 68.8 69.0 87 5 82
C
om
m
.
R
E
150
0.3
lin 0.6 6.0 0.2 2 0 2
steep 0.8 7.1 0.3 2 0 2
0.9
lin 1.2 9.3 0.7 2 0 2
steep 69.0 68.8 69.0 87 5 82
400
0.3
lin 1.0 10.7 0.4 2 0 2
steep 1.3 12.1 0.5 2 0 2
0.9
lin 2.0 14.6 1.1 2 0 2
steep 69.0 68.8 69.0 87 5 82
Table B.5: Effect of a shock that originates in Greece. There are
a total of 6 banks in Greece. We simulate a sudden increase of risk
weights to 150 percent and to 400 percent of their original value. We
show the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio across the entire system
(Loss Avg), the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio for banks in Greece
(Loss Greece) as well as the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio for banks
in other than Greece (Loss Other). We also show the number of banks
failing the stress test by having their tier 1 capital ratio drop below
4.5 percent after 100 time steps for the entire system (D100 Total), for
Greece (D100 Greece) and for other than Greece (D100 Other).
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Origin Sector
Shock
Size
(%)
QA P (x)
Loss
Avg
Loss
Italy
Loss
Other
D100
Total
D100
Italy
D100
Other
It
a
ly
S
ov
.
D
eb
t
150
0.3
lin 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 0 2
steep 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 0 2
0.9
lin 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 0 2
steep 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 0 2
400
0.3
lin 0.0 0.1 0.0 2 0 2
steep 0.0 0.1 0.0 2 0 2
0.9
lin 0.0 0.2 0.0 2 0 2
steep 69.0 66.1 69.2 87 5 82
F
in
an
ci
al
150
0.3
lin 0.9 5.2 0.7 2 0 2
steep 1.6 6.7 1.3 2 0 2
0.9
lin 4.1 10.5 3.8 3 0 3
steep 69.0 66.1 69.2 87 5 82
400
0.3
lin 4.4 22.9 3.3 3 0 3
steep 6.5 25.9 5.3 3 0 3
0.9
lin 14.7 33.7 13.6 7 3 4
steep 69.0 66.1 69.2 87 5 82
C
or
p
or
at
e
150
0.3
lin 2.2 18.8 1.2 2 0 2
steep 3.8 22.4 2.7 5 2 3
0.9
lin 11.2 32.3 10.0 5 2 3
steep 69.0 66.1 69.2 87 5 82
400
0.3
lin 5.9 43.1 3.7 7 4 3
steep 8.6 44.5 6.5 7 4 3
0.9
lin 18.7 48.8 16.9 9 4 5
steep 69.0 66.1 69.2 87 5 82
R
et
.
R
es
id
. 150
0.3
lin 0.8 5.3 0.5 2 0 2
steep 1.3 6.5 1.0 2 0 2
0.9
lin 3.3 9.5 3.0 3 0 3
steep 69.0 66.1 69.2 87 5 82
400
0.3
lin 4.1 25.0 2.9 3 1 2
steep 6.6 29.2 5.3 5 2 3
0.9
lin 16.7 39.7 15.3 8 3 5
steep 69.0 66.1 69.2 87 5 82
R
et
.
R
ev
.
150
0.3
lin 0.1 0.2 0.0 2 0 2
steep 0.1 0.3 0.1 2 0 2
0.9
lin 0.4 0.6 0.3 2 0 2
steep 69.0 66.1 69.2 87 5 82
400
0.3
lin 0.2 0.7 0.2 2 0 2
steep 0.4 1.0 0.4 2 0 2
0.9
lin 1.1 1.9 1.1 2 0 2
steep 69.0 66.1 69.2 87 5 82
R
et
.
S
M
E
150
0.3
lin 0.6 6.7 0.3 2 0 2
steep 1.1 8.0 0.7 2 0 2
0.9
lin 2.9 11.2 2.4 3 0 3
steep 69.0 66.1 69.2 87 5 82
400
0.3
lin 1.2 12.1 0.5 2 0 2
steep 1.9 13.5 1.2 2 0 2
0.9
lin 4.5 16.8 3.8 3 0 3
steep 69.0 66.1 69.2 87 5 82
C
om
m
.
R
E
150
0.3
lin 0.8 7.4 0.4 2 0 2
steep 1.3 8.7 0.8 2 0 2
0.9
lin 3.2 12.0 2.7 3 0 3
steep 69.0 66.1 69.2 87 5 82
400
0.3
lin 1.5 13.1 0.8 2 0 2
steep 2.2 14.5 1.4 2 0 2
0.9
lin 5.0 17.8 4.2 3 0 3
steep 69.0 66.1 69.2 87 5 82
Table B.6: Effect of a shock that originates in Italy. There are a total
of 6 banks in Italy. We simulate a sudden increase of risk weights to
150 percent and to 400 percent of their original value. We show the
average loss in tier 1 capital ratio across the entire system (Loss Avg),
the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio for banks in Italy (Loss Italy) as
well as the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio for banks in other than
Italy (Loss Other). We also show the number of banks failing the stress
test by having their tier 1 capital ratio drop below 4.5 percent after 100
time steps for the entire system (D100 Total), for Italy (D100 Italy) and
for other than Italy (D100 Other).
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Origin Sector
Shock
Size
(%)
QA P (x)
Loss
Avg
Loss
France
Loss
Other
D100
Total
D100
France
D100
Other
F
ra
n
ce
S
ov
.
D
eb
t
150
0.3
lin 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 0 2
steep 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 0 2
0.9
lin 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 0 2
steep 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 0 2
400
0.3
lin 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 0 2
steep 0.0 0.1 0.0 2 0 2
0.9
lin 0.0 0.1 0.0 2 0 2
steep 0.0 0.1 0.0 2 0 2
F
in
an
ci
al
150
0.3
lin 0.3 1.6 0.3 2 0 2
steep 0.6 2.0 0.6 2 0 2
0.9
lin 1.8 3.4 1.7 2 0 2
steep 69.0 68.1 69.1 87 4 83
400
0.3
lin 1.9 8.8 1.5 2 0 2
steep 3.3 10.6 3.0 3 0 3
0.9
lin 8.8 16.1 8.5 3 0 3
steep 69.0 68.1 69.1 87 4 83
C
or
p
or
at
e
150
0.3
lin 1.2 8.8 0.9 2 0 2
steep 2.4 10.6 2.0 2 0 2
0.9
lin 7.6 16.7 7.2 3 0 3
steep 69.0 68.1 69.1 87 4 83
400
0.3
lin 3.7 23.8 2.8 2 0 2
steep 6.2 25.9 5.3 4 0 4
0.9
lin 15.7 32.3 14.9 5 1 4
steep 69.0 68.1 69.1 87 4 83
R
et
.
R
es
id
. 150
0.3
lin 0.6 3.3 0.5 2 0 2
steep 1.1 4.1 1.0 2 0 2
0.9
lin 3.2 6.7 3.1 3 0 3
steep 69.0 68.1 69.1 87 4 83
400
0.3
lin 3.3 15.9 2.7 2 0 2
steep 5.7 19.5 5.1 3 0 3
0.9
lin 16.1 29.7 15.4 5 1 4
steep 69.0 68.1 69.1 87 4 83
R
et
.
R
ev
.
150
0.3
lin 0.1 0.5 0.1 2 0 2
steep 0.2 0.6 0.1 2 0 2
0.9
lin 0.5 1.0 0.5 2 0 2
steep 69.0 68.1 69.1 87 4 83
400
0.3
lin 0.3 1.4 0.2 2 0 2
steep 0.5 1.8 0.4 2 0 2
0.9
lin 1.5 3.0 1.5 2 0 2
steep 69.0 68.1 69.1 87 4 83
R
et
.
S
M
E
150
0.3
lin 0.3 2.6 0.2 2 0 2
steep 0.6 3.2 0.5 2 0 2
0.9
lin 1.9 4.8 1.8 2 0 2
steep 69.0 68.1 69.1 87 4 83
400
0.3
lin 0.6 4.9 0.4 2 0 2
steep 1.1 5.7 0.9 2 0 2
0.9
lin 3.2 8.0 3.0 3 0 3
steep 69.0 68.1 69.1 87 4 83
C
om
m
.
R
E
150
0.3
lin 0.3 1.0 0.2 2 0 2
steep 0.5 1.3 0.4 2 0 2
0.9
lin 1.4 2.4 1.3 2 0 2
steep 69.0 68.1 69.1 87 4 83
400
0.3
lin 0.5 2.0 0.4 2 0 2
steep 0.9 2.5 0.8 2 0 2
0.9
lin 2.5 4.4 2.5 3 0 3
steep 69.0 68.1 69.1 87 4 83
Table B.7: Effect of a shock that originates in France. There are
a total of 4 banks in France. We simulate a sudden increase of risk
weights to 150 percent and to 400 percent of their original value. We
show the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio across the entire system
(Loss Avg), the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio for banks in France
(Loss France) as well as the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio for banks
in other than France (Loss Other). We also show the number of banks
failing the stress test by having their tier 1 capital ratio drop below
4.5 percent after 100 time steps for the entire system (D100 Total), for
France (D100 France) and for other than France (D100 Other).
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Origin Sector
Shock
Size
(%)
QA P (x)
Loss
Avg
Loss
Ger-
many
Loss
Other
D100
Total
D100
Ger-
many
D100
Other
G
e
rm
a
n
y
S
ov
.
D
eb
t
150
0.3
lin 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 0 2
steep 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 0 2
0.9
lin 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 0 2
steep 0.0 0.1 0.0 2 0 2
400
0.3
lin 0.0 0.2 0.0 2 0 2
steep 0.0 0.3 0.0 2 0 2
0.9
lin 0.1 0.3 0.1 2 0 2
steep 69.0 69.0 69.0 87 11 76
F
in
an
ci
al
150
0.3
lin 2.5 14.0 0.7 3 1 2
steep 3.7 16.6 1.7 3 1 2
0.9
lin 9.2 24.0 6.9 3 1 2
steep 69.0 68.9 69.0 87 11 76
400
0.3
lin 8.5 44.5 3.0 6 4 2
steep 10.9 45.8 5.6 6 4 2
0.9
lin 21.2 50.4 16.7 8 5 3
steep 69.0 68.9 69.0 87 11 76
C
or
p
or
at
e
150
0.3
lin 3.0 13.5 1.4 3 1 2
steep 4.9 16.5 3.1 3 1 2
0.9
lin 12.8 25.8 10.8 3 1 2
steep 69.0 68.9 69.0 87 11 76
400
0.3
lin 8.1 33.4 4.3 3 1 2
steep 11.3 35.7 7.5 3 1 2
0.9
lin 22.4 42.5 19.3 6 2 4
steep 69.0 68.9 69.0 87 11 76
R
et
.
R
es
id
. 150
0.3
lin 0.8 1.6 0.6 2 0 2
steep 1.3 2.3 1.1 2 0 2
0.9
lin 3.5 4.8 3.2 3 1 2
steep 69.0 68.9 69.0 87 11 76
400
0.3
lin 4.2 8.6 3.5 3 1 2
steep 6.9 12.2 6.1 3 1 2
0.9
lin 18.1 24.4 17.1 4 1 3
steep 69.0 68.9 69.0 87 11 76
R
et
.
R
ev
.
150
0.3
lin 0.1 0.2 0.1 2 0 2
steep 0.1 0.3 0.1 2 0 2
0.9
lin 0.4 0.6 0.4 2 0 2
steep 69.0 68.9 69.0 87 11 76
400
0.3
lin 0.3 0.6 0.2 2 0 2
steep 0.5 0.9 0.4 2 0 2
0.9
lin 1.3 1.7 1.2 2 0 2
steep 69.0 68.9 69.0 87 11 76
R
et
.
S
M
E
150
0.3
lin 0.2 0.3 0.2 2 0 2
steep 0.4 0.5 0.4 2 0 2
0.9
lin 1.2 1.4 1.1 2 0 2
steep 69.0 68.9 69.0 87 11 76
400
0.3
lin 0.4 0.5 0.4 2 0 2
steep 0.8 1.0 0.8 2 0 2
0.9
lin 2.2 2.6 2.1 3 1 2
steep 69.0 68.9 69.0 87 11 76
C
om
m
.
R
E
150
0.3
lin 1.2 5.7 0.5 3 1 2
steep 1.8 7.0 1.0 3 1 2
0.9
lin 4.5 10.5 3.6 3 1 2
steep 69.0 68.9 69.0 87 11 76
400
0.3
lin 2.1 10.4 0.9 3 1 2
steep 3.1 11.8 1.8 3 1 2
0.9
lin 6.8 15.7 5.5 3 1 2
steep 69.0 68.9 69.0 87 11 76
Table B.8: Effect of a shock that originates in Germany. There are
a total of 12 banks in Germany. We simulate a sudden increase of
risk weights to 150 percent and to 400 percent of their original value.
We show the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio across the entire system
(Loss Avg), the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio for banks in Germany
(Loss Germany) as well as the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio for
banks in other than Germany (Loss Other). We also show the number
of banks failing the stress test by having their tier 1 capital ratio drop
below 4.5 percent after 100 time steps for the entire system (D100 To-
tal), for Germany (D100 Germany) and for other than Germany (D100
Other).
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Origin Sector
Shock
Size
(%)
QA P (x)
Loss
Avg
Loss
Spain
Loss
Other
D100
Total
D100
Spain
D100
Other
S
p
a
in
S
ov
.
D
eb
t
150
0.3
lin 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 1 1
steep 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 1 1
0.9
lin 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 1 1
steep 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 1 1
400
0.3
lin 0.0 0.1 0.0 2 1 1
steep 0.0 0.2 0.0 2 1 1
0.9
lin 0.1 0.2 0.0 2 1 1
steep 69.0 69.3 68.9 87 24 63
F
in
an
ci
al
150
0.3
lin 1.4 4.2 0.3 2 1 1
steep 2.0 5.7 0.6 2 1 1
0.9
lin 4.2 9.4 2.1 3 1 2
steep 69.0 69.3 68.9 87 24 63
400
0.3
lin 6.6 19.3 1.7 3 2 1
steep 8.5 22.9 2.9 5 3 2
0.9
lin 15.0 31.7 8.6 9 7 2
steep 69.0 69.3 68.9 87 24 63
C
or
p
or
at
e
150
0.3
lin 5.2 17.1 0.6 3 2 1
steep 7.3 22.1 1.6 5 4 1
0.9
lin 15.4 35.5 7.7 11 9 2
steep 69.0 69.3 68.9 87 24 63
400
0.3
lin 12.2 39.0 1.9 11 10 1
steep 14.1 41.3 3.6 12 10 2
0.9
lin 21.7 48.1 11.5 17 15 2
steep 69.0 69.3 68.9 87 24 63
R
et
.
R
es
id
. 150
0.3
lin 3.8 12.9 0.3 2 1 1
steep 5.1 16.2 0.8 3 2 1
0.9
lin 9.7 24.7 3.9 5 3 2
steep 69.0 69.3 68.9 87 24 63
400
0.3
lin 14.0 46.7 1.4 16 15 1
steep 16.9 52.0 3.5 21 19 2
0.9
lin 25.3 58.3 12.6 22 20 2
steep 69.0 69.3 68.9 87 24 63
R
et
.
R
ev
.
150
0.3
lin 0.9 3.2 0.0 2 1 1
steep 1.2 4.1 0.2 2 1 1
0.9
lin 2.2 6.0 0.7 2 1 1
steep 69.0 69.3 68.9 87 24 63
400
0.3
lin 2.5 8.7 0.1 2 1 1
steep 3.2 10.4 0.4 2 1 1
0.9
lin 5.3 14.1 1.9 3 2 1
steep 69.0 69.3 68.9 87 24 63
R
et
.
S
M
E
150
0.3
lin 1.8 6.2 0.1 2 1 1
steep 2.3 7.6 0.3 2 1 1
0.9
lin 4.1 11.1 1.4 3 2 1
steep 69.0 69.3 68.9 87 24 63
400
0.3
lin 3.2 11.0 0.2 3 2 1
steep 3.9 12.7 0.5 3 2 1
0.9
lin 6.1 16.3 2.2 3 2 1
steep 69.0 69.3 68.9 87 24 63
C
om
m
.
R
E
150
0.3
lin 1.9 6.4 0.2 2 1 1
steep 2.5 7.9 0.4 2 1 1
0.9
lin 4.3 11.5 1.6 2 1 1
steep 69.0 69.3 68.9 87 24 63
400
0.3
lin 3.4 11.5 0.4 2 1 1
steep 4.2 13.1 0.7 3 2 1
0.9
lin 6.5 16.8 2.5 4 2 2
steep 69.0 69.3 68.9 87 24 63
Table B.9: Effect of a shock that originates in Spain. There are a total
of 25 banks in Spain. We simulate a sudden increase of risk weights
to 150 percent and to 400 percent of their original value. We show the
average loss in tier 1 capital ratio across the entire system (Loss Avg),
the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio for banks in Spain (Loss Spain)
as well as the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio for banks in other than
Spain (Loss Other). We also show the number of banks failing the
stress test by having their tier 1 capital ratio drop below 4.5 percent
after 100 time steps for the entire system (D100 Total), for Spain (D100
Spain) and for other than Spain (D100 Other).
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Origin
Shock
Size
QA P (x)
Loss
Avg
Loss
GI-
IPS
Loss
Other
D100
Total
D100
GI-
IPS
D100
Other
G
II
P
S
20%
0.3
lin 12.1 24.0 1.2 5 5 0
steep 16.1 29.5 3.8 11 10 1
0.9
lin 31.9 46.9 18.2 27 25 2
steep 72.0 75.2 69.1 88 42 46
50%
0.3
lin 28.4 56.1 3.0 35 34 1
steep 33.7 61.8 7.9 38 37 1
0.9
lin 57.6 79.4 37.7 47 42 5
steep 76.4 84.5 69.1 89 43 46
Table B.10: Effect of a shock that originates in the GIIPS countries. There are a
total of 43 banks from these countries. We simulate a sudden drop of bank equity
by 20% and by 50%. We show the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio across the
entire system (Loss Avg), the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio for banks in GIIPS
countries (Loss GIIPS) as well as the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio for banks in
other than GIIPS countries (Loss Other). We also show the number of banks failing
the stress test by having their tier 1 capital ratio drop below 4.5 percent after 100
time steps for the entire system (D100 Total), for the GIIPS (D100 GIIPS) and for
other than GIIPS (D100 Other).
Origin
Shock
Size
QA P (x)
Loss
Avg
Loss
EE
Loss
Other
D100
Total
D100
EE
D100
Other
E
a
st
e
rn
E
u
ro
p
e
20%
0.3
lin 1.0 21.2 0.0 3 1 2
steep 1.1 22.5 0.1 3 1 2
0.9
lin 1.4 24.8 0.3 3 1 2
steep 69.3 74.3 69.1 87 4 83
50%
0.3
lin 2.4 52.0 0.0 4 2 2
steep 2.5 53.2 0.1 4 2 2
0.9
lin 3.4 57.7 0.9 4 2 2
steep 69.7 84.0 69.1 87 4 83
Table B.11: Effect of a shock that originates in the Eastern European countries.
There are a total of 4 banks from these countries. We simulate a sudden drop of
bank equity by 20% and by 50%. We show the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio
across the entire system (Loss Avg), the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio for banks
in Eastern Europe (Loss EE) as well as the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio for
banks in other than Eastern European countries (Loss Other). We also show the
number of banks failing the stress test by having their tier 1 capital ratio drop below
4.5 percent after 100 time steps for the entire system (D100 Total), for the Eastern
Europe (D100 EE) and for other than Eastern European countries (D100 Other).
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Origin
Shock
Size
QA P (x)
Loss
Avg
Loss
Benelux
Loss
Other
D100
Total
D100
Benelux
D100
Other
B
e
n
e
lu
x
20%
0.3
lin 2.2 21.8 0.6 2 0 2
steep 3.5 24.1 1.8 3 0 3
0.9
lin 10.1 31.4 8.3 3 0 3
steep 69.5 77.5 68.8 87 7 80
50%
0.3
lin 5.4 52.8 1.4 3 1 2
steep 7.8 55.3 3.8 6 3 3
0.9
lin 24.3 67.3 20.7 14 7 7
steep 70.1 85.9 68.8 87 7 80
Table B.12: Effect of a shock that originates in the Benelux countries. There
are a total of 7 banks from these countries. We simulate a sudden drop of bank
equity by 20% and by 50%. We show the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio across
the entire system (Loss Avg), the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio for banks in
Benelux countries (Loss Benelux) as well as the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio
for banks in other than Benelux countries (Loss Other). We also show the number
of banks failing the stress test by having their tier 1 capital ratio drop below 4.5
percent after 100 time steps for the entire system (D100 Total), for the Benelux
countries (D100 Benelux) and for other than Benelux countries (D100 Other).
Origin
Shock
Size
QA P (x)
Loss
Avg
Loss
Greece
Loss
Other
D100
Total
D100
Greece
D100
Other
G
re
e
ce
20%
0.3
lin 1.6 22.5 0.1 2 0 2
steep 2.0 25.3 0.3 2 0 2
0.9
lin 3.2 31.2 1.2 3 1 2
steep 69.4 75.0 69.0 88 6 82
50%
0.3
lin 3.8 53.8 0.2 5 3 2
steep 4.3 56.8 0.6 5 3 2
0.9
lin 7.6 67.1 3.4 8 5 3
steep 70.1 84.4 69.0 88 6 82
Table B.13: Effect of a shock that originates in Greece. There are a total of 6
banks in Greece. We simulate a sudden drop of bank equity by 20% and by 50%.
We show the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio across the entire system (Loss Avg),
the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio for banks in Greece (Loss Greece) as well as
the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio for banks in other than Greece (Loss Other).
We also show the number of banks failing the stress test by having their tier 1
capital ratio drop below 4.5 percent after 100 time steps for the entire system (D100
Total), for Greece (D100 Greece) and for other than Greece (D100 Other).
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Origin
Shock
Size
QA P (x)
Loss
Avg
Loss
Italy
Loss
Other
D100
Total
D100
Italy
D100
Other
It
a
ly
20%
0.3
lin 1.6 22.7 0.4 4 2 2
steep 2.7 26.0 1.4 4 2 2
0.9
lin 8.3 34.9 6.8 6 3 3
steep 69.4 72.9 69.2 87 5 82
50%
0.3
lin 4.0 54.2 1.1 7 5 2
steep 5.9 57.7 2.9 8 5 3
0.9
lin 20.9 71.7 18.0 10 5 5
steep 70.0 83.1 69.2 87 5 82
Table B.14: Effect of a shock that originates in Italy. There are a total of 6
banks in Italy. We simulate a sudden drop of bank equity by 20% and by 50%. We
show the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio across the entire system (Loss Avg),
the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio for banks in Italy (Loss Italy) as well as the
average loss in tier 1 capital ratio for banks in other than Italy (Loss Other). We
also show the number of banks failing the stress test by having their tier 1 capital
ratio drop below 4.5 percent after 100 time steps for the entire system (D100 Total),
for Italy (D100 Italy) and for other than Italy (D100 Other).
Origin
Shock
Size
QA P (x)
Loss
Avg
Loss
France
Loss
Other
D100
Total
D100
France
D100
Other
F
ra
n
ce
20%
0.3
lin 1.7 21.7 0.8 2 0 2
steep 3.4 24.1 2.4 3 0 3
0.9
lin 12.0 32.8 11.0 4 0 4
steep 69.3 74.5 69.1 87 4 83
50%
0.3
lin 4.2 52.6 1.9 6 4 2
steep 7.3 55.3 5.0 7 4 3
0.9
lin 28.3 68.6 26.4 12 4 8
steep 69.7 84.0 69.1 87 4 83
Table B.15: Effect of a shock that originates in France. There are a total of 4
banks in France. We simulate a sudden drop of bank equity by 20% and by 50%.
We show the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio across the entire system (Loss Avg),
the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio for banks in France (Loss France) as well as
the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio for banks in other than France (Loss Other).
We also show the number of banks failing the stress test by having their tier 1
capital ratio drop below 4.5 percent after 100 time steps for the entire system (D100
Total), for France (D100 France) and for other than France (D100 Other).
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Origin
Shock
Size
QA P (x)
Loss
Avg
Loss
Ger-
many
Loss
Other
D100
Total
D100
Ger-
many
D100
Other
G
e
rm
a
n
y
20%
0.3
lin 3.6 22.5 0.6 3 1 2
steep 5.3 25.8 2.1 3 1 2
0.9
lin 13.6 35.8 10.2 3 1 2
steep 69.9 75.2 69.0 87 11 76
50%
0.3
lin 8.6 53.9 1.6 8 6 2
steep 11.5 57.4 4.4 9 7 2
0.9
lin 31.8 72.8 25.5 18 11 7
steep 71.1 84.5 69.0 87 11 76
Table B.16: Effect of a shock that originates in Germany. There are a total of
12 banks in Germany. We simulate a sudden drop of bank equity by 20% and by
50%. We show the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio across the entire system (Loss
Avg), the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio for banks in Germany (Loss Germany)
as well as the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio for banks in other than Germany
(Loss Other). We also show the number of banks failing the stress test by having
their tier 1 capital ratio drop below 4.5 percent after 100 time steps for the entire
system (D100 Total), for Germany (D100 Germany) and for other than Germany
(D100 Other).
Origin
Shock
Size
QA P (x)
Loss
Avg
Loss
Spain
Loss
Other
D100
Total
D100
Spain
D100
Other
S
p
a
in
20%
0.3
lin 7.0 24.3 0.4 3 2 1
steep 9.3 30.0 1.4 7 6 1
0.9
lin 18.8 45.7 8.4 17 15 2
steep 70.7 75.4 68.9 87 24 63
50%
0.3
lin 16.4 56.7 0.9 21 20 1
steep 19.5 62.5 3.0 23 21 2
0.9
lin 37.4 80.2 21.0 29 24 5
steep 73.3 84 .6 68.9 88 25 63
Table B.17: Effect of a shock that originates in Spain. There are a total of 25
banks in Spain. We simulate a sudden drop of bank equity by 20% and by 50%.
We show the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio across the entire system (Loss Avg),
the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio for banks in Spain (Loss Spain) as well as the
average loss in tier 1 capital ratio for banks in other than Spain (Loss Other). We
also show the number of banks failing the stress test by having their tier 1 capital
ratio drop below 4.5 percent after 100 time steps for the entire system (D100 Total),
for Spain (D100 Spain) and for other than Spain (D100 Other).
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Appendix C
Supplementary Material to Chapter 5
C.1 Macroeconomic data used for analysis
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Country ISO
code
FX
symbol
Gov’t
bond
ETF
ticker
Timezone Classi-
fication
Australia AUS AUD AU EWA Pacific Comm.
Austria AUT EUR EZ EZU Europe Res.
Belgium BEL EUR EZ EZU Europe Res.
Canada CAN CAD CA EWC Americas Comm.
Cyprus CYP EUR EZ EZU Europe Res.
Estonia EST EUR EZ EZU Europe Res.
Finland FIN EUR EZ EZU Europe Res.
France FRA EUR EZ EZU Europe Res.
Germany DEU EUR EZ EZU Europe Res.
Greece GRC EUR EZ EZU Europe Res.
Ireland IRL EUR EZ EZU Europe Res.
Italy ITA EUR EZ EZU Europe Res.
Japan JPN JPY JP EWJ Asia Res.
Latvia LVA EUR EZ EZU Europe Res.
Lithuania LTU EUR EZ EZU Europe Res.
Luxembourg LUX EUR EZ EZU Europe Res.
Malta MLT EUR EZ EZU Europe Res.
Mexico MEX MXN MX EWW Americas —
Netherlands NLD EUR EZ EZU Europe Res.
New Zealand NZL NZD NZ ENZL Pacific —
Norway NOR NOK NO ENOR Europe Comm.
Portugal PRT EUR EZ EZU Europe Res.
Slovakia SVK EUR EZ EZU Europe Res.
Slovenia SVN EUR EZ EZU Europe Res.
South Africa ZAF ZAR ZA EZA Africa Comm.
Spain ESP EUR EZ EZU Europe Res.
Sweden SWE SEK SE EWD Europe —
Switzerland CHE CHF CH EWL Europe Res.
UK GBR GBP GB EWU Europe Res.
USA USA USD US SPY Americas Res.
Table C.1: Lookup table for the macroeconomic indicators of countries in our data
set and classifications into commodity (Comm.) or reserve (Res.) currency.
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